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 Decentralization of forest management aims to empower local communities.  
Intentions notwithstanding, decentralization is a historically-contingent process that 
does not necessarily result in synergistic state–community relationships.  
Decentralizing governance structures implies changes in power relationships, but an 
understanding of power and its dynamics in forest management situations is lacking.  
In addition, governance outcomes of decentralized forest management in a state–
community institutional configuration are unclear.  Understanding how instances of 
decentralized community-based forest management (CBFM) operate and how 
participants perceive the governance outcomes of this system is needed to improve 
governance structures and processes.  The case of CBFM in Madagascar is used to 
explore the power dynamics of decentralized governance of forests.  In Madagascar, 
the government has adopted a policy known as Contractual Forest Management to 
achieve community-based forest management.  Data collection took place in two 
phases.  To understand forest-related interests, I conducted semi-structured, open-
ended interviews of community members in eight villages in the Menabe region, state 
forest agents at the local and national level, and participating NGO staff from two 
NGOs at the local and national level in Menabe and Antananarivo, Madagascar 
(n=55).  I also conducted participant-observation and document review.  The second 
phase involved a quantitative survey of participants in 12 CBFM contracts in 
Madagascar (n=621).  Findings suggest that all three categories of actors (i.e., 
 community members, forest agency staff, and NGO employees) are generally satisfied 
with governance outcomes of CBFM, with forest agency staff the least satisfied.  
Overall, decentralization of forest management in Madagascar has had a more tangible 
effect on institutional-level relationships than on individual-level capacity to act.  It 
has not “empowered” local communities.  Rather, it begins to open a space in which 
individuals, located in various social positions, can act to transform pre-existing power 
relations. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 This dissertation describes research conducted to explore the relationship 
among government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and communities in 
forest management in Madagascar.  Specifically, I used an iterative process of inquiry 
that evolved as insights were gained to investigate social dimensions of decentralized 
forest governance.  This process of learning centered on two main aspects of state-
community relationships:  the structural/institutional and the sociopolitical/individual.  
In addition, the line of inquiry responded to a real-world problem related to 
decentralized forest governance. 
 This chapter describes the research problem, which is grounded in both the 
theoretical and the practical.  From a theoretical perspective, I have conducted inquiry 
to understand the workings of governance and decentralization.  Moves toward 
decentralized forms of governance necessarily imply changes in power dynamics, and 
therefore I began by developing an understanding of the workings of power in a 
natural resources management context.  Theoretical and empirical work, as well as my 
own experience working and living in Madagascar contributed to my reflection and 
learning about power and its role in state-community hybrid institutional 
arrangements.  An in-depth review of literature and application of understandings of 
power to natural resources management cases provided a basis from which to 
understand the results of my research and draw appropriate conclusions. 
 From a practical perspective, I have addressed the real issue of decentralized 
forest management, a phenomenon that is pervasive throughout the developing world.  
Decentralizing forest management responsibilities from the central state to locally-
based community groups involves developing policy, changing institutional 
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relationships, defining roles, and creating management systems.  It is a lengthy and 
costly process, and questions remain regarding its effectiveness in terms of its 
governance outcomes.  Thus, this research attempts to shed light on what 
decentralization means in terms of governance, both at the institutional and individual 
levels.  I have used a variety of methods to understand the outcomes of 
decentralization of forest management in Madagascar. 
 
Theoretical Background 
Governance of Common-Pool Resources 
Governance, like most powerful concepts, is extremely difficult to define.  One 
definition states that governance refers to the combination of “people, political 
institutions, regimes, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) at all levels of 
public and private policy making that are collectively responsible for managing world 
affairs” (Hempel 1996:5).   In this context, institutions are “complexes of norms and 
behaviors that persist over time by serving collectively valued purposes” (Uphoff 
1986:9).  Others have defined governance as “the interactions among structures, 
processes and traditions that determine how power and responsibilities are exercised, 
how decisions are taken, and how citizens or other stakeholders have their say” 
(Graham, Amos, and Plumptree 2003).  Thus, governance refers to the set of rules, 
structures, interactions, and processes that exist to shape how decisions are made.   
Traditionally, political science has addressed questions of governance related 
to public policy, economics has focused on private exchange governance via markets, 
and sociology has concentrated on governance by norms, social values, and 
community (Wolf 2004).  Natural resources cross these public/private/community 
divisions and are therefore the object of various forms of governance.  For instance, 
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national parks are often governed by the state, private forests are often governed by 
individuals or firms, and communal pastures are often governed by the community.   
In 1968, Garrett Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” painted a bleak picture 
of the future of the world’s common-pool resources.  The commons, he argued, were 
being over-exploited at an alarming rate and drastic action was needed to conserve the 
commons for future generations.  This argument has prompted decades of discussion 
and scholarship about management of common-pool resources. 
Common-pool resources (CPRs) are defined as resources for which “(1) it is 
costly to exclude individuals from using the good either through physical barriers or 
legal instruments and (2) the benefits consumed by one individual subtract from the 
benefits available to others” (Ostrom 2000:337).  This definition applies regardless of 
the property rights involved.  CPRs are composed of resource systems and the 
resource units that flow from those systems.  Examples of resource systems include 
forests, lakes, and grazing areas.  The resource units that flow from those systems 
include timber, fish, and cattle feed (Ostrom 2000).  CPRs are generally subject to one 
of four property-rights regimes: open access, individual property, government 
property, and common property (Ostrom et al. 1999; Steins and Edwards 1999).  
Under an open access form of governance, individuals are not restricted from using 
the resource.  The “rational” individual, Hardin (1968) argued, uses a resource until 
the expected benefits of his or her actions equal the expected costs.  Each individual 
ignores costs imposed on others.  Such individual behavior cumulates and inevitably 
leads to a tragic over-use of open-access commons.  An individual resource user has 
no incentive to self-impose restrictions on resource use or make improvements to the 
resource because of the fear that others may take advantage of his or her good will 
(i.e., free ride).  As a result, Hardin (1968) recommended that CPRs be governed 
either as government property or as private property.  Other scholars have since 
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illustrated the success of a third governance option, that of common property.  I briefly 
describe each of the three governance arrangements below. 
 
State-based approaches 
 In an attempt to avoid the tragedy of open-access commons, Hardin (1968) 
recommended either state-based policy enforcement or privatization of CPRs.  State-based 
resource conservation schemes involve ownership by a federal, regional, or local public 
agency that can forbid or allow use of a resource by individuals.  Protected areas are a 
typical example of state-driven conservation and management of CPRs.  In Northern 
countries, areas were set aside for particular scenic beauty or uniqueness (Pretty and Pimbert 
1995).  This model of conservation, known as the “fences and fines” approach, based on the 
U.S. national park model, was largely implemented during the colonial era in developing 
countries, and additional parks of this type were established in various parts of the world 
more recently in the 1980s and 1990s.  Under the fences and fines approach, local people 
were sometimes forced to move from the areas designated for protection, with no 
compensation or consideration for their economic and cultural well-being (Furze, De 
Lacy, and Birckhead 1996; Kiss 1990).  Naturally, local people came to view the 
existence of parks with disdain and chose not to cooperate with park authorities (Kiss 
1990).  Although effective in terms of biodiversity conservation, the success of parks 
and strict nature reserves vis-à-vis local resource-dependent people’s ability to pursue 
their livelihoods came into question in the 1990s.  Fortwangler (2003) describes negative 
social impacts of protected areas, including removals, fear and torture, and restricted access 
to resources.  For instance, in 1997, over 1,000 San were relocated from the Central 
Kalahari Game Reserve in Botswana to settlements on non-reserve land (Hitchcock 2002).  
In another example, local people who tried to resist forceful relocation from Rajive Gandhi 
National Park in India were beaten by armed officers (WRM 2000).  Finally, the Ts’Exa of 
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Botswana were blocked access to seasonal migrations of wildlife when Chobe National 
Park was created (Taylor 2002).  As a response, there has been a call for more participatory 
and decentralized forms of natural resources management and conservation that involve 
local people.   
  Although state-based approaches may result in compliance with strict legislation 
regarding natural resource governance, they can lead to the marginalization and 
disenfranchisement of certain groups and provide little incentive for individuals to act as 
stewards of resources they do not own.  In addition, hierarchical and bureaucratic state-
based arrangements are often rigid, resistant to innovation, and inefficient (Brechin, 
Wilshusen, and Benjamin 2003).   
 
Market-based approaches 
Hardin’s (1968) second recommendation was the privatization of CPRs.  Under a 
private-property regime, owners have full rights to the resource.  Individuals have the 
power to buy or sell a share of the resource (i.e., their private property).  They are able 
to enter the physical area of the resource, withdraw resource units, make improvements to 
the resource, determine who will have access and use rights, and sell or lease access and use 
rights to others (Ostrom 2000).  Such arrangements usually rely on market forces for 
driving individuals’ decisions regarding resource management.  For instance, a 
market-based approach to governance might provide incentives for resource owners to 
invest in improvements to the resource because owners are able to see a direct relationship 
between their investments and benefits they accrue.  The fear of free riders is minimized 
because resource owners have the rights of exclusion and alienation (Ostrom 2000).  Many 
economists consider private property to be the optimal property regime for economic 
development in part because it rests on the assumption that rational individuals will act in 
their own self-interest (Hardin 1968).   
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 Private property, however, poses a problem as far as conservation of CPRs is 
concerned.  The most economically beneficial use of a resource may not result in 
ecologically-sound management practices.  In addition, assigning property rights can be 
difficult and impractical.  If forests’ hydrological functions are damaged, the public suffers a 
loss.  Identifying the perpetrator and assigning a cost suffered by the public at large can be 
virtually impossible.   
 Although privatization may result in maximized benefits and efficiency of resource 
use as a result of increased participation and horizontal social structure for interaction, it can 
have negative consequences as well.  For instance, marked-based approaches often 
undermine conservation efforts of resources of ecological importance (e.g., threatened and 
endangered species), and concentrate control of the resource in the hands of elites (Streek 
and Schmitter 1985; Langholz 2003). 
 
Rules-based approaches 
 Under common-property, or rules-based approaches, individuals are subject to the 
rules established by a group.  “Some form of collective action between the individuals 
constituting the user community is essential, since a collective effort is required to 
manage access to the CPR and the allocation of the benefits it produces” (Steins and 
Edwards 1999:540).  The prediction that resource users are destined to destroy CPRs 
in an open-access arrangement is based on the assumption that all users are “selfish, 
norm-free, and maximizers of short-run results” (Ostrom et al. 1999:279).  However, 
empirical evidence does not support predictions based on this assumption (e.g., 
Ostrom 1998).  In most cases where individuals face a CPR problem, are able to 
communicate, and can make and enforce rules, reciprocity is used to overcome the 
problem (Ostrom et al. 1999).  Thus, this evidence leads to the conclusion that 
common-property regimes are a governance option for natural resources. 
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 Each of the above property regimes has its strengths and weaknesses (i.e., 
government property, private property, and common property).  Government property, 
or state-based conservation, is a centralized approach that relies upon expert 
knowledge to make decisions.  As such, it allows for broad changes to occur.  
However, this approach is often plagued by inefficiency and corruption, and does not 
account for contextual specificities.  Private property is a decentralized governance 
regime that allows individuals and groups to make decisions about the resources they 
own.  For public resources, property rights can be difficult to assign.  Finally, common 
property privileges local knowledge and encourages social interaction.  However, 
consensus building can be time-consuming, local people may not have access to 
information needed to make sound conservation decisions, and power asymmetries 
may exclude certain groups from participating.   
 In an attempt to maximize the benefits of each of the governance regimes and 
minimize their weaknesses, scholars and practitioners have called for synergistic 
relationships among hybrid institutional forms (Uphoff 1993; Agrawal and Gibson 
1999; Ostrom 2002; Evans 1996).  To achieve a blend of institutions for natural 
resource governance, governments and international conservation and development 
groups have solicited the participation of local people by decentralizing decision-
making processes and structures of authority (e.g., Nemarundwe 2004; Pandit and 
Thapa 2004).  State–civil society linkages have been sought to decentralize 
management from the central government (minimizing negative effects such as 
inefficiency) and involve local communities (maximizing effects of local contextual 
knowledge).  Although theoretically compelling, state–civil society hybrids are 
difficult to design and implement given real-world institutional complexities.  Efforts 
to decentralize natural resource governance in developing countries have often 
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involved not only the state and local communities, but third-party NGOs as well 
(Mohan 2002).  
 
Institutional Synergy  
 State–society “institutional synergy” has been described as a catalyst for 
development, where institutional synergy describes the set of mutually-reinforcing 
relationships between the state and civil society (Evans 1996).  It rests on the idea that 
“the existence of the state and the rules it establishes and enforces can strengthen and 
increase the efficiency of [local organizations and institutions, which in turn] give rise 
to collective action increasing the power of the state” (Nugent 1993:629).  The idea of 
state–society synergy emerged from the realization that the development paradigm 
being adopted by multilateral donors and banks relied almost exclusively on the 
market as the mechanism for development (Evans 1996).  However, renewed interest 
in the role of state bureaucracies, and social norms and networks1 has resulted in 
recent analysis related to how these two institutional forms come together in a 
positive-sum relationship.  Thus, the “idea of ‘synergy’ implies that civic engagement 
strengthens state institutions and effective state institutions create an environment in 
which civic engagement is more likely to thrive” (Evans 1996:1034).   
The question related to synergy in development contexts has been what forms 
of state–society relations lend themselves to synergy?  Two conceptualizations help 
frame the debate: complementarity (Lam 1996; Heller 1996) and embeddedness 
(Ostrom 1996; Fox 1996).  Complementarity suggests a division of labor between 
government and civil society based on their respective strengths (e.g., governments 
                                                 
1 Evans (1996) describes civil society in terms of Putnam’s (1993) social capital (the norms, trust, and 
social networks that characterize social interaction), but other authors have refrained from using this 
terminology regarding the characteristics or assets that define the non-state actors in synergistic 
relationships (e.g., Ostrom 1996; Lam 1996). 
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provide enforcement authority and civil society provides locale-specific knowledge).  
“Putting the two kinds of inputs together results in greater output than either public or 
private sectors could deliver on their own” (Evans 1996:1120).  Embeddedness refers 
not to the structural division of labor between government and communities, but rather 
to individual-level ties that span the public–private divide.  Embeddedness is the 
degree to which informal networks exist among public servants and local residents 
(Evans 1996).  Thus, the state and civil society are inseparably linked and need not be 
conceived as oppositional.  “The power of civil society and the capacity of state 
institutions can increase together, in a positive-sum interaction, or they may also 
decline together, in a negative-sum way, as when the state’s policymaking and 
administrative capacities stagnate along with civil society’s capacity for independent 
self-determined activity” (Keane 1988:61). 
 A partnership between the state and civil society may provide benefits beyond 
state-based or rules-based governance alone, but confounding factors exist that may 
complicate the state–civil society linkage.  Agrawal and Gibson caution scholars and 
practitioners alike not to lose sight of the real-world contextual complexities:  “We 
must recognize that state officials and community representatives are located within 
asymmetric organizational structures.  They enjoy access to very different levels of 
resources and power” (1999:639).  Similarly, Ribot asserts that it is not enough to join 
the state to community or to transfer power from the state to the community.  The 
mechanisms by which transfer of power occurs, and the institutional forms that are 
created for such purposes are of importance:  “Transferring power without accountable 
representation is dangerous.  Establishing accountable representation without powers 
is empty” (2002:2).  Striking a balance between the state and civil society can be 
difficult precisely because of these issues of inequality, representation, and 
accountability.  
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Although the notion of institutional synergy emerged in the context of 
development, it can be applied to the case of CPR management as well.  As 
governments have moved to decentralize natural resource management, they have 
often entered into partnerships with civil society regarding responsibility for and 
authority over resource-related decisions.  Moves to decentralize governance of 
natural resources necessarily imply rearranging institutional structures, redefining 
rules, reformulating relationships, and redistributing power.  In a development context, 
this process is highly complex as it involves actors acting at various geographic scales 
and the stakes are high.  This is especially true when decentralizing natural resources-
related decision making and management, as actors have strong ties to the land and 
deeply-vested interests in the control and use of resources (e.g., Peluso 1995; 
McDaniel 2003). 
 For the case of CPRs, decentralization and possibilities for institutional 
synergy are complicated by an unclear understanding of the social categories of civil 
society and community. 
 
Civil Society and Community  
The precise meaning and boundaries of civil society as a social construct are 
difficult to define.  Generally, civil society is understood as the social space between 
the state and the individual or family (Mohan 2002; Bratton 1994).  However, even 
within this broad understanding, many questions remain.  Mohan (2002) describes 
four schools of thought related to the nature of civil society.  The “associational 
school” sees “associational life keeping the state in check through scrutinizing its 
operations and inculcating in the citizenry a sense of political participation and 
tolerance” (Mohan 2002:127).  Thus understood, civil society is a space of self-
governing associations that protect citizens from an overbearing state.  The “regime 
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school” does not see associational life as automatically leading to better governance.  
Civil society  
“does not necessarily or straightforwardly democratize so [proponents of this 
school of thought] are more prescriptive in seeing a need for state reform and, 
therefore, examine the rules by which state-society relations might be altered 
to foster democracy” (Mohan 2002:127). 
The “neoliberal school” sees civil society as involving private economic interests – it 
is the space of private property rights.  Thus, good governance “initiatives are aimed at 
creating market-friendly political institutions” (Mohan 2002:127).  And finally, the 
“post-Marxist school” argues that the state simply reflects the needs of the bourgeoisie 
insofar as the state is captured by social elite.  Thus understood, the conceptual 
division between the state and civil society disappears and civil society is segmented 
along class lines.  Political life is a reflection of economic structures, but state reforms 
will only strengthen the position of the dominant.  Thus, the road to democracy is 
through some form of social movement (Mohan 2002).   
 Still others define civil society not in terms of what it is, but in terms of what it 
does.  Uphoff and Krishna argue that the institutions and organizations that perform 
civil society functions allow citizens to: “articulate their interests and make demands; 
defend their rights vis-à-vis the state and others; and meet their needs directly, without 
depending on state agencies” (2004:359). 
 These differences in understanding of the nature and function of civil society 
are amplified for the case of CPR governance.  Recent trends toward decentralization 
in developing countries have included decentralization of the forest and fisheries 
sectors, and implementation of state–society partnerships for CPR management and 
conservation.  Whether labeled joint management, community-based management, or 
co-management, these governance arrangements pair the state to a non-state entity 
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(often a user group or local association) for management of the natural resource in 
question (e.g., Prasad and Kant 2003; Gauld 2000; Antona et al. 2004; Carlsson and 
Berkes 2005).  However, the various manifestations of civil society (e.g., local 
resource users, local NGOs, international NGOs, churches, universities, etc.) are often 
neither deliberately and systematically considered nor called into question.  A local 
group (however constituted) is tied to the state by a contract or other partnership 
mechanism through which roles and responsibilities are divvied up (Li 2002; Wily 
1999).  The default position in CPR management contexts is to define civil society as 
“the community.”  However, this precision is still problematic in that the meaning of 
community remains an enigma.  The dialogue among community sociologists on the 
meaning of community illustrates some of the complexity of the concept. 
Community sociologists’ interpretations of what community is and how it 
functions sheds light on the difficulty of treating this social category as a static and 
homogenous entity.  Community sociologists are not unified in their understanding of 
community (e.g., Bell and Newby 1971).  The sociological traditions of human 
ecology, political economy, symbolism, and interactional sociology have each 
distinctly contributed to the understanding of community.  Macro, or structural, 
understandings such as those of human ecology and political economy take the 
population as the unit of analysis, view communities as whole systems, and focus 
largely on social, political, and economic institutions for explaining social 
organization and change.  Alternatively, symbolism and interactional sociology are 
micro perspectives that focus on the individual as the unit of analysis, rely on social-
psychological understandings, and emphasize the importance of culture and history in 
shaping social phenomena.   
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Macro perspectives – human ecology 
Human ecology is concerned with “the study of social organization,” primarily 
through examination of social structures (Stephan 1970:220).  It views the community 
as interconnected groups of individuals that rely on one another through division of 
labor and other forms of differentiation.  This “organic,” or highly-differentiated form 
of social organization was described by Emile Durkheim as a more evolved social 
form than “mechanical” organization, which is relatively homogenous and 
undifferentiated (As described in Schnore 1958).  Human ecology thus perceives 
society as having an identifiable morphology that evolves from more primitive to 
more sophisticated forms over time. Social differentiation, such as division of labor, 
results in a social structure that is identifiable.  Communities consist of families, 
churches, civic organizations, and firms that exist in dynamic equilibrium with one 
another (Warren 1978).  Although sub-groups within community may change, the 
overall structure of community remains stable as other sub-groups adapt to these 
changes.  Communities function to integrate society, and social change occurs as sub-
groups or sub-systems adapt to internal or external pressures.  Thus, coalitions of 
individuals constantly shift and adapt to maintain equilibrium in the community 
(Young 1999). 
 
Macro perspectives – political economy  
 Political economy, like human ecology, is a structural approach to 
understanding social organization.  Although political economy is similar to human 
ecology insofar as it views community as interconnected groups that are linked 
through differentiation, it differs in some fundamental ways.  Political economy 
stresses the role of capital flow and market forces in shaping community (both social 
and political structures).  According to Bratton (1994), Karl Marx and Friedrich 
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Engels describe community as rooted in the material conditions of life.  In The 
German Ideology (1932), Marx and Engels conceived community as “a set of 
commodity production and exchange institutions that tilted contractual relations in 
favor of capitalist entrepreneurs.  Its laws amounted to a sort of ‘unwritten 
constitution’ for managing the common affairs of the bourgeoisie” (Bratton 1994:54).  
Additionally, political economy interprets social change “in terms of the way societal 
processes and structures produce advantages for some groups and disadvantages for 
others” (Smith 1995:433).  Social inequalities persist because power elites form a 
permanent coalition to advance their interests and control activities in the community 
(e.g., Molotch 1976).  This permanent coalition, because of its position of power, is 
able to exercise ideological domination (Cohen 1999).  It “promotes ethical values 
among the populace through the exercise of ideological and cultural hegemony” 
(Bratton 1994:55).  Thus understood, the community reflects the interests and values 
of power elites.  Change occurs through political contestation as social movements 
emerge to combat the ideological hegemony deployed by the power elite. 
Both the human ecology and political economy perspectives view society as a 
whole, but then compartmentalize it into visible and analyzable categories.  Political 
economy, however, emphasizes the causes and outcomes of social inequalities, and 
human ecology largely ignores these dynamics.  Ecologists focus their attention on the 
mechanisms of adaptation that allow communities to hold together despite internal and 
external pressures and unanticipated changes.   
 
Micro perspectives – symbolism 
Symbolism is a theoretical tradition that views the community as a set of 
shared mental constructs (Cohen 1985) or mental maps (Hummon 1990) that bind 
individuals together.  Members of a community share certain meanings and 
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interpretations with one another, but more importantly, these meanings and 
interpretations are distinguishable from those of members of other communities.  
Thus, the idea of community is closely related to its boundary from other communities 
(Cohen 1985).   
Symbols are representations of things that both express their own meaning and 
allow individuals to create meaning from them (Cohen 1985).  Individuals who share 
similar (not necessarily the same) interpretations of symbols, make up community.  
This community, then, is bounded by some threshold for variance in interpretation of 
symbols held by the collectivity.  Community boundaries are therefore more 
interpretive than they are physical.  Community character – elements unique to a given 
community – is created through a process of “lash-up” that results when material and 
ideational elements converge through human agency (Molotch, Freudenberg, and 
Paulsen 2000).  The persistence of character over time is what Molotch et al. (2000) 
term tradition.  The interpretive and social nature of how character and tradition are 
formed point to boundaries that are symbolic, meaning-dependent, individual, and 
interpretive (Cohen 1985).  Thus, the idea of community from a symbolic perspective 
explicitly accounts for historical forces.  Individuals’ interpretations of symbols will 
be constrained and enabled by previous experiences they have with symbols, as well 
as their observation of others’ interpretations of symbols.  “‘Tradition’ stands in for 
how…character moves across time – how a mode of conjuncture at one point 
constrains or enables a particular mode of conjuncture at the next” (Molotch, 
Freudenberg, and Paulsen 2000:793).  
Thus understood, the function of community is to create culture and tradition 
as shared meanings of symbols that persist over time, and to define boundaries.  
Change occurs when disagreement over the meaning of symbols develops, the 
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threshold for variance in meaning is surpassed, and new boundaries emerge that result 
in new communities.   
 
Micro perspectives – interactional sociology 
Community as defined by an interactional perspective is dynamic and 
emergent.  An emergent field refers to the notion that “its character is not governed 
entirely by the collective properties of its parts, but is the outcome of the interaction of 
the parts and thus is novel” (Wilkinson 1970:314).  Communities consist of many 
networks of interaction, or fields, which emerge and retreat as time passes and the 
importance of issues ebbs and flows.  The community field, however, persists because 
it crosses the boundaries of specific interest-based fields that emerge in communities, 
draws on shared histories, norms, and kin, and ties them to the specific locality in 
question (Kaufman 1959; Wilkinson 1970).  Thus, the community field serves to 
regulate the self-seeking behavior of any particular interest field.   
The micro perspectives of symbolism and interactional sociology highlight 
some nuanced differences in understandings of community.  With a focus on the 
individual as the unit of analysis, symbolism provides insight into the cognitive 
aspects of how people are bound to one another, and interactional sociology highlights 
individual social interaction as the mechanism of establishing community.  
Symbolism, with its focus on individual-level interpretations of collectively-held 
symbols, suggests a mechanism for how culture is created and sustained over time 
(e.g., Swidler 1986).  This approach accounts for the historical and contextual 
specificity of community.   
Macro and micro understandings of community reflect competing views of 
group structure, function, and capacity for collective action.  Whereas the macro 
understandings focus on collectivities and social structures, the micro perspective 
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highlights the individual and his/her ability to act to affect change.  In an effort to 
reflect both the collective and individual aspects of community, I adopt the broad 
definition of community as a social aggregate characterized by communal 
relationships that serve general purposes.  Community differs from organizations that 
are characterized by relationships that serve specific purposes and are interest-driven 
(Selznick 1992; Bell and Newby 1971).  Social interaction creates and results in social 
structures, which constrain and enable possibilities for social interaction (Giddens 
1984).  Community, the result of bringing people together in an on-going process of 
interaction, also facilitates collective action (e.g., Baiocchi 2003; Parisi et al. 2002).   
The concepts of governance, institutional synergy, and community inform my 
exploration of governance outcomes when the state, communities, and NGOs are 
brought together in decentralized forest management. I use the case of community-
based forest management (CBFM) in Madagascar as the setting for inquiry. 
 
Research Justification 
 This research is justified on both practical and theoretical grounds.  From a 
practical perspective, increased understanding of the process and outcomes of 
decentralization of natural resources is needed given the mixed results of such 
initiatives.  Over 20 years of effort to decentralize natural resource governance has not 
provided a clear basis from which to design or implement decentralized governance 
arrangements.  Empirical studies have demonstrated that achieving success is difficult, 
and conditions for effective or successful decentralized systems have been theorized 
(e.g., Pagdee, Kim, and Daugherty 2006).  Given the real-world effort to decentralize 
governance, it is important to understand this process in terms of its institutional and 
sociopolitical results and impacts.  A greater understanding may inform new or 
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improved approaches to achieving effective governance structures that cross state—
community lines. 
 From a theoretical perspective, this study is justified because it contributes to 
the age-old debate related to social structures and individual agency.  As 
decentralization occurs, institutions may be created, dissolved, or transformed.  The 
structural-level relationships among institutions, classes, or other groups are affected.  
Governance outcomes of decentralization may be impacted by the structures that are 
established.  Yet, changes in structure necessarily imply changes in individuals’ 
relationships with one another.  Social categories are not mutually exclusive.  People 
operate within many social spheres and are members of social networks that are 
dynamic, socially and historically contingent, and that are socially constructed.  This 
study therefore attempts to contribute to an understanding of how social structures and 
individuals within them operate and adapt in a decentralized milieu.   
 
Research Problem 
The purpose of decentralization is to distribute decision-making and 
implementation powers more broadly throughout the state and civil society.  Re-
distribution of power is meant to enhance the ability of both parties to act as agents 
that affect substantive outcomes.  The rationale of decentralization is that it will 
minimize negative consequences and maximize benefits of strict state-based and rules-
based common-pool resource governance regimes.  However, decentralization is a 
historically-contingent process that does not necessarily result in synergistic state–
society relationships.  Decentralizing governance structures implies changes in power 
relationships, but an understanding of power and its dynamics in these situations is 
lacking.  In addition, governance outcomes of decentralized forest management in a 
given state–society institutional configuration are unclear.  Understanding how 
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instances of decentralized community-based forest management (CBFM) operate, and 
how participants perceive the governance outcomes of this system may shed light on 
how to improve governance structures and processes.  The thesis addressed is: State—
civil society relationships are infused with power.  Processes of decentralizing forest 
governance that create new institutional arrangements have an effect on (1) the 
capacity of government, NGO, and community actors to act, and (2) the governance 
outcomes of the new institutional arrangements. 
 
Operating Assumptions and Positions 
Several assumptions underlie the research presented in the following chapters.  
These assumptions influenced the methods and outcomes of the research, so I 
articulate them here. 
Researcher position:  As a researcher, I played a specific role in developing 
this study.  My background, education, experience, and personal convictions influence 
the way I understand the issue of decentralized forest management in Madagascar, the 
manner in which the inquiry was designed, the questions I asked, the methods I chose, 
and the conclusions I drew.  It is important that what is presented in this dissertation 
be understood as a product of my position as a researcher, which is historically, 
socially, culturally, and politically contingent (Schwandt 2000).   
Epistemology:  This research was conducted under the assumption that inquiry 
and analysis provide useful insights for future practice, but do not reveal the truth 
behind community-based forest governance in Madagascar.  Rather, analysis and 
inquiry allow for interpretation of events and experiences that can inform the 
improvement of future practice.  Inquiry and reflection also allow for increased 
understanding of concepts, categories, and ideas of which our reality is constructed.   
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Due to the iterative and grounded nature of this study, I assumed that 
information I gathered, my interpretation of that information, and the conclusions I 
drew reflected a reality that is knowable.  However, I also believe that ideas and 
understandings are politically conditional.  This is applicable to social concepts and 
constructions, but also to the material.  For instance, not only should the actual state of 
forests be understood materially as the outcome of political processes, but the way 
nature itself is understood is also political.  Ideas about nature are formed, shared, and 
applied in ways that are inherently political (Escobar 1999).   
Through this research process I have not fully reconciled my beliefs in both the 
“knowable reality” and the “socially- and politically-constructed reality.”  Rather, I 
have chosen methods of observation, reflection, and analysis that allow me to consider 
various aspects of how I can understand reality and the knowledge those various 
methods confer.   
Role of research:  The purpose of this research process was twofold.  First, I 
assume that the results of this inquiry can inform the practice of CBFM in 
Madagascar, and perhaps elsewhere as well.  The results presented here are a 
contribution to a body of knowledge and insight that existed before this study was 
undertaken and will continue to grow thereafter.   
Second, this study served in my own intellectual development.  Aside from the 
research results, the research process also contributed to my understanding of how I 
know the world and how my position influences my understanding of reality.  
Although not stated as an objective of this inquiry, this outcome is of great value and 
will inform my future endeavors. 
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Overview of Methods 
A variety of methods and an iterative process of moving between inductive and 
deductive reasoning were used to collect data.  Inductive reasoning allowed me to 
formulate questions and identify categories for analysis based on direct observation 
and open-ended inquiry.  Deductive reasoning involved evaluation of previously-
identified categories and their relationship to one another.  A combination of 
qualitative and quantitative methods was used.  The use of qualitative inquiry provided 
a nuanced understanding that informed the development of a quantitative survey 
instrument.  Understanding the nuanced research context facilitates the interpretation 
of quantitative research results (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998).  In seeking to 
understand the practice of community-based forest management, and due to time and 
resource limitations, I deliberately selected regions in Madagascar to examine.   Thus, 
care should be taken in assessing contextual similarities and differences when 
applying the results of this study to other cases.  In addition, this inquiry focuses on 
the institutional and socio-political aspects of decentralized forest governance, and 
does not attempt to draw conclusions regarding biological or ecological parameters 
related to forests. 
This research relied upon a variety of methods in two phases, one focused on 
gathering information regarding forest-related interests held by government, NGO, 
and community respondents, and the other focused on assessing governance outcomes 
of the community-based forest management contract mechanism implemented in 
Madagascar.  To understand forest-related interests held by government employees, 
NGO staff, and community members, I conducted semi-structured, open-ended 
interviews (LeCompte and Preissle 1993; Seidman 1998) of community members in 
eight villages in the Menabe region, state forest agents at the local and national level, 
and participating NGO staff from two NGOs at the local and national level in Menabe 
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and Antananarivo, Madagascar (Appendix D).  Semi-structured interviews are 
appropriate in predetermined, formal field settings when the purpose is 
phenomenological (Denzin and Lincoln 2000).  Individuals were sampled using a 
snowball sampling methodology (LeCompte and Preissle 1993; Miles and Huberman 
1994) to ensure subjects with knowledge and experience in the CBFM process were 
included in the study.  The sample reached saturation when redundancy occurred in 
individuals identified.   
Interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes, and were conducted in-person in 
the local language.  No translator was used because I am proficient in the local 
language and wanted to avoid any misunderstandings with additional layers of data 
manipulation.  In addition, I conducted participant-observation (Miles and Huberman 
1994; LeCompte and Preissle 1993) by attending workshops, participating in CBFM-
related discussions and field trips, and accompanying forest users to collect forest 
products.  I also conducted document review to triangulate results among the three 
data collection methods (Miles and Huberman 1994).  Data collection occurred over 
the three-month period from June to August 2004.  Interview questions focused on 
experiences to date with CBFM, expectations for CBFM, interests related to CBFM, 
perceived problems regarding CBFM implementation, and future expectations.   
This exploratory phase identified forest-related interests held by community 
members, forest agency staff, and NGOs.  These interests were coded and categorized, 
and governance emerged as an area needing further study (see Chapter 5).  This 
finding is important given that CBFM is itself an institutional structure designed to 
improve governance through decentralization.  Thus, the second phase of inquiry (see 
Chapter 6), employed a quantitative survey to focus on governance outcomes of 
CBFM in Madagascar (Appendices E, F, G).   
 23
For the quantitative survey, the population of CBFM contracts in Madagascar 
(n≈350) was divided into sampling strata (Trochim 2001) to ensure variability in 
CBFM contract types represented in the sample, and also to facilitate data collection at 
the field level.  Strata were identified based on two criteria: (1) objective of the CBFM 
contract and (2) forest type.  In general, CBFM contracts in Madagascar have one of 
two objectives: conservation or sustainable use.  Conservation-oriented contracts are 
often facilitated by conservation organizations and are put into place as a mechanism 
of decentralized forest governance whereby local communities have the primary 
responsibility for ensuring long-term conservation of the forests they manage.  
Conversely, development-oriented CBFM contracts are set up to encourage 
sustainable use of forest resources (both timber and non-timber).  Additionally, CBFM 
contracts occur throughout Madagascar, in a variety of forest ecosystems.  For the 
purposes of this study, three broad categories of forests have been identified: natural 
humid forests, natural dry forests, and Tapia forest2.  The CBFM mechanism is a 
standardized tool that was designed for application throughout Madagascar in a variety 
of forest types, and therefore differences among forest types is not expected.  Yet, 
including various forest types and comparing results across them is important for 
assessing its universal applicability.  To ensure diversity in the types of CBFM 
contracts included in the study, sample contracts were selected to reflect combinations 
of the two strata identified. Two CBFM contracts were selected for each of the six 
combinations of the two strata.  Table 6.2 illustrates the strata and sampling frame for 
the CBFM contracts.   
                                                 
2 Tapia forest – An endemic forest of Madagascar dominated by the Tapia tree (Uapaca bojeri). These 
woodlands or wooded savannas grow in several zones scattered across the western highlands, and have 
long been seen as remnants of previously grander and more diverse forests, degraded into their current 
shape by frequent burning (Kull 2000). 
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For each of the 12 contracts sampled, three categories of actors exist:  
community members, government employees, and NGO staff.  A systematic sample 
(Trochim 2001) of community members was taken for each contract.  However, given 
the disproportionately small number of government employees and NGO staff 
involved in each contract, a census of these groups was taken.  For NGO staff, 
individuals both at the national and local levels from the NGOs involved in CBFM at 
the selected sites were included.  For government employees, no national-level staff 
were included because no one at the Ministry of Environment, Water, and Forests self-
identified has having primary responsibility for CBFM contracts.  At the local level, 
relevant employees of the mayor’s offices and regional offices of the Ministry of 
Environment, Water and Forests were included. 
Permission to conduct research in Madagascar was granted by the Department 
of Water and Forests in the Ministry of Environment, Water, and Forests in 
Antananarivo, Madagascar (Appendix A).  In addition, the methods and instrument 
used in this research were approved by the appropriate institutional human subjects’ 
committees for the duration of the research project (Appendix B).  My protocol 
included communicating risks to participants and maintaining confidentiality.    
Although the results of this research are not generalizable to all cases, 
understandings from this inquiry may be transferable to other contexts.  “Transferring 
knowledge from one context to another relies on understanding the contextual factors 
in the situation where the inquiry took place, judging the new context where the 
knowledge is supposed to be applied, and making a critical assessment of whether the 
two contexts have sufficient processes in common to make it worthwhile to link them” 
(Greenwood and Levin 1998:79).  To facilitate this assessment, I have attempted to 
provide sufficient description of the CBFM context and process as applied in 
Madagascar.  Results of this inquiry are trustworthy insofar as a variety of methods 
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were used that provide a reasonable basis for interpretation and conclusions.  Three 
types of qualitative methods were used to allow for triangulation (Miles and 
Huberman 1994) as well as a quantitative survey method.  The totality of this 
methodology is a robust approach to collecting data and providing trustworthy results. 
 
Organization of Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized into seven chapters, beginning with this 
introductory chapter.  Chapters Two through Six, which make up the body of the 
dissertation, are written as independent manuscripts suitable to be submitted for 
publication in peer-reviewed journals; thus, minor redundancy occurs between 
chapters.  The final chapter includes some synthesis of the previous five chapters and 
concluding thoughts. 
 Chapter One, this introduction, presents justification for the research and 
outlines the research purpose.  It describes operating assumptions of the inquiry, gives 
an overview of methods used, and discusses the trustworthiness of research results. 
 Chapter Two is in the form of a theoretical research paper titled “Power in 
Natural Resources Management: An Application of Theory.”  It explores various 
understandings of power as developed in the disciplines of critical theory, adult 
education, and development sociology, and then illustrates these conceptions of power 
with examples from the field of natural resources.  This chapter, although not data-
based, contributes new understanding to the field of natural resources and informs 
conclusions drawn in Chapter Seven. 
 Chapter Three, “Possibilities for Institutional Synergy for Good Governance of 
Natural Resources,” is an analysis of literature on governance of natural resources. It 
synthesizes theoretical and empirical work on governance, and specifically identifies 
eleven key elements of good governance.  This chapter is an original contribution in 
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the way these elements have been combined and presented to represent good 
governance of natural resources. 
 Chapter Four, which situates the research, is titled “Forest Management in 
Madagascar: An Historical Overview.”  It outlines the chronology of forest 
management in Madagascar explains how decentralized forest management came to 
be.  The history of forest management in Madagascar is critically examined with 
respect to the assumptions about the role of government and the governed, as well as 
the dominant narrative that drove policy. 
 Chapter Five, “A Multi-Sector Framework for Assessing Community-based 
Forest Management: Lessons from Madagascar,” assesses the responsiveness of 
CBFM to stakeholder needs, and proposes an analytical framework for conducting 
such an assessment.  Specifically, this chapter relates the results of qualitative data 
analysis related to the following research objectives:  (1) identify interests related to 
forest management held by the state, the community, and NGO representatives, (2) 
apply the People, Nature, Wealth, and Power framework as a lens for classifying these 
interests, and (3) conduct an initial assessment of the extent to which the CBFM 
mechanism responds to various interests held by multiple actors.  This assessment 
indicated that governance is a key aspect of CBFM in Madagascar that requires 
additional inquiry. 
 Based on the findings in Chapter Five, Chapter Six is a research paper that 
further explores governance in CBFM in Madagascar.  Titled “Governance Outcomes 
of Community-based Forest Management in Madagascar,” this chapter uses 
quantitative data to answer the following research questions: (1) What are the 
governance outcomes of CBFM? (2) What are the relationships among eleven 
governance principles in the context of CBFM? And (3) To what extent do the eleven 
governance principles explain or account for good governance? 
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 Chapter Seven synthesizes and summarizes the results of this inquiry, as well 
as draws conclusions from the dissertation as a whole.  It identifies additional areas of 
research needed to assess the efficacy of designing intervention strategies based on the 
results of this research.  Chapter Seven also describes the significance of the research 
and its contributions and implications for methods, theory, practice, and policy. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
POWER IN NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT:  AN APPLICATION OF 
THEORY  
 
Abstract 
Processes of decentralization characterize much of the developing world’s 
natural resource sectors (e.g., forestry, fisheries).  Efforts to decentralize rest on the 
assumption that bureaucratic efficiency, procedural equity among administrative levels 
of government, increased service provision, citizen participation and democratization, 
and maintenance of national cohesion and political stability will result.  At the heart of 
decentralization processes lies the question of power, given that most decentralization 
efforts involve some transfer of authority from a central agency to downwardly-
accountable, decentralized groups, or claim to “empower” local-level actors.  These 
processes also often involve organizations such as the state, NGOs, and local 
communities, who may have divergent or conflicting interests.  The question thus 
arises, how is power reflected in various approaches to natural resources conservation 
and management?  In this paper, I trace some theoretical understandings of the 
concept of power from disciplines such as critical theory, adult education, and 
development sociology.  I then illustrate these conceptions of power with various 
examples from the field of natural resources.  My purpose is to shed light on how 
power can be understood with the aim informing more deliberate, and perhaps more 
democratic professional practice. 
 
Introduction 
Moves to decentralize governance of natural resources necessarily imply 
rearranging institutional structures, redefining rules, reformulating relationships, and 
 35
redistributing power. In a development context, this process is complex as it involves 
actors at various geographic scales.  Typically, the stakes are high when decentralizing 
decision making and management of natural resources, as actors have strong ties to the 
land and deeply-vested interests in the control and use of resources (e.g., Peluso 1995; 
McDaniel 2003). 
As academics and practitioners in the field of conservation have noted, natural 
resource management is inherently political (Dryzek 1997; Brechin et al. 2003; 
Botchway 2001; Bryant 1998).  The field is suffused with issues of access, control, 
rights, ownership, and use – issues of power.  As Harvey (1993:25) observes: 
…all ecological projects (and arguments) are simultaneously political-
economic projects (and arguments) and vice versa.  Ecological arguments are 
never socially neutral any more than socio-political arguments are ecologically 
neutral.  Looking more closely at the way ecology and politics interrelate then 
becomes imperative if we are to get a better handle on how to approach 
environmental/ecological questions. 
Politics – the practices of individuals as they negotiate power relations – and 
power itself are sociological constructs. “Questions of access to, exercise of, and limits 
on power are quintessentially the subject of political contestation” (Winter 1996:729).   
The concept of power emerges as important for understanding the processes 
and structures associated with decentralization of natural resource governance.  
However, despite some recognition at an abstract level of the centrality of power for 
the practice of natural resources conservation and management, little theoretical or 
empirical attention has been paid to exploring the workings of power in the field.  
Previous studies have focused on decentralization of natural resources management at 
the structural level, using states, municipalities, and communities as the units of 
analysis (e.g., Ribot 2002; Bratton 1990; McConnell and Sweeney 2005).  These 
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studies do not explore the power-related assumptions that underlie the analyses.  
Decentralization implies changing power structures yet much of scholarly and 
practical work accepts the idea of power as inherently understandable, needing no 
explanation, discussion, or reflection.  For instance, the practice of planning natural 
resources management programs or decentralizing natural resources management is 
often presented as comprising a series of discrete steps that are to be implemented 
procedurally (e.g., Crowe 1983; Gutierrez et al. 2005; Lane 1990; Eaux et Forêts et al. 
2002).  These prescriptions are expected to work for any context unproblematically as 
if natural resources management occurs in a social vacuum (Raik and Wilson 2006).  
In the real world, natural resources management and especially decentralization of 
such management, is problematic because it occurs within complex and dynamic 
social, historical, cultural and political conditions.  A need exists for research, 
scholarship, and practical reflection on how power is exercised during the practice of 
natural resources management and what this implies for professional practice. 
The field of natural resources management and conservation is dominated by a 
highly technocratic outlook, which is not surprising given the biological and 
ecological nature of much of the work.  Manipulating fish stocks, establishing 
silvicultural rotations, and monitoring populations of endangered species are all 
technical activities that require a high level of expertise.  However, these activities fall 
within the broader set of practices that make up natural resources management: 
negotiation, discussion, persuasion, communication, and decision making, to name a 
few (Brechin et al. 2003; Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000).  While much technical 
knowledge of natural systems is applied to practice in supposedly neutral, 
disinterested ways, much professional practice operates – sometimes intentionally, 
sometimes unintentionally – to exclude, dominate, marginalize, or otherwise 
disadvantage some groups (Raik and Wilson 2006).  
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The construct of power is the subject of decades of theoretical social debate, 
and does not lend itself to simplistic definitions (Clegg 1989; Wartenberg 1990; 
Winter 1996).  In this paper, I explore how power works in the field of natural 
resources.  I agree with Brookfield (1995:9) who reminds us that “when we become 
aware of the pervasiveness of power, we start to notice the oppressive dimensions to 
practices that we had thought were neutral or even benevolent.”  Specifically, I ask 
three main questions:  How is power understood?  How are various understandings of 
power reflected in natural resources conservation and management? What can these 
examples teach us about how to improve natural resource management practice?  
Given the breadth and depth of scholarly thought on the concept of power, I do not 
presume to provide a comprehensive treatment in this paper.  Instead, I provide a brief 
summary of four understandings of the concept of power and illustrate these with 
cases of natural resources conservation and management from the literature (Table 
2.1).   
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Agent-Centered View 
Power as Coercion 
Most discussions of power in the field of natural resources are limited to a 
simplistic understanding of power as something that some have and others do not.  
This view focuses on coercion and is often limited to descriptions of one person’s 
power over another.  Power as coercion is often referred to as the “first dimension,” or 
face, of power (Lukes 2005).  In simple terms, it can be understood as: “A has power 
over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” 
(Dahl 1957:88).  Power is that force whereby social agents alter the behavior of other 
social agents.  Thus, one concept of power is an empirical relation of cause and effect 
that can be observed and measured empirically (Isaac 1987).  Such an understanding 
of power is rooted in behaviorism, having as a central tenet to “treat social explanation 
as no different in principle from the explanation of non-social phenomena” (Clegg 
1989:10).  The exercise and effects of power are therefore observable, and studying 
power involves examining social agents in decision-making.   
 Many discussions of power in natural resources are limited to this 
understanding of power as coercion, mainly because of negative consequences related 
to the creation of protected areas.  Protected areas are a typical example of state-based 
conservation insofar as they are often created and managed by governments.  In 
Northern countries, areas were set aside for particular scenic beauty or uniqueness 
(Pretty and Pimbert 1995).  This model of conservation, known as the “fences and 
fines” approach, based on the U.S. national park model, was largely implemented 
during the colonial era in developing countries, and additional parks of this type were 
established in various parts of the world more recently in the 1980s and 1990s.  Under 
the fences and fines approach, local people were sometimes forced to move from the 
areas designated for protection, with no compensation or consideration for their 
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economic and cultural well-being (Furze, De Lacy, and Birckhead 1996; Kiss 1990).  
Naturally, local people came to view the existence of parks with disdain and chose not 
to cooperate with park authorities (Kiss 1990).  Although effective in terms of 
biodiversity conservation, the success of parks and strict nature reserves vis-à-vis local 
resource-dependent people’s ability to pursue their livelihoods came into question in 
the 1990s.  Fortwangler (2003) describes negative social impacts of protected areas, 
including forced removals, fear and torture, and restricted access to resources.  For 
instance, in 1997, over 1,000 San were forced to relocate from the Central Kalahari 
Game Reserve in Botswana to settlements on non-reserve land (Hitchcock 2002).  In 
another example, local people who tried to resist forceful relocation from Rajive 
Gandhi National Park in India were beaten by armed officers (WRM 2000).  These 
examples of natural resources conservation reflect an idea of power as coercion that 
sometimes resulted in negative social impacts as people were forced to behave in a 
manner contrary to their wishes.  
 
Power as Constraint 
Bachrach and Baratz (1970) introduced the “second dimension” of power.  In 
addition to the “first face” of power that is manifested through coercion and influence 
of behavior, a “second face” exists when power is exercised by A to constrain the 
actions or possible actions of B: 
Power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing 
social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the 
political process to public consideration of only those issues which are 
comparatively innocuous to A.  To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B 
is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that 
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might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A’s set of preferences 
(Bachrach and Baratz 1970:7). 
The argument that A can act to constrain the actions of B rests on idea of 
“mobilization of bias:” 
All forms of political organization have a bias in favour of the exploitation of 
some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others, because organization is 
the mobilization of bias.  Some issues are organized into politics while others 
are organized out (Schattschneider 1960:71). 
Power is not merely a matter of control over active decision making, but is also 
exercised to ensure inaction on issues.  Bias can be organized by those in power to 
exclude issues from the agenda.  Analysis of power therefore requires examining both 
decision making and nondecision making, where a nondecision is “a decision that 
results in suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the values or 
interests of the decision-maker” (Bachrach and Baratz 1970:44).  This view recognizes 
that some institutional procedures systematically organize bias to skew the process to 
benefit the interests of one group over another. 
 The idea of power as constraint is also reflected in certain instances of natural 
resources management.  One example is that of the discourse around suburban deer 
management in the eastern United States.  Suburban deer often cause conflicts among 
local people as some enjoy viewing deer and feeding deer, while others suffer negative 
consequences from deer such as deer-vehicle accidents and plant or crop damage 
(Raik, Decker, and Siemer 2003; Raik, Siemer, and Decker 2005).  Wildlife agency 
staff are often asked to make recommendations to local governments and community 
associations about how to address negative deer-related impacts.  Raik and Wilson 
(2006) describe a case in which the realm of possible deer management actions was 
limited by the interests and position of the deer manager.  They argue that “the deer 
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manager’s explicit interest in reducing the deer population drove the position he took 
in negotiating the terms of the deer management plan.  The deer manager organized 
attention around the issue of deer population reduction, and steered it away from deer-
vehicle accident reduction” (Raik and Wilson 2006:331).  This example illustrates 
power as constraint in action.  The deer manager effectively constrained the possible 
actions of the local government regarding deer management. 
 Both agent-centered views (i.e., power as coercion and power as constraint) are 
too limiting to be useful for understanding the dynamic and pervasive nature of power.  
They view the individual as possessor of power and say nothing about the social 
conditions in which individuals exist.  In one instance, an individual or group holds 
the power to manipulate others’ behavior.  In the other instance, an individual or group 
holds the power to exclude items from the agenda deliberately.  Questions arise such 
as how are government agents able to exert power over local residents?  Does their 
social position affect their practices or their exercise of power (e.g., authority)?  The 
agent-centered view is not only unable to answer these questions, it does not ask them.  
It focuses solely on the agent and ignores the effects of structured social relations on 
power dynamics. 
 
Structural View 
Power as Consent Production 
A “third dimension” of power arises from the critique that the first and second 
faces do not adequately account for social-structural processes that shape human 
relations and interests.  The structural view understands power as forces above and 
external to the individual (e.g., race, gender, class) that operate unacknowledged to 
influence people and their behavior.  Power no longer resides within individuals, it 
emanates from structural forces (Clegg 1989).  This understanding asserts that “A 
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exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests” 
(Lukes 2005:37).  Individuals exercise power over others because of their position in 
social structure.  The distinguishing trait of this definition – and of the third dimension 
of power – is the distinction between preferences (i.e., subjective interests that can be 
articulated by agents) and interests (i.e., objective interests that are not articulated) 
(Winter 1996). 
Indeed, is not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have 
the desires you want them to have – that is, to secure their compliance by 
controlling their thoughts and desires? (Lukes 2005:27). 
The notion of interests is central to the third dimension of power. 
 Lukes (2005) agrees that power is a causal concept for understanding 
behavioral regularities (e.g., A always gets what A wants despite B’s preferences).  He 
also agrees that A has power over B when A’s behavior causes B to do something B 
would not otherwise do:  “any attribution of the exercise of power…always implies a 
relevant counterfactual” (Lukes 2005:43-44).  This line of logic begs the question, 
what would B otherwise do?  What would B have done had it not been for A’s power?  
This question is addressed by the concept of objective interests: “true” interests that 
may go unarticulated and unrecognized by the individual, but are shaped through 
social-structural processes (Lukes 2005). 
 The third dimension of power is therefore the social-structural production of 
consent and norms.  The status quo is maintained not through the actions of 
individuals but through the practices and rituals of groups and institutions.  Societal 
forces shape individual preferences and this shaping process works to justify and 
maintain current systems of power.  Societal control is exerted as individuals “only 
strive for those things that the ‘defenders of status quo’ want them to strive for, thus 
there is no conflict or rebellion” (Braynion 2004:455).  The idea that people come to 
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agree with the interests of dominating groups without questioning them or even 
recognizing an alternative has spurred work on notions of hegemony and 
conscientization (Freire 1970). 
 The third dimension of power goes beyond the observable essences of power 
as coercion and constraint in that it accounts for social structural practices, which 
shape how interests themselves are defined.  Conflict is not necessarily a correlate to 
the exercise of power but the threat of coercive power always lies behind the 
production of consent.  As Lukes (2005:27) notes, “…the most effective and insidious 
use of power is to prevent…conflict from arising in the first place.”   
 The structural interpretation of power is present in the practice of natural 
resources management.  Much of the justification for encouraging local participation 
in management of natural resources stems from the idea that local people are 
disadvantaged based on their social position.  Social stratifications are such that 
government officials and NGO staff are more “powerful” than local, resource-
dependent people.  However, studies have shown that attempts to implement 
participatory approaches to natural resources management can reproduce, and even 
aggravate pre-existing social hierarchies both within a community and between local 
people and external actors (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Agrawal and Gibson 1999).  For 
example, in decentralizing forest management many donors, governments, and NGOs 
support the transfer of management from the forest agency to a local forest-user 
association created for this purpose (e.g., Eaux et Forêts et al. 2002; Randrianasolo 
2000).  Externally-motivated social structures may result in institutionalizing power 
asymmetries. 
For instance, a study conducted by Schafer and Bell (2002) on human-wildlife 
conflicts in Mozambique reveals that despite not having official authority with which 
to make decisions and implement actions related to their resource needs, certain 
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factions of the local community were able to manipulate the situation to advance their 
interests.  Conflict between the state and the local community regarding crop damage 
by wild elephants revealed that neither the state nor the community represented a 
homogenous set of interests or desires related to management.  Within the state natural 
resource agency, some individuals were willing to respond to community requests to 
kill the elephants, while others were not.  Within the community, the traditional 
authority sided with conservationists and donors because he viewed the affected 
farmers as squatters on his traditional land (Schafer and Bell 2002).  Thus, in this case, 
power structures were reproduced as individuals and groups maneuvered to take 
control of resource management.  The contested nature of resource-governing rules 
enabled different groups to jockey for a position of power and challenge pre-existing 
structured power relations. 
Structural views of power that focus solely on social structures and ignore 
individually exercised power are limited in their ability to account for agency.  They 
assume that the social system creates a “false consciousness” among the dominated 
whereby they believe and behave contrary to their “true” interests.  One shortcoming 
of this view is that this false consciousness is not equally applied to all individuals.  
For instance, Lukes (2005:38) asserts that “…people’s wants may themselves be a 
product of a system which works against their interests….”  Thus, people undergo a 
process of social construction whereby they (the subordinated) not only act in ways 
contrary to their interests, but they do not even perceive their objective interests.  The 
subordinated are blinded into accepting “their role in the existing order of things” 
(Lukes 2005:28).  Yet, the dominant have somehow escaped these very processes of 
social construction and have achieved a degree of autonomy such that they are able to 
identify their objective interests and act accordingly (Isaac 1987). 
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Realist View 
The realist view is based on identifying enduring structural preconditions that 
shape contingent human interaction.  This view provides a relationship between 
individual agency and social structure from which to understand the workings of 
power and conduct analyses.  Although the agency-structure relationship is 
fundamental to understanding power, this relationship is not necessarily a reified 
dualism between agency and structure (Giddens 1984).  Social structures both 
constrain and enable human agency, and they are produced by human agency 
simultaneously.  The exercise of power is contingent upon social structures but not 
determined by them because social structures are enduring but not immutable (Isaac 
1987).   That is, “actors are involved in the continuous reproduction of structural 
properties through systematic practices.  In turn, structural properties influence 
individual behavior and are beyond the direct influence or cognition of individual 
actors” (Fogarty and Ravenscroft 2000:417).  Power structures enable and constrain 
human agency (Haugaard 2002; Digeser 2002) just as the exercise of power by agents 
produces and reproduces power structures (Winter 1996; Isaac 1987).   Power is thus 
the capacity to act within preconditioned, structured social relations.   
Little evidence of the realist view exists in scholarship related to natural 
resources management practice.  A brief analysis suggests that this view may be useful 
for understanding how practitioners act within the social structures and relations to 
which they belong:  The natural resources manager, for instance, accomplishes tasks 
by way of his/her participation in manager-donor, manager-forest user, and collegial 
relationships.  These relationships are structured, but the manager has the capacity to 
act within them.  As the manager interacts with the donor, s/he responds to agendas 
and objectives that have been identified and reports on activities that respond to these 
objectives.  The manager is constrained by the donor’s position of authority, but can 
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act authoritatively on technical matters.  As the manager interacts with the forest user, 
s/he orients discussion and decision making, implements activities, and monitors 
progress according to given objectives.  The manager is constrained by his position of 
authority linked to his technical knowledge, but can act to democratize processes in 
which forest users participate.   The manager’s possible range of actions is limited by 
thresholds set by his/her position and authority in structured social relations.   
The realist view makes the exercise of power visible by highlighting the 
importance of social relationships for structuring interaction.  “Rather than A getting B 
to do something B would not otherwise do, social relations of power typically involve 
both A and B doing what they ordinarily do” (Isaac 1987:96).  For instance, a 
manager may behave in a variety of ways within the confines of the structured 
manager-forest user relationship to which s/he belongs.  Managers typically apply 
specialized knowledge to make decisions regarding natural resource conservation and 
management in collaboration with a variety of stakeholders.  However, social structure 
does not pre-determine the manager’s actions.  S/he can exercise power to shape 
projects and programs so that they are more or less inclusive, diverse, or democratic.  
It is this ability to maneuver and make choices within structured social relations that 
differentiates the realist view from other views of power.  By understanding social 
structures as pre-existing the agent, the realist view enables us to imagine how the 
manager might transform these structures, either for positive or negative outcomes. 
 
Conclusion 
 Decentralization of natural resource management and conservation involves 
transfer of responsibilities and authority from a central body to more decentralized 
structures (Ribot 2002, 2003).  This transfer can take many forms and may include 
transfers of specific authorities such as law enforcement, rule creation, management, 
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and monitoring.  In the hopes of resulting in some increased level of social equity, 
empowerment, and democratization, mechanisms for implementing decentralization of 
natural resources management often include some form of popular participation.  
These efforts to neutralize power among actors are pervasive in the field, and have 
been the subject of much scholarly and practical reflection.  However, little rigorous, 
analytical thought has been given to the meaning of power in these contexts and its 
implication for how natural resources management practice occurs.   
In this paper, I contend that the realist view of power as the socially-structured 
capacity to act may be useful for understanding and improving the practice of natural 
resources management and conservation, especially in cases of decentralization.  
Natural resources practitioners operate within established social structures such as 
universities, governments, organizations, and cultures.  Their actions, however, are not 
pre-determined by their participation in particular social practices and relatively 
enduring social relations.  As they interact and participate in social relations, they are 
constantly negotiating intricate webs of power, and either transforming or reproducing 
them.  Beginning to see and understand power and its role in natural resources 
management may lead to insights as to how natural resource practitioners can be 
strategic about how they act and consciously take steps to democratize and equalize 
asymmetrical power relations. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
POSSIBILITIES FOR INSTITUTIONAL SYNERGY FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE 
OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
 
Abstract 
 This paper reviews literature relevant to governance of natural resources.  It 
argues that in view of the emphasis placed on issues such as access, control, and use of 
renewable natural resources by donor, NGO, and government-sponsored programs, 
understanding modes of governance, and better or worse forms of governance, is of 
importance for the field of natural resources conservation and management.  I describe 
four modes of governance – state-based, market-based, rules-based, and hybrid.  I also 
identify elements of good governance specific to hybrid governance arrangements.  
The lessons compiled in this review serve as a starting point for how institutional 
arrangements might be designed a priori to maximize the possibility of good 
governance outcomes for conservation and management of natural resources. 
 
Introduction 
 Conservation of natural resources is at the heart of many donor, government, 
and NGO-sponsored programs in developing countries.  In addition to the physical 
manipulation of resources, these programs often address critical issues of governance 
including resource access, control, and use.  The issues become extremely complex 
when many actors are involved and when the state agency moves to decentralize 
decision making (Baland and Platteau 1996). 
 Governance plays an important role in natural resource programs.  
Increasingly, the form of governance has been recognized as having significant 
influence over effectiveness of management and success in conservation of natural 
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resources. At international, national, and local levels, the idea of governance has 
become central to natural resources policy and programming, as attested to by policy 
documents, briefing notes, and working papers published by organizations such as the 
United Nations, The World Conservation Union (IUCN), and The World Bank (e.g., 
UNDP 1997; Graham, Amos, and Plumptree 2003; IUCN 2004).  The increased 
attention to governance has spawned numerous publications defining governance, 
describing forms of governance, and calling for good governance.  This paper 
synthesizes this literature with the purpose of shedding light on current thought 
regarding the construction of innovative institutional regimes that result in good 
governance.  After reviewing four modes of governance – state-based, market-based, 
rules-based, and hybrid – the discussion focuses on elements of good governance for 
hybrid institutional arrangements.   
 
Governance of natural resources 
Governance is extremely difficult to define.  One definition states that 
governance refers to the combination of “people, political institutions, regimes, and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) at all levels of public and private policy 
making that are collectively responsible for managing world affairs” (Hempel 1996:5).   
Others have defined governance as “the interactions among structures, processes and 
traditions that determine how power and responsibilities are exercised, how decisions 
are taken, and how citizens or other stakeholders have their say” (Graham, Amos, and 
Plumptree 2003).  Thus, governance refers to the set of rules, structures, interactions, 
and processes that exist to shape how decisions are made.   
Traditionally, political science has addressed questions of governance related 
to public policy, economics has focused on private exchange governance via markets, 
and sociology has concentrated on governance by norms, social values, and 
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community.  Natural resources cross these public/private/community divisions and are 
therefore the object of multiple forms of governance.  For instance, national parks are 
often governed by the state, private forests are often governed by individuals, and 
communal pastures are often governed by the community.   
In 1968, Garrett Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” painted a bleak picture 
of the future of the world’s common-pool resources.  The commons, he argued, were 
being over-exploited at an alarming rate and drastic action was needed to conserve the 
commons for future generations.  The “rational” individual, Hardin (1968) argued, 
uses a resource until the expected benefits of his or her actions equal the expected 
costs.  Each individual ignores costs imposed on others.  Such behavior cumulates and 
inevitably leads to a tragic over-use of open-access commons.  An individual resource 
user has no incentive to self-impose restrictions on resource use or make 
improvements to the resource because of the fear of free riders.  As a result, Hardin 
(1968) recommended that common-pool resources be governed either as government 
property or as private property.  Other scholars have since illustrated the success of 
two other governance options, that of rules-based and hybrid approaches (Lemos and 
Agrawal 2006; Baland and Platteau 1996) (Table 3.1). 
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State-based Approaches 
 State-based resource conservation schemes involve ownership by a federal, 
regional, or local public agency that can forbid or allow use of a resource by 
individuals.  Protected areas are a typical example of state-driven conservation and 
management of natural resources.  In developing countries, the “fences and fines” 
approach, based largely on the U.S. national park model, was implemented during the 
colonial era, and additional parks of this type were established in various parts of the 
world more recently in the 1980s and 1990s.  Under the fences and fines approach, 
local people were sometimes forced to move from the areas designated for protection, 
with no compensation or consideration for their economic and cultural well-being 
(Furze, De Lacy, and Birckhead 1996; Kiss 1990).  Naturally, local people came to 
view the existence of parks with disdain and chose not to cooperate with park 
authorities (Kiss 1990).  Although effective in terms of biodiversity conservation, the 
success of parks and strict nature reserves vis-à-vis local resource-dependent people’s 
ability to pursue their livelihoods came into question in the 1990s.  Fortwangler (2003) 
describes negative social impacts of some protected areas, including removals, fear 
and torture, and restricted access to resources. For instance, in 1997, over 1,000 San 
were relocated from the Central Kalahari Game Reserve in Botswana to settlements on 
non-reserve land (Hitchcock 2002).  In another example, local people who tried to 
resist forceful relocation from Rajive Gandhi National Park in India were beaten by 
armed officers (WRM 2000).  Finally, the Ts’Exa of Botswana were blocked access to 
seasonal migrations of wildlife when Chobe National Park was created (Taylor 2002).  
As a response, there has been a call for more participatory and decentralized forms of 
natural resources management and conservation that involve local people.   
  Although state-based approaches may result in compliance with strict legislation 
regarding natural resource governance, they can lead to the marginalization and 
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disenfranchisement of certain groups and provide little incentive for individuals to act as 
stewards of resources they do not own.  In addition, hierarchical and bureaucratic state-
based arrangements are often rigid, resistant to innovation, and inefficient (Brechin, 
Wilshusen, and Benjamin 2003).   
 
Market-based Approaches 
Hardin’s (1968) second recommendation was the privatization of resources.  Under 
a private property market-based regime, owners have full rights to the resource.  They are 
able to withdraw resource units, make improvements to the resource, determine who will 
have access and use rights, and sell or lease access and use rights to others (Ostrom 2000).  
Such arrangements usually rely on market forces for driving individuals’ decisions 
regarding resource management.  For instance, a market-based approach to 
governance might provide incentives for resource owners to invest in improvements to the 
resource because owners are able to see a direct relationship between their investments and 
benefits they accrue.  The fear of free riders is minimized because resource owners have the 
rights of exclusion and alienation (Ostrom 2000).  Many economists consider private 
property to be the optimal property regime for economic development in part because it 
rests on the assumption that rational individuals will act in their own self-interest (Baland 
and Platteau 1996; Hardin 1968).   
 Private property, however, poses a problem as far as conservation of common-pool 
resources is concerned.  The most economically beneficial use of a resource may not result 
in ecologically-sound management practices.  While individual property owners benefit in 
the short-term from new agricultural lands, the public as a whole suffers in the long-term as 
hydrological cycles are disturbed and negative downstream impacts ensue.  In addition, 
assigning property rights can be difficult and impractical in situations where land tenure is 
unclear or contested.    
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Although privatization may result in maximized benefits and efficiency of resource 
use as a result of increased participation and interaction, it can have negative consequences 
as well.  For instance, market-based approaches may undermine conservation efforts for 
resources of ecological importance (e.g., threatened and endangered species), and 
concentrate control of the resource in the hands of elites (Streek and Schmitter 1985; 
Langholz 2003). 
 
Rules-based Approaches 
 Under rules-based approaches, individuals are subject to the rules established by 
a group.  “Some form of collective action between the individuals constituting the user 
community is essential, since a collective effort is required to manage access to the 
[resource] and the allocation of the benefits it produces” (Steins and Edwards 
1999:540).  The prediction that resource users are destined to destroy resources in an 
open-access arrangement is based on the assumption that all users are “selfish, norm-
free, and maximizers of short-run results” (Ostrom et al. 1999:279).  However, 
empirical evidence does not support predictions based on this assumption (e.g., 
Ostrom 1998).  In most cases where individuals face a resource problem, are able to 
communicate, and can make and enforce rules, reciprocity is used to overcome the 
problem (Ostrom et al. 1999).  Thus, this evidence leads to the conclusion that rules-
based regimes are a governance option for natural resources. 
 
Hybrid Approaches 
 Each of the above governance regimes has its strengths and weaknesses (i.e., 
state-based, market-based, and rules-based).  State-based conservation is a centralized 
approach that relies upon expert knowledge to make decisions.  As such, it allows for 
broad changes to occur.  However, this approach is often plagued by inefficiency and 
corruption, and does not account for contextual specifics.  Market-based arrangements 
 60
are a decentralized governance regime that allows individuals and groups to make 
decisions about the resources they own.  However, for public resources, property 
rights can be difficult to assign.  Finally, rules-based regimes privilege local 
knowledge and encourage social interaction.  However, consensus building can be 
time-consuming, local people may not have access to information needed to make 
sound conservation decisions, and power asymmetries may exclude certain groups 
from participating.   
In an attempt to maximize the benefits of each of the governance regimes and 
minimize their weaknesses, scholars and practitioners articulated hybrid governance 
forms that cut across the conventional state/market/community boundaries (Uphoff 
1993; Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Ostrom 2002; Evans 1996; Lemos and Agrawal 
2006).  Indeed, scholars and practitioners alike have called for governance structures 
that result in (1) sustainable use of natural resources, (2) equitable distribution of 
resource benefits, and (3) institutional forms that reflect the complexity and diversity 
of the natural systems being governed (Barrett, Lee, and McPeak 2005; Ostrom et al. 
1999; Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003).  Moves toward innovative hybrid institutional 
designs have also reflected recent trends to decentralize governance to resource users 
(e.g., Ribot 2002), to ensure social justice related to resource access and control (e.g., 
Brechin et al. 2003), and to empower local people (e.g., Agrawal and Gupta 2005).  To 
achieve a blend of institutions for natural resource governance, governments and 
international conservation and development groups have solicited the participation of 
local people by decentralizing decision-making processes and structures of authority 
(e.g., Nemarundwe 2004; Pandit and Thapa 2004).  State–civil society linkages have 
been sought to decentralize management from the central government (minimizing 
negative effects such as inefficiency) and involve local communities (maximizing 
effects of local contextual knowledge).  Public–private partnerships have also been 
cultivated to maximize efficiency while upholding legitimacy.   
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Although theoretically compelling, hybrid governance arrangements are 
difficult to design and implement given real-world institutional complexities.  Efforts 
to decentralize natural resource governance in developing countries have often 
involved not only the state and local communities, but third-party NGOs as well 
(Mohan 2002).  
 
Elements of Good Governance in Hybrid Approaches 
Given the relative novelty of hybrid approaches to environmental governance, 
most cases of institutional hybrids have been described in theoretical terms.  When 
empirical evidence does exist, it is often documented retrospectively.  Although the 
emergence of successful hybrids is certainly encouraging, the true challenge lies in 
designing and implementing hybrid institutional forms that will result in good 
governance outcomes with respect to both effective, just processes and substantive 
conservation achievements.  A review of both theoretical and empirical work suggests 
certain elements that may be necessary for the emergence (and construction) of 
successful hybrids.  To select reference documents, I searched peer-reviewed journal 
article databases for key words “governance, natural resources, conservation, and 
decentralization.”  I also solicited recommendations from scholars and practitioners 
working in natural resource governance.  The identified elements for synergistic 
hybrids that result in good governance include: clear resource governance goal, 
coherent institutional structure, clear rules, participation, accountability, transparency, 
monitoring, enforcement, equity, responsiveness, and transfer of authority (Table 3.2).  
Below is a description of each of these eleven principles of good governance in hybrid 
arrangements. 
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Table 3.2  Good governance principles as identified through literature review.  
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1. Goal: At the most basic level, the state and society (market or non-market actors) 
share the same goals related to resource governance for hybrid institutional 
arrangements to succeed.  Without a “common set of goals” (Evans 1996:1121) 
institutional complementarity is reduced to parallel sets of activities implemented 
by the state and society working oppositionally for separate objectives.  In 
addition, a congruence of interests related to the achievement of those goals 
facilitates complementarity insofar as the means for achieving the goals are easily 
agreed upon (Lam 1996; Antona et al. 2004). 
2. Structures: Certain state and societal structural forms have been observed to 
facilitate resource governance and the emergence of institutional hybrids (Evans 
1996).  With regard to the state, a coherent and dependable set of public 
institutions is necessary.  However, the specific form these public institutions take 
may vary without jeopardizing the possibilities for hybridism.  For instance, 
successful hybrids may result from collaboration with a highly hierarchical and 
bureaucratic state (Heller 1996; Lam 1996).  However, others have observed 
negative consequences as a result of highly bureaucratic states that demand 
simplistic application of inflexible rules.  Regarding the community, evidence 
suggests that institutional hybrids are more likely when the state’s partner is a 
tightly-knit group that shares norms of reciprocity and whose members trust one 
another (Johnson and Nelson 2004; Ostrom 2000).   
3. Rules: The state is responsible for establishing fair legal frameworks and enforcing 
them impartially (UNDP 1997).  These frameworks need to be predictable, 
dependable, and systematic.  Rules about appropriation of the natural resource 
must be agreed upon by all parties to the hybrid, and must be well-suited to the 
local context (Johnson and Nelson 2004; Ostrom 1990).  In addition, partners 
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should have a clear legal status with commensurate responsibilities and authority 
(Menzies 2004). 
4. Participation: Individuals should have a voice in decision making, either directly 
or through legitimate representation (UNDP 1997; Graham, Amos, and Plumptree 
2003).  This collective choice arrangement may not be completely egalitarian, but 
it must be perceived as fair and legitimate by all participants (Johnson and Nelson 
2004).  The state has a responsibility to provide the public sphere in which civil 
society can participate, and civil society has the responsibility to demand and take 
advantage of this sphere (Baiocchi 2003).  Although genuine participation is 
necessary for institutional hybrids in resource governance, participation alone 
cannot guarantee sustainability in a situation plagued by corruption and deception 
(Nygren 2005). 
5. Accountability: Decision makers, whether public or private actors, are accountable 
to their stakeholders and the public.  State actors need to be held accountable for 
their actions.  Decentralization without appropriate checks and balances can 
“easily privilege local governments and traditional authorities as ‘authentic’ 
sources of authority, with little consideration for whether these actors are 
accountable to the local populations” (Nygren 2005:646).   
6. Transparency:  Transparency includes free flow of information that is accessible 
to those concerned (UNDP 1997; Ostrom 2000; Guttman 1976; Andersson and 
Hoskins 2004).  Transparency facilitates accountability insofar as individuals and 
groups have access to information they need to assess the validity, legitimacy, and 
appropriateness of decisions that are made. 
7. Monitoring:  Monitoring responsibilities are extremely important to the success of 
hybrid governance regimes.  Ideally, “monitoring of resource use and the 
imposition of sanctions for violations should be carried out by either the members 
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of the managing communal entity or by persons accountable to the members” 
(Johnson and Nelson 2004:721).  Otherwise, the ability of resource users to 
regulate behavior among themselves and outsiders during the absence of state 
authorities may be weakened to the point that no effective management of resource 
use is possible.   
8. Enforcement:  Although the state usually retains law enforcement authority, in a 
hybrid arrangement, state enforcement may undermine or complicate non-state 
attempts to set rules and sanction behavior (Johnson and Nelson 2004; Ostrom 
1990).  “It matters less which rules a community or country adopts than how well 
they monitor and enforce the rules they set” (Barrett, Lee, and McPeak 2005:195)1.   
9. Equity: Actors in hybrid arrangements have a responsibility for ensuring that 
institutions are created and emerge to support equitable distribution of resource 
benefits (Ostrom 1990).  What is deemed equitable to some, however, may not be 
equitable to others.  Care must be taken to understand the legitimacy of local social 
structures and the culturally-specific definitions of equity (Agrawal and Gupta 
2005).  Just as institutions can reify inequitable social structures, loose institutional 
structures are easily dominated by elites (Menzies 2004).   
10. Responsiveness: Flexibility and adaptability in design and implementation can be 
critical to establishing hybrid institutional arrangements for resource governance 
(Barrett, Lee, and McPeak 2005).  This implies that the construction of hybrids is a 
process of constant negotiation, re-positioning, improvement, and evaluation.  One 
crucial element to designing adaptable institutional arrangements is being keenly 
aware of the social and ecological environment to ensure rules are appropriate to 
the context (Schafer and Bell 2002).   
                                                 
1 Original italics. 
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11. Transfer of Authority:  Transfer of Authority, in addition to responsibility, may be 
a necessary element for good governance in hybrid arrangements (Wily 1999; 
Schafer and Bell 2002; Kumar and Vashisht 2005).  The distinction is made 
between authority – the ability to make decisions, create rules, and change rules – 
and responsibility – the task of implementing activities.  Specifically, hybrids 
require “strong political commitment to the devolution of power on the part of the 
bureaucracy” (Kumar and Vashisht 2005:37). 
These eleven conditions have been identified through theoretical and empirical 
work to be essential for the emergence (and construction) of hybrid institutional forms 
for good governance of natural resources. 
 
Conclusion 
Designing hybrid institutional forms for governance of natural resources is a 
complex task involving many actors with multiple interests, motivations, and agendas.  
These actors come to resource governance with historically and culturally shaped 
circumstances that constrain and enable their interactions with one another.  These 
circumstances also shape how power is exercised and produced through social 
interactions.    
Given the complexity of goals of sustainable resource management and 
equitable distribution of resource benefits, institutional hybrids may be a mechanism 
through which the state and resource stakeholders alike can design institutional forms 
and relationships for their mutual benefit.  However, several principles related to 
governance structures and functions may be necessary conditions for successful 
hybrids.  The eleven elements identified in this review serve as starting point for how 
hybrid institutional arrangements might be designed a priori to maximize the 
possibility of good governance outcomes. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FOREST MANAGEMENT IN MADAGASCAR:  AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
 
Abstract 
Madagascar is regarded as one of the most important areas for biodiversity on 
Earth, and this biodiversity is found mainly in Madagascar’s forests.  Rural Malagasy 
people struggle to meet their daily food needs and often turn to the forest for new 
agricultural land.  Efforts to curb deforestation and conserve threatened and 
endangered species undertaken by the Malagasy government and by international 
conservation and development organizations have been shaped by the history of forest 
management in the country.  This paper traces the evolution of forest management in 
Madagascar from pre-colonial times to the present in an effort to contextualize current 
efforts to create new protected areas and transfer forest management responsibilities 
from the central government to local communities.  In addition, the history of forest 
management is critically examined with respect to the assumptions about the role of 
government and the governed, as well as the general theme that drove policy, 
providing context for understanding the approach currently underway in Madagascar. 
Introduction 
Madagascar is regarded as one of the most biologically rich areas on Earth. 
The island is a global priority for conservation with 11 endemic families and 310 
endemic genera of plants, five endemic families and 14 endemic genera of primates, 
and five endemic families and 35 endemic genera of birds (Lourenco 1996; Goodman 
and Benstead 2003; Myers et al. 2000).   
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Madagascar is also one of the world’s hotspots for conservation attention 
because its biodiversity faces a wide variety of threats, including habitat loss and 
fragmentation, and overexploitation of commercially valuable species of plants and 
animals. As recently summarized by the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund (Critical 
Ecosystem Partnership Fund 2007): 
These threats, coupled with insufficient local technical capacity, limited 
biodiversity information, inadequate government presence to manage and 
protect natural resources, and ambiguous policies, present a complex set of 
challenges that need to be addressed if biodiversity conservation and 
sustainable livelihoods for the people of Madagascar are to be achieved.  
Changes in human activity on the island have resulted in an alarming rate of 
deforestation in Madagascar (Figure 4.1) (Nelson and Horning 1993; Green and 
Sussman 1990), putting both biodiversity and local livelihoods at risk (Donohoe 2003; 
UNDP et al. 2000; McLean and Straede 2003).  Global deforestation has been linked 
to a variety of direct and indirect factors, including population growth (UNDP et al. 
2000; Green and Sussman 1990), the introduction of coffee cash cropping (Jarosz 
1993), timber export (UNDP et al. 2000), and local, national, and global political and 
economic factors (Lambin et al. 2001; Kull 2000; Moser 2006).  In addition to such 
global factors, major domestic threats to forests in Madagascar include clearing for 
subsistence agriculture (tavy), charcoal, and timber (Ganzhorn et al. 1997).  However, 
other factors such as political resistance to restrictive policies have also been identified 
as contributing to current rates of deforestation (Klein 2002; Jarosz 1993). 
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Figure 4.1  Forest Cover Map of Madagascar. 
 
Studies in many countries (e.g., Tanzania, Philippines, Burma, Ecuador, 
Madagascar) indicate that deforestation such as that characteristic of Madagascar can 
result in extirpation or extinction of species (Brooks et al. 2002).  Deforestation can 
also put people at risk.  As forests decline, people are forced to move to distant 
forested areas where vital resources are available, thus modifying their traditional ties 
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to the land and perhaps threatening aspects of their cultural identity.  Scarce forests 
may also result in conflict among peoples for control over resources (Donohoe 2003).   
Madagascar is among the poorest countries in the world with per capita GDP at 
$290 in 2005, an infant mortality rate of 76/1000 births, and only 45% primary school 
completion rate (The World Bank 2007).  The country is stricken by frequent natural 
disasters such as cyclones, flooding, and drought.  Food security is an issue as only 
0.1% of the national surface area is under agricultural cultivation (estimate in 2000) 
and people struggle to meet their daily food needs (The World Bank 2007).  Thus, 
forest clearing is an understandable consequence of a population under pressure to eke 
out food production from the land. 
Efforts to curb deforestation and conserve threatened and endangered species 
undertaken by the Malagasy government and by international conservation and 
development organizations have been shaped by the history of forest management in 
the country.  This paper traces the evolution of forest management in Madagascar 
from pre-colonial times to the present.  Understanding this history will help to 
contextualize current efforts to create new protected areas and transfer forest 
management responsibilities from the central government to local communities.  In 
addition, the history of forest management is critically examined with respect to the 
assumptions about the role of government and the governed, as well as the general 
belief that drove policy, providing context for understanding the approach currently 
underway in Madagascar. 
 
Madagascar Biogeography 
 Madagascar is located off the southeast coast of Africa, in the western Indian 
Ocean.  It is the fourth largest island on Earth with a surface area of 587,040 square 
kilometers.   The island is made up of distinct biogeographic zones with varying 
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regional climates.  Generally speaking, four broad vegetative zones exist: humid and 
degraded humid forest, grassland/wooded grassland mosaic, dry forest, and spiny 
forest (Figure 4.1, Table 4.1).  These areas are habitat for an incredible diversity of 
plant and animal life, serve as watersheds for Madagascar’s rivers and streams, and 
provide the majority of rural people with resources needed for subsistence. 
 
Table 4.1 Summary of Madagascar’s four main vegetation types (Moat and Smith 
2007). 
Forest Type Location Altitudinal 
Range 
Temperature Rainfall 
Primary and 
degraded 
humid forest 
Eastern and central 
plateau of Madagascar 
along a narrow ridge 
from Vohemar to 
Tolagnaro 
0 – 2750m 12 – 30º C 700 – 
3400mm
Grassland/ 
wooded 
grassland 
mosaic 
Western and central 
plateau of Madagascar 
350 – 
2700m 
0 – 30º  C 300 – 
3300mm
Western dry 
forest 
Along the west coast 
from the northern-most 
tip (Cap d’Ambre) to the 
Mangoky River 
0 – 800m 18 – 30º C 600 – 
1500mm
Spiny forest/ 
thicket 
Limestone basement/ 
sandstone ridges inland 
from the south and west 
coasts 
0 – 1600m 18 – 30º C 540mm 
 
Madagascar Cultural History 
 Madagascar is not only diverse ecologically, it is also extremely diverse culturally.  
Its cultural diversity is due to its long line of settlers including: Indonesians, Swahilis, 
Africans, Arabs, Portuguese, Dutch, English, French, Indo-Pakistanis, and Chinese 
(Verin 1986; Allen 1995).  Recent research suggests the island was uninhabited until 
Malay seafarers arrived approximately 1,500 to 2,000 years ago.  Subsequent 
 78
migrations from the Pacific islands and Africa further added to this original mixture, 
and 18 separate tribal groups emerged.  Malay features are most predominant in the 
central highlands people, the Merina and the Betsileo; the remaining 16 tribal 
groupings are coastal people of predominantly East African origins with Malay, Arab, 
European, Indian, and Chinese mixtures.  Malagasy society has long been somewhat 
polarized between the politically and economically advantaged highlanders of the 
central plateau and the coastal groups.  However, strong themes that tie all ethnic 
groups together include rice cultivation, cattle herding, and spiritual ties to land and 
the ancestors (Tyson 2000).   
  Approximately half the country’s population practices traditional religions, 
which tend to emphasize links between the living and the dead.  They believe the dead 
join their ancestors as divine spirits and that these ancestors are intensely concerned 
with the fate of their living descendants.  About 45% of Malagasy are Christian, 
divided almost evenly between Catholics and Protestants.  Many incorporate their 
traditional form of worshipping the dead with their religious beliefs and bless their 
dead at church before proceeding with traditional burial rites.  Islam in Madagascar 
constitutes approximately 7% of the population.  Muslim traders who first brought 
Islam to Madagascar had a lasting impact on the people and many Malagasy converted 
to Islam.  Muslims also were the first to transcribe the Malagasy language into an 
alphabet based on Arabic (Tyson 2000).   
  Malagasy generally have strong ties to the land, which has traditionally 
included clearing forested land for agriculture (primarily rice cultivation).  In some 
cases, slash-and-burn agricultural practices (i.e., tavy) are associated with a long-term 
shifting cultivation system, and in other cases cleared fields are abandoned after only a 
few agricultural cycles because of unproductive soils (Tyson 2000).  
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Pre-Colonial Forest Policies and Practices 
  Forest conservation and management in Madagascar has a long history that 
dates back to pre-colonial times (Table 4.2).  James Sibree, a British missionary who 
spent 50 years on the island attributed deforestation to shifting agriculture and timber 
concessions:  
This large extent of wooded country is, however, being diminished every year 
by the wholesale destruction of the forest in burning it for rice-planting, and it 
is grievous to see how recklessly it is cut down and destroyed for this and other 
more trivial reasons.  The large concessions of forest land to European 
companies for timber-cutting and plantations also tend in the same direction, 
and unless some plan of forest conservation is soon effected, the beautiful 
woods, with most of their flora and fauna, will eventually disappear (Sibree 
1896:363) . 
In response to Sibree’s and others’ observations regarding forest destruction due 
mainly to deliberately-set forest fires, traditional forest conservation in Madagascar 
took the form of top-down and repressive policy enforcement.  Records dating as far 
back as the early nineteenth century document this approach to forest management.  
At that time, King Andrianampoinimerina (1745-1810) of Madagascar banned the 
cutting of live firewood and declared all forests in his kingdom as royal property.  It is 
reported that he declared, “…it is forbidden for people to come to forge clandestinely 
arms in the forest because they can prepare a rebellion” (Ratovoson 1979:22).  At the 
same time, Prime Minister Rainilaiarivony declared that anyone caught cutting pristine 
forest would be chained in irons (Sibree 1881).   
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  Two definitive pieces of legislation appeared in the mid-nineteenth century: 
The Code of 101 Articles in 1868 and the Code of 305 Articles in 1881 (Henkels 
2001).  Both concerned civil law, criminal law, and procedure (Ratovoson 1979).  
Article numbers 101-106 forbade burning of forests and settling of people in the 
forest.  Article 105 forbade the practice of tavy: “One may not clear the forest by fire 
with the goal of cultivating rice fields, corn or other crops.  One who clears by fire a 
new terrain or expands those which exist already, that person will be put in irons” 
(Ratovoson 1979 as translated by Henkels 2001-2002:2).  Early legislation such as this 
fueled the argument that Madagascar was once completely covered by forest and 
human activity alone had resulted in dramatic forest cover loss (Sibree 1896).  
Recently, concerns over deforestation have also linked to debates surrounding global 
climate change and its impact on Malagasy biodiversity (Ascribe Newswire 2007; 
Ingram and Dawson 2005). 
 
Colonial Forest Practices 
Top-down approaches to conservation continued during the colonial period 
(1896 – 1961).  Soon after the French took control in 1896 they established the Water 
and Forests Service and declared all forests to be under government control or in the 
public domain.  The French also began an intense reforestation program on the central 
plateau and eastern escarpment of the island by establishing plantations of fast-
growing, nonnative species such as eucalyptus and pine.  They banned the killing of 
lemurs, and in 1927 established the first protected-areas system (Tyson 2000).  In 
1930, the French-led government passed Article 36, which prohibited all forest fires 
and other forms of deforestation (Montagne 2004).  At this time, no distinction was 
made between forest fires started for the purposes of creating agricultural fields, and 
those associated with cattle pastures (Maldidier 2000).  Despite policies aimed at 
native Malagasy practices, the French contributed to deforestation in Madagascar.  
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They planted much of the eastern lowlands with coffee, displacing many Malagasy 
farmers (Tyson 2000).  In fact, the beginning of massive deforestation is thought to be 
the direct result of coffee cash cropping (Jarosz 1993).  Since local people no longer 
had access to lowlands, they began cultivating less fertile, higher slopes for tavy.  
French officials responded by prohibiting the clearing of forests for tavy.   
 The tavy ban backfired, leading to popular unrest and more deforestation.  The 
Malagasy circumvented the prohibition where they could and resented the French for 
banning a practice that had been, and still is, representative of what Malagasy perceive 
as an ideal means of subsistence inherited from the ancestors.  The ban had the effect 
of elevating the tavy way of life to a ritual that symbolized resistance to colonial rule.  
As Jarosz (1993:374) notes,  
Resistance to the ban was more than pitting the right to subsistence over forest 
conservation; it embraced issues of power, labor control, and Malagasy 
identity.  Not surprisingly, the French failed to eradicate the practice; likewise, 
the postcolonial state is beset with the same difficulties. 
 
 The French also directly contributed to deforestation in Madagascar by 
opening the state’s forests to logging concessions (Jarosz 1993).  In their search for 
precious woods such as ebony, rosewood, and palisander, concession owners clearcut 
lands beyond the boundaries of their concessions.  The Water and Forests Service was 
unable to enforce regulations due to a lack of labor, capital, and political will.  Forest 
Service agents often allowed infractions to slip by because of their personal 
relationships with concession owners. 
 The colonial period is thus characterized by a palpable tension between the 
government and the governed.  This tension focused on the practice of shifting 
cultivation as colonists and local people struggled to advance their interests and 
impose their will on land use.  Whereas for the Malagasy peasants, shifting cultivation 
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was a cultural practice that affirmed their identity, linked them to the ancestors, and 
allowed them a means of resistance to state authority, the colonial authority saw 
shifting cultivation as a destructive practice that resulted in degraded grassland and 
hindered state-led forest extraction, labor control, and tax collection (Jasosz, 1993). 
 
Post-Colonial Forest Policies and Practices  
Madagascar gained its independence from France in 1961, but this had little 
effect on its conservation policy until very recently.  In addition to the 1930 forest law 
that banned forest fires, other conservation laws continued to be passed, including one 
that prohibited the hunting of several endangered species.  In 1962, President Philibert 
Tsiranana declared that all men had to plant 100 seedlings a year or suffer a tax 
(Tyson 2000).  This string of legislation reinforced the state as the only legitimate 
manager of forest resources in Madagascar, and contributed to a relationship 
characterized by forest service policies that repressed local people (Montagne 2004).   
Nonetheless, despite decades of conservation laws, the decrease in 
Madagascar’s forests throughout most of the twentieth century has been attributed to 
corruption among forest service employees, lack of motivation to adhere to forest 
policies among poor rural people, and the government’s inability to monitor the forest 
and enforce policies because of a lack of resources, bad roads, and difficult terrain 
(Ganzhorn et al. 1997).  Forest practices in Madagascar since 1930 can be 
characterized as open access, where individuals and groups exploiting forest resources 
were both uncontrolled and uncontrollable by the government.  The result was a 
paradoxical conflict between illegal local-level forest exploitation regarded as 
legitimate by local people, and the legally-sanctioned forestry policies regarded as 
illegitimate by local people (Bertrand and Razafindrabe 1997; Montagne 2004).  This 
pattern of behavior and interaction between the government and the governed 
continued through the 1960s and 1970s.   
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The NEAP Era 
In the mid-1980s, Madagascar’s political climate began to change as it moved 
from an insular, quasi-communist political system closely tied to the Soviet Union, to 
a socialist democracy open to foreigners and foreign ideas.  Due to this change, 
international biologists and ecologists began coming to Madagascar and discovered a 
wealth of biodiversity previously unknown to science.  Madagascar’s reputation as a 
refuge for unique biodiversity was well known from its biogeography and from early 
Portuguese, British, and French records, but with modern methods and techniques, 
scientists we able to identify and classify many new organisms.  
The move toward more open policy and increased interaction with foreigners 
also impacted Madagascar’s development agenda.  The early 1990s met with a flurry 
of conservation and development activity.  Bi-lateral and multi-lateral donor agencies 
such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the 
World Bank increased their involvement, as well as their funding levels.  Policies and 
programs were developed, including Africa’s first National Environmental Action 
Plan (NEAP).  This plan was designed to include three five-year phases.  Phase I 
(1992-1997) responded to the increasing consensus about the importance of 
Madagascar’s unique biodiversity.  This phase focused on the creation of protected 
areas and the institutional and organizational structures necessary for their 
management.  This initial period was characterized by Integrated Conservation and 
Development Projects (ICDPs) in peripheral zones of protected areas, which were 
meant to compensate local people with micro-development projects as mitigation of 
restrictions on access to resources imposed by new protected areas.  This model of 
conservation, known as the “fences and fines” approach, based on the U.S. national 
park model, focused on the establishment of protected areas to the exclusion of people 
(Barrett and Arcese 1995; Kiss 1990).   
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Despite millions of dollars of investment, Phase I had mixed results  (e.g., 
Barrett and Arcese, 1995; Peters, 1998).  The policy of standardized projects made up 
of four main components (i.e., protected areas, buffer zones, compensation, and 
economic development), grew out of a deep-seated development discourse.  This 
discourse views development as a linear trajectory from less developed to developed 
that should be followed by all nations regardless of culture, resource availability, or 
history.  Similarly, the discourse advocates standardized approaches to achieving 
development from site to site (Peet and Hartwick 1999).  Results of management 
practices informed by this discourse and policy were that protected areas were 
disjointed from the economic development activities in peripheral zones meant to 
serve as alternatives to destructive environmental practices.  Providing health centers 
or schools did not dissuade local people from practicing tavy, and the link between 
conservation and development was not made.  Thus, the government, along with 
conservation and development donors and implementing organizations, imposed a 
model of development ill-suited to the local context in many ways, and local people 
struggled to navigate the new webs of relationships and institutions created by ICDPs. 
Evaluations of Phase I activities indicated that the creation of a few dozen 
protected areas was not a viable approach to long-term sustainable management of 
Madagascar’s natural resources (Montagne 2004).  In addition, the ICDP model was 
deemed too centralized and standardized across sites to respond to local-level 
specificities.  As a result, the Malagasy government and other actors interested in 
sustainable forest management began to look for new legal structures and institutional 
arrangements for forest governance.  This trend reflects a global move toward more 
bottom-up, democratic, and participatory methods for designing and implementing 
natural resource-related policies and programs in developing countries (Durbin and 
Ralambo 1994; Peters 1998; Brechin et al. 1991; Chambers 1997).   
 
 87
Community-based Forest Management 
In the 1990s, faced with high rates of deforestation and inefficient forestry 
practices, the Malagasy government, with support from international conservation and 
development organizations, pushed for a new community-based natural resources 
management policy (Bertrand 1994; Rajaonson et al. 1995; Kull 2002).  This policy, 
known as GELOSE, is applicable to forests, pastures, wildlife, and water.  It grew out 
of a larger, continent-wide movement to decentralize government functions, including 
natural resources management.  GELOSE aims to promote better resource 
management through local-level management, rule-setting, and enforcement, leading 
to better environmental stewardship.  GELOSE was signed into law on September 10, 
1996 (law No. 96-025), and in 1997, the law was incorporated into the new national 
forestry policy (Law 97-107 and Decree 97-1200).   
The GELOSE law allows for the creation of tripartite negotiated contracts 
among the state (represented by the forest service), the municipality (i.e., mayor’s 
office), and a voluntary association of community residents created for the purpose of 
this contract (i.e., Communauté de Base or COBA).  The law does not stipulate how 
this association should be constituted – it may be constituted through some form of 
representation or include all village residents.  Under GELOSE contracts, 
communities regulate resource use through dina, a locally-developed social contract 
whose form pre-dated state-sanctioned rules (Henkels 2001; Marcus 2000).  Contract 
negotiations are coordinated by an “environmental mediator” and the process for 
establishing a GELOSE contract, which is described in legislation, includes 22 steps 
(Kull 2002). 
Only in 2000 did the GELOSE law receive the first two installments of its 
enabling legislation (décrets d’application).  Because implementation of GELOSE 
was viewed as complex and cumbersome, a piece of enabling legislation specific for 
forests was defined under order No. 2001-122.  This policy, Contractual Forest 
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Management (Gestion Contractualisée des Forêts or GCF), simplifies the process for 
transferring forest management rights to communities by eliminating the need for an 
environmental mediator and reducing the contract signatories to two: the state 
(represented by the regional office of the Ministry of Environment, Water, and 
Forests), and the COBA (Kull 2002; Antona et al. 2004).   
The move toward community-based natural resources management gained 
momentum during the second of three five-year phases of the NEAP.  Phase II (1998-
2003) activities emphasized a landscape approach to natural resources management 
outside protected areas and included participatory approaches to conservation and 
development (Montagne 2004).  GELOSE and GCF contracts were a major 
component of Phase II activities, and currently over 400 GELOSE and GCF contracts 
exist throughout Madagascar. 
Law 96-025 allowed for local populations to take part in decision making and 
actions related to local natural resource management, but it did not specify the 
institutional mechanisms by which this should occur.  GELOSE and GCF were an 
experiment to transfer the management of local forest resources for subsistence use as 
well as conservation (Randrianasolo 2000; Andriambelo 2004).   Subsistence use in 
this case included exploitation of timber products for domestic consumption such as 
home construction and firewood.   
Phase III of the NEAP (2004-2008) aims to mainstream the environmental 
agenda and also includes a major initiative to expand the protected area network.  In 
2003, the President of Madagascar, Marc Ravalomanana, declared his “Durban 
Vision” to expand the surface area of protected areas from 1.7 million hectares to 6 
million hectares by 2012.  This will put Madagascar within IUCN’s recommended 
standard of having 10% of the country’s land area under some form of protection.  The 
protected area network, which will include both pre-existing and new protected areas, 
is now known as the System of Protected Areas of Madagascar (Système des Aires 
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Protegées de Madagascar, or SAPM).  Under SAPM, the majority of new protected 
areas will be co-managed, and one vision for this co-management is that local 
communities will partner with government through COBA structures set up through 
GELOSE and GCF contracts. 
GELOSE and GCF arrangements, whether or not associated with protected 
areas, have a strong conservation component.  Despite rhetoric of local empowerment 
to make decisions about forest management, these governance arrangements are fairly 
controlled.  COBA are given management responsibilities for an initial period of three 
years, renewable for ten years.  They are not granted land tenure.  In addition, third 
parties such as conservation and development NGOs play a strong role in orienting 
management plans and zoning of these areas.  Their field agents often initiate 
community-level discussions regarding resource management and their organizations’ 
values, goals and missions are often reflected in the management plans or zoning 
systems developed for community-managed areas (e.g., Antona et al. 2004).  Thus, the 
effort to decentralize forest management in Madagascar has transferred some powers 
to local people while maintaining a certain level of centralized control, and has 
provided opportunity for outside intervention by conservation and development 
organizations.    
 
Conclusion 
 Forest management in Madagascar has evolved over the last century from top-
down, centralized legislation that restricted access to forest resources to more 
decentralized governance forms that put local people at the center of decision making.  
Although by tracing legislation this trend is clearly apparent, implementing truly 
decentralized governance is a complex process that involves institutional structure and 
power dynamics that are difficult to modify.  In Madagascar, decentralized governance 
arrangements are changing the web of interactions among actors such as government, 
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international agencies, and local communities in an attempt to shape power dynamics.  
Nevertheless, it is still unclear the extent to which local communities are able to 
capture the opportunity these changes represent and ensure their interests are 
represented.  Understanding how these dynamics are evolving is a crucial step for 
monitoring the implementation of these policies and improving upon them over time.  
Additional research is needed to assess how these institutional changes are affecting 
principles of good governance such as participation, accountability, and transparency 
in decision making.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
A MULTI-SECTOR FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING COMMUNITY-BASED 
FOREST MANAGEMENT:  
LESSONS FROM MADAGASCAR 
 
Abstract 
Community-based forest management has proliferated throughout Africa as 
national governments have decentralized the administration of public forestry.  
Community-based forestry has taken multiple forms, depending on the assortment of 
land-tenure systems, forest-use norms, wood demand, and social organization in a 
particular locality.  In this paper, I propose an analytical framework for assessing the 
responsiveness of community-based forest management programs to local needs.  
Assessment of the degree to which such programs achieve decentralization or forest 
conservation goals can inform policy development and program implementation.  
Nature, Wealth, and Power is an analytical framework that has been developed from 
experiences in natural resource management in Africa.  I amend the framework to 
People, Nature, Wealth, and Power (PNWP), and propose it as an analytical lens for 
community-based forest management initiatives.  I use the PNWP framework to assess 
responsiveness of contractual forest management in the Menabe region of Madagascar 
to interests of communities, the state forest agency, and conservation non-
governmental organizations (NGOs).  For the purposes of this paper, I define interests 
as those norms and values that are implicit and inherent in the practice of social life.  
My assessment is based on interviews conducted with local forest users, forest agency 
staff, and NGO employees in 2004.  More research is needed, but this inquiry 
indicates the PNWP framework holds promise for designing, implementing, and 
evaluating community-based forest management initiatives.   
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Introduction 
 Throughout Africa, national governments are decentralizing authority related 
to health service provision, education systems, public works, and forestry (Ribot 2002; 
Agrawal and Ribot 1999).  Decentralization has taken many forms, including 
democratic decentralization, or devolution, which is an act by the central government 
to relinquish power to local entities that are accountable to local people (e.g., local 
community) (Bergh 2004).  This kind of action is part of a broader trend toward more 
participatory, populist approaches to the practice of development intervention.  
Populist approaches to development are evident in the plethora of participatory 
appraisal techniques developed over the last 20 years, and the tendency to direct 
interventions at the local level (e.g., Hildyard et al. 2001; Kiss 1990).  The rationale 
behind decentralization efforts and participatory interventions rests in part on the idea 
of subsidiarity; i.e., decisions should be made at the lowest administrative level 
possible (Uphoff 1986).  Outcomes attributed to decentralization include bureaucratic 
efficiency, procedural equity among administrative levels of government, increased 
service provision, citizen participation and democratization, and maintenance of 
national cohesion and political stability (Ribot 2002).   
 Decentralization of government functions and authorities has extended to the 
forestry sector in many African nations (e.g., Oyono 2004; Wiggins, Marfo, and 
Anchirinah 2004).  The movement toward community-based forest management 
regimes is a manifestation of this trend (e.g., Edmonds 2002; Brown and 
Schreckenberg 2001; Vabi et al. 2000).  However, despite strong and long-lasting 
rhetoric and discourse around decentralized, community-based management, efforts to 
decentralize forest governance to local entities have had mixed results at best (Blaikie 
2006).  Various studies have assessed the performance of decentralized arrangements 
on ecological, social, and economic indicators (Platteau 2004; Gauld 2000; Blaikie 
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2006; Larson and Ribot 2004; Pagdee, Kim, and Daugherty 2006).  For instance, 
efforts to increase citizen participation, devolve power and authority, and create more 
efficient and equitable structures for managing resources have been unsuccessful when 
decision-making powers have remained centralized or have been captured by elites 
unaccountable to local people (e.g., Platteau 2004; Gauld 2000; Blaikie 2006).  Efforts 
to increase conservation areas through community-based forests have often been 
unsuccessful as communities continue to use timber resources for daily needs or strike 
deals with commercial timber harvesters.  And finally, community-based forest 
management for the purpose of stimulating economic development has frequently 
failed when transparency and accountability in local communities and local 
governments are lacking (Larson and Ribot 2004).   
Previous studies have identified conditions under which decentralized, 
community-based forest management is most likely to succeed or fail (Ostrom 1990; 
Adams and Hulme 2001; Pagdee, Kim, and Daugherty 2006).  These studies have 
focused primarily on understanding what worked and what did not work 
retrospectively.  Although insightful, these studies fail to address a larger issue, which 
is the way in which community forest management arrangements are designed in the 
first place.  In this paper, I argue that efforts to decentralize authority in the forest 
sector are not meeting their potential in part because of the narrow, sector-specific 
manner in which decentralized forest-related structures and activities are conceived 
and put into place.  The forests in question often have high economic and/or 
biodiversity value.  However, the people who live in these forests, depend on them for 
their livelihoods, and are the entity to which management authority is transferred, 
often are among the poorest and most marginalized populations (Brechin et al. 2003; 
Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004).  These people do not live sector-specific lives in 
terms of forests alone, they live their lives as whole people (see Selznick 1992).  They 
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concern themselves with issues in many sectors (e.g., health, education, business) and 
across sectors (e.g., social cohesion, culture, family) simultaneously and in an 
integrated and interactive fashion.  They hold multiple interests that may converge or 
diverge over time (Pfeffer 2001).  I define interests as those norms and values that are 
implicit and inherent in the practice of social life.  They are embedded within social 
roles and guide action.  This type of interest differs from objective interests, which are 
the “purposes to which [people] should ascribe,” because they are the purpose and 
motivation that are actually exercised (Cervero and Wilson 1994:125).  Interests are 
always reproduced or transformed in the exercise of power.  Thus, interests are 
constructed, and therefore can be reconstructed (Cervero and Wilson 1994). 
Thus, I propose that efforts to decentralize forest-related powers and activities 
in the form of community-based forest management may be more responsive to local 
realities if the process (i.e., design of institutional structures, interventions, and 
activities) reflects the multi-sector nature of people’s lives.  Given the financial and 
social hardships that many forest communities face, addressing realities beyond the 
forestry sector may be the only way to ensure that remaining tropical forests provide 
the resources people need while they are managed sustainably for future generations.   
 
People, Nature, Wealth, and Power 
 After decades of designing, implementing, and evaluating natural resource 
management initiatives in Africa, a consortium of institutions working in development 
reflected on their experiences and developed a framework that describes those efforts 
that seemed to have had positive results.  This framework, Nature, Wealth, and Power 
(NWP), was offered as a lens through which analysis can be conducted, discussions 
can be structured, and current and future natural resources management initiatives can 
be designed (USAID et al. 2002).  The framework was developed to both describe the 
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components of effective or successful natural resources management initiatives, as 
well as to prescribe elements that may be needed to ensure success of future efforts.  
The framework recognizes the complexities of natural resources management and 
describes linkages among various sectors related to natural resources.  Specifically, the 
framework draws on cases where natural resources management led to increased 
resource productivity, increased conservation, and increased access to resource use.  
The framework is made up of three components: 
 
• Nature – Natural resources of all types (e.g., land, water, forests, wildlife) that 
are “dynamic, socially embedded, economic and political” (USAID et al. 2002: 
4).  It describes the gamut of natural resources that have economic, cultural, 
existence, aesthetic, biodiversity, or other value. 
• Wealth – Natural capital, which is the basis of rural production and economic 
development systems across Africa.  This component represents the economic 
concerns of natural resources management. 
• Power – Governance, which refers to the interactions among structures, 
processes, rules, and traditions that determine how authority is exercised, how 
responsibilities are distributed, how decisions are made, and how various 
actors are implicated (Hempel 1996). 
 
 The NWP framework is built on specific cases of programs implemented in 
Namibia, Botswana, Madagascar, and Mali.  It highlights that natural resources 
management extends beyond biological and physical manipulation of resources.  
Given that natural resources are embedded in the social and political fabric of society 
and government, issues of economic value, production, markets, laws, norms, access, 
and rights come into play when decisions are made about how to manage resources 
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(e.g., Brechin et al. 2003; Peluso 1993; Menzies 2004).  Thus, the Nature, Wealth, and 
Power framework is an articulation of how programs that integrate across 
environment, economic, and governance sectors result in positive impacts (USAID et 
al. 2002).   
 Although this framework articulates links among sectors and recognizes the 
multi- and inter-sector nature of natural resources management, it does not sufficiently 
emphasize several additional linkages that can be clustered under the broad category, 
People.  The links between natural resources and health, education, and 
communication are missing from the Nature, Wealth, and Power framework (e.g., 
Chivian 2001; Chivian and Bernstein 2004).  These linkages are important insofar as 
conservation activities are tied to development interventions in developing countries.  
Although one could argue that health and education are forms of Wealth, I believe that 
a distinction between these categories allows for more nuanced analysis.  For instance, 
undertaking forest management activities requires that local people (i.e., forest users) 
are in good health.  Without sufficient nutrition and potable water, forest management 
activities can not be completed.  Biodiversity can contribute to human health by 
keeping disease-causing organisms in check, providing medicinal plants, contributing 
to clean water and air, as well as mitigating effects of climate change (European Union 
2005; Chivian and Bernstein 2004).  Pressure on the forest from local populations is 
related to population growth, among other factors.  As the number of households per 
settlement increases, the need to clear additional land for dwellings or agriculture also 
increases.  Family planning activities therefore have a direct link with forest 
management. These links are so apparent that the President of Madagascar was 
spurred to write a letter to WorldView magazine entitled, “Madagascar Naturellement: 
Birth Control is My Environmental Priority”  (Ravalomanana 2006).  The links 
between natural resources and education and communication are equally important.  
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Environmental education and communication convey information to people that may 
influence attitudes and behaviors regarding natural resources practices.  In addition, 
basic education, especially for girls, reduces family size thereby alleviating pressures 
on forest resources. 
Thus, I have adapted the original framework to reflect a more populist 
perspective and to include a broader range of interests (Figure 5.1).  For the purposes 
of this paper, I define interests as those subjective, identifiable, identified and 
articulated (e.g., preferences) (Winter 1996).  This adaptation, which I refer to as 
People, Nature, Wealth, and Power (PNWP), illustrates links that exist among 
environmental management, economic growth, governance, and health and education 
activities for the goal of natural resources management in rural areas populated by 
people living primarily in a subsistence economy.  The linkages are depicted in a 
hierarchy consistent with current thinking in Madagascar and elsewhere on national 
priorities.  Wealth is at the top, reflecting the overall goal of sustainable economic 
development or poverty reduction, as stated in many national policies of African 
nations (e.g., Government of Madagascar 2004; Government of Burkina Faso 2004) 
and donor strategy statements (e.g., USAID/Madagascar 2002; Klugman 2002).  
People and Nature are at the bottom as they represent basic elements of rural society 
in many developing countries.  Power represents governance, which is cross-cutting 
and an integral part of the other three elements.  Thus Power is at the center.  The two-
way arrows among elements illustrate the interdependent and interactive nature of 
policies and interventions in each sector.  This hierarchical conceptualization of the 
multi-sector linkages was identified as valid for the case of Madagascar during a 
brainstorming workshop held by USAID/Madagascar in July 2005.  This workshop, 
attended by USAID staff, implementing partners, and Government of Madagascar 
representatives, was held to establish consensus on USAID/Madagascar’s strategy for 
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implementing an integrated program aimed and achieving development goals in areas 
of high biodiversity.  This framework is therefore embedded within USAID’s interests 
of providing development assistance that addresses rural Malagasy needs while 
supporting the conservation of Madagascar’s unique biodiversity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1.   People, Nature, Wealth, and Power – A conceptual framework to guide 
assessment of responsiveness of community-based forest management efforts to local 
needs. 
 
Contractual Forest Management in Madagascar – A Case for PNWP 
Madagascar is regarded as one of the most biologically rich areas on Earth 
with nearly 80% of its flora and fauna endemic to the island (Lourenco 1996; 
Goodman and Benstead 2003).  Madagascar is also home to a unique dry forest 
ecosystem located in the Menabe region (Figure 5.2).  Primary forest cover in the 
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western dry forests of Madagascar declined from 12.5% in 1950 to 2.8% in 1990 
(Smith, Horning, and Moore 1997).  Western Madagascar is also among the most 
economically depressed regions of the country because of its short growing season and 
poor soils (Sorg, Ganzhorn, and Kappeler 2003).  Efforts to curb deforestation and 
conserve threatened and endangered species have been undertaken by the Malagasy 
government and by international conservation and development organizations.  These 
efforts have coincided with a government-wide decentralization movement that 
includes transferring management rights and responsibilities from the state forest 
agency to local communities.   
 
Figure 5.2.  Map of Madagascar indicating location of Menabe region. 
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National forestry policy #2001-122 establishes the legal framework for 
contractual forest management, or Gestion Contractualisée des Forêts (GCF) (Eaux et 
Forêts 2002).  Under the GCF arrangement, local communities enter into a contractual 
agreement with the regional-level office of the Malagasy forest service, DGEF 
(Direction Generale des Eaux et Forêts), regarding the use and management of local 
forested lands.  In most cases, the contracting process is facilitated by a third party – 
either a conservation or development organization (Randrianasolo 2000; Montagne 
2004).   
GCF contracts are signed between DGEF and a community-level forest 
association that is formed for this purpose (COBA).  The DGEF’s mission is to act as 
a steward of all Malagasy forest resources.  Specific activities include zoning for 
conservation, production, and reforestation, and overseeing the implementation of 
management plans for each of these zones.   The COBA is made up of local forest 
users – local residents who use forests for firewood, timber, medicinal plants, food, 
and cultural practices.  To be granted a contract, a COBA must have official standing 
as an association and be sanctioned by the Mayor’s office.  The intended relationship 
between the DGEF and the COBA under the GCF arrangement is that both the forest 
agency and the community association will benefit.  The forest agency serves as 
technical advisor to the community to ensure sound forest management practices are 
implemented, and the COBA implements, monitors, and evaluates management.  The 
GCF arrangement consists of four documents: 
1. The contract itself 
2. A management plan (which sets goals for management and articulates 
activities to be completed) 
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3. A dina (rules and regulations for sanctions associated with disobeying the 
terms of the contract or the management plan based on traditional sanctions 
used by communities before the existence of GCF) 
4. A book of responsibilities (articulates who will be responsible for what aspects 
of management and defines roles of both DGEF and the COBA) 
Initial GCF contracts are granted for three years.  If all parties involved agree that the 
GCF is being properly managed at the end of this initial period, the contract can be 
renewed for ten years.  Areas of forest that are under GCF contract are zoned into 
three parts:  a conservation zone (no extraction of any resources), a sustainable use 
zone (for daily-use resource extraction), and a commercial zone (Eaux et Forêts et al. 
2002).  Currently, approximately 300 GCF contracts exist in Madagascar, eight of 
which are in Menabe (RESOLVE Conseil et al. 2005). 
 The Menabe region of Madagascar was selected for this study because it was a 
pilot region for community-based forest management even before the official GCF 
legislation was finalized.  With the support of international donors and NGOs, the 
forest agency began the process of transferring forest management to local 
communities in Menabe in the early 1990s.  The additional years of experience of 
GCFs in Menabe, as opposed to other regions of Madagascar, offer insight into a 
process that has developed over time. 
The success of GCF contracts in Madagascar and community-based forest 
management initiatives elsewhere will depend in part on their ability to respond to the 
interests of the various parties involved.  PNWP is a framework for analyzing the 
multi-sector interests held by various actors, thus facilitating assessment of the 
responsiveness of decentralized, community-based forest management.  The 
objectives of the exploratory research conducted in this study were to: (1) identify 
interests related to forest management held by the state, the community, and the NGO 
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representatives; (2) apply the PNWP framework as a lens for classifying these 
interests; and (3) conduct an initial assessment of the extent to which the GCF 
mechanism responds to various interests held by the multiple actors. 
 
Methods 
  I conducted a total of 55 semi-structured, open-ended interviews (LeCompte 
and Preissle 1993; Seidman 1998) of community members in eight villages in the 
Menabe region (n=31), state forest agents at the local and national level (n=11), and 
participating NGO staff from two NGOs at the local and national level in Menabe and 
Antananarivo, Madagascar (n=13) (Appendix D).  In the case of Menabe, the NGOs in 
question have a biodiversity conservation mandate.  Individuals were sampled using a 
snowball sampling methodology (LeCompte and Preissle 1993; Miles and Huberman 
1994) to ensure subjects with knowledge and experience in the GCF process were 
included in the study.  The sample reached saturation when redundancy occurred in 
individuals identified.   
Interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes, and were conducted in-person in 
the local language.  No translator was used because I am proficient in the local 
language and wanted to avoid any misunderstandings with additional layers of data 
manipulation.  In addition, I conducted participant-observation (Miles and Huberman 
1994; LeCompte and Preissle 1993) by attending workshops, participating in GCF-
related discussions and field trips, and accompanying forest users to collect forest 
products.  I also conducted document review to triangulate data collected via the three 
methods (Miles and Huberman 1994).  Data collection occurred over the three-month 
period from June to August 2004.  Interview questions focused on experiences to date 
with GCF, expectations for GCF, interests related to GCF, perceived problems 
regarding GCF implementation, and future expectations.   
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Permission to conduct research in Madagascar was granted by the Department 
of Water and Forests in the Ministry of Environment, Water, and Forests in 
Antananarivo, Madagascar (Appendix A).  In addition, the methods and instrument 
used in this research were approved by the appropriate institutional human subjects’ 
committees for the duration of the research project.  My protocol included 
communicating risks to participants and maintaining confidentiality (Appendices B 
and C).    
Qualitative, inductive inquiry facilitated an initial understanding of the social 
dynamics that characterize community-based forest contracts.  Given the exploratory 
nature of this portion of the study, I felt this approach was more appropriate for my 
purposes than a deductive, quantitative survey.  An iterative approach guided data 
analysis.  Notes were taken during interviews, and those notes were then written up in 
narrative form.  I refrained from tape-recording and transcribing interviews as this 
practice is culturally inappropriate in the rural setting of Menabe.  Interview notes 
were coded using the PNWP framework for each of the categories of actors (i.e., 
community, forest agency, NGO).  The coded data were then grouped into the PNWP 
categories in tabular form (Miles and Huberman 1994).   
In seeking to understand the practice of community-based forest contracts, and 
the multi-sector interests that combine to shape the agendas advanced by various 
actors, I deliberately sampled forest users, forest agency personnel, and participating 
NGO staff.  Care should be taken in assessing contextual similarities and differences 
when considering the implications of this study for other cases.  In addition, my 
inductive approach does not allow for reproduction or prediction, but sheds light on a 
complex governance structure that involves various institutional actors.  Future 
research addressing the broader implications of a multi-sector approach to 
decentralized forest management would be of value.   
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Results 
 Individual interviews revealed interests related to the People, Nature, Wealth, 
and Power categories held by community forest users, the state forest agency, and 
NGO staff (Table 5.1).  Results from participant-observation affirm the interview 
results.  Italicized cells in Table 5.1 indicate interests that are not being met under the 
current GCF management arrangements in Menabe.  Despite many similarities among 
the three classes of actors (e.g., state, community, and NGO), interests held by each of 
the three groups differ somewhat for several of the four analytical categories, as 
described below. 
 
Community Forest Users 
 Forest users in the Menabe region reported that GCF contracts contributed to 
their ability to continue to access the forest for purposes of collecting construction 
materials, medicinal plants, food, and fuel wood.  They linked this ability to use forest 
resources to the overall health and functioning of their communities.  Forest users 
stressed the linkages between forest health and community health, and indicated great 
satisfaction from having state-approved access to forests for medicinal plants.  They 
also indicated the GCF contracts contributed to their ability to ensure that forest 
resources would be accessible for use by future generations.   
 Forest users did not feel GCF contracts met their needs with respect to the 
Wealth and Power elements of forestry.  Specifically, some people were of the opinion 
that the GCF arrangements did not ensure financial benefit to the community from 
forest products.  Reasons for this included lack of markets for non-timber forest 
products from the dry forest and lack of surveillance of illegal timber harvesters.  The 
Menabe dry forest has extremely low productivity, which makes sustainable timber 
harvest extremely difficult (Covi 1992; Randrianasolo 2000).  Further, non-timber 
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forest products are not profitable in the region, leaving no options for 
commercialization of forest products (Rakotomanana 2004).  In addition, forest users 
reported that the state forest agency is unable to keep logging companies and migrant 
groups from extracting forest resources illegally.  Forest users felt they did not hold 
the legal authority or the means to stop illegal cutting, even within community-
managed areas. 
 
Table 5.1.  Interests held by GCF actors related to People, Nature, Wealth, and Power.  
Italics indicate interests that are not met by the current GCF contracts in Menabe. 
Analytical 
Framework COBA/Community State Forest Agency 
Conservation-
oriented NGOs 
People  Use forest 
products for 
medicinal plants, 
construction, 
firewood, etc. 
 Educate local people 
about rules and 
policies regarding 
legal forest use 
 Ensure people 
continue to 
value the 
forest and 
support its 
conservation 
Nature  Conserve forest-
use and cultural 
values for future 
generations 
 Conserve forest-use 
value for renewable 
use by future 
generations 
 Conserve 
forest 
biodiversity 
value for 
future 
generations 
Wealth  Receive financial 
benefits from the 
forest 
 Exploit forest 
resources for 
economic gain of 
local people (e.g., 
timber sales) and the 
agency (e.g., timber 
permits) 
 Ensure local 
people have 
resources 
necessary and 
reduce 
pressure on 
forests 
Power  Forest agents 
enforce laws and 
keep illegal 
loggers out of 
community forest 
 Keep migrants 
from using local 
forest resources 
 Ensure communities 
are adhering to the 
conditions set forth in 
the GCF contract 
 Ensure more efficient 
use of agency staff 
with respect to forest 
patrols and 
monitoring 
 Ensure that 
state forest 
agency 
prosecutes 
illegal forest 
users 
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State Forest Agency 
 State forest agency personnel at the local level in Menabe and at the national 
level in Antananarivo indicated that the current GCF arrangement is falling short of 
meeting the agency’s goals.  Both in the Menabe region and beyond, forest agency 
personnel reported that GCF contracts are not functioning as they should with respect 
to their interests in the People, Nature, Wealth, and Power categories. 
 Agency staff indicated that they would like GCF to serve as a mechanism for 
reducing, if not eliminating, illegal logging in community-managed forests. They 
noted that a lack of understanding of the rules of GCF contributes to the continuation 
of illegal activities.  Under GCF, communities are encouraged to enforce forest rules 
(i.e., the legislation affords them this right), but staff noted community members do 
not exercise this authority for fear of retribution.  Despite their legal ability to enforce 
rules, the historically-shaped social relationships among community members, illegal 
forest users and forest agency staff inhibit community members from acting in this 
capacity.  After considering the possible outcomes of enforcing rules, agency staff 
reported that community members decide not to confront illegal forest users.  Thus, 
the legal authority exists on paper, but agency staff believe community members do 
not take the responsibility for this activity due to the social-structural conditions in 
which they operate.  In addition, agency staff recognize that community members may 
lack some of the technical skills and capacity to implement enforcement effectively.  
Mentoring by forest agency staff is needed. 
 Agency staff also reported that GCFs are not contributing to economic gain by 
communities or the agency.  Communities are losing as timber continues to be 
extracted illegally.  In addition, the GCF mechanism itself excludes the agency from 
benefiting from permit sales because this responsibility is transferred to the 
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community under this decentralized management arrangement.  Therefore, Wealth-
related interests held by the agency are not being met under the GCF contracts. 
 Finally, agency staff reported their interest in the conservation of forest 
resources for renewable use by future generations, and in the efficient functioning of 
the state forest agency in general.  Lack of transparency and accountability, and a high 
rate of corruption are blocking the GCF mechanism from functioning as intended.  
Illegal timber harvest is reducing the amount of forest available for future generations, 
and unclear monitoring and evaluation methods, together with a lack of incentives for 
adherence to rules, are contributing to delinquency on the part of community forest 
users and agency staff.   Thus, the state forest agency is dissatisfied with the current 
GCF arrangement. 
 
Conservation-Oriented NGOs 
 NGO staff reported that the current GCF arrangement is meeting their People- 
and Nature-related interests.  The conservation and subsistence use zones within 
community forests are contributing to an environmental ethic among people by 
engaging them in the active management and monitoring of the resources they use.  In 
addition, conservation zones are ensuring that the forest will be available for future 
generations. 
 NGO staff also indicated that the ecological specificity of the dry forest makes 
it virtually impossible for communities to extract financial benefits from forest 
products.  Although they would like communities to benefit financially, NGO staff 
noted that extractive benefits are an unlikely possibility, so they are working to 
develop non-extractive benefits such as tourism.   
 Finally, NGO staff both locally and nationally indicated that the current GCF 
arrangement is not resulting in prosecution of illegal timber harvesters as originally 
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intended.  They cite corruption, lack of formal authority on the part of community 
members, and lack of motivation on the part of forest agency staff as reasons for 
continued illegal harvest. 
 
Discussion 
 Results from this exploratory analysis of the multi-sector interests held by 
three participating actors in community-based, contractual forest management in the 
Menabe region of Madagascar indicate that actors hold some similar, and some 
differing interests.  Specifically, interests held by the three groups seem to converge 
around the Nature and Wealth categories, and diverge around the People and Power 
categories.  This finding confirms the importance of including the People category in 
the PNWP framework insofar as it encourages divergent, yet extremely relevant 
interests to surface.  These interests can then be addressed deliberately before 
intractable conflicts emerge.  In addition, results indicate that the state agency is the 
least satisfied with the current management arrangement, and that interests related to 
Wealth and Power aspects of forest management are not accounted for under the 
current management mechanism.  These results have implications for how the GCF 
structure could be modified and for improvements that could be made under the 
current structure. 
 Interests identified by members of the three research groups (i.e., community 
forest users, forest agency staff, and NGO personnel) reflected the goals of each 
group.  For instance, forest users, who rely on the forest for daily needs, identified 
interests that reflect their livelihood priorities.  Thus, the addition of the People 
category to the NWP framework is justified for the case of community forest users.  
Of note is that the current GCF structure meets the People- and Nature-related 
interests of community forest users, but not the Wealth- and Power-related interests.  
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According to the PNWP framework, People and Nature represent fundamental 
building-blocks of rural life in Madagascar.  I submit three possible explanations for 
these preliminary results: (1) GCFs are still evolving; (2) the GCF model is not 
designed to respond to community interests in all four categories, or (3) the GCFs of 
Menabe are an anomaly with regard to their responsiveness to community-held 
interests.  Additional research is needed to allow us to draw definitive conclusions 
regarding these three possibilities.   
The state forest agency – the entity charged with managing forests, enforcing 
laws, and generating revenue for the state – identified interests that reflect its mandate.  
Worthy of note is that the state forest agency is the least satisfied with the current GCF 
structure and/or function (Table 5.1).  None of the interests identified by state agency 
staff are currently being met in a satisfactory manner.  In some cases, this is due to the 
structure of GCF itself.  For instance, among the purposes of decentralizing forest 
management is reducing the agency’s workload and empowering local communities.  
The intended result is communities that have the authority to issue permits to 
individuals or groups who wish to extract timber from community forests, 
consequently reducing revenue to the forest agency from forest permits.  In other 
cases, the forest agency is unsatisfied because of the implementation of the GCF 
contracts.  Lack of good governance (i.e., corruption, lack of accountability, lack of 
transparency, lack of enforcement of rules) keeps the GCF mechanism from 
functioning as intended, resulting in negative impacts on the agency.  The emergence 
of the state as a point of contestation and tension in community-based forest 
management is affirmed by other, similar studies world-wide (e.g., Wily 1999; Schafer 
and Bell 2002; Kumar and Vashisht 2005). 
NGO staff identified interests that reflect their commitment to biodiversity 
conservation.  Interestingly, People- and Nature-related interests are currently being 
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met, while Wealth- and Power-related interests are not.  This mirrors the case for 
community interests.  Reasons for this are difficult to identify without additional 
research, but I propose several possibilities: (1) As conservation organizations, the 
NGOs’ first priority is biodiversity conservation.  However, because the forests are 
populated, NGOs are obliged to work hand-in-hand with local people to ensure 
conservation is achieved.  Thus, NGOs may devote the bulk of their efforts to meeting 
its People- and Nature- related interests.  (2) As conservation organizations, NGOs 
have neither the expertise nor the budget to invest in income-generating activities for 
local populations.  Although NGOs would like local people to benefit from 
conservation, they are unable to ensure that this occurs.  (3) Although the NGOs 
would like to ensure transparency and accountability in how the forest is managed, as 
a third-party to the GCF arrangement, they have no real standing from which to 
improve governance.  Thus, NGO Power-related interests are beyond their control.  
Again, these possibilities can only be confirmed with additional research. 
 Finally, the results suggest the Wealth and Power interests held by all groups 
are the least accounted for under the GCF mechanism.  Economic gain by the local 
community is limited by the peculiarities of the dry forest ecosystem.  Although this is 
not a result of GCFs per se, the fact that sustainable commercialization of forest 
products in this region is not currently occurring raises questions about the 
appropriateness of community forest management in such ecosystems.  If one of the 
goals of GCF is economic benefit to the community (as suggested by the commercial 
use zone mandated by the GCF), and if all parties involved are interested in seeing the 
community benefit economically from forest management, then perhaps the GCF 
arrangement in a zone of low forest productivity should be modified to account for 
these needs.  One recommendation may be to explore non-extractive means for 
generating economic benefits from dry forests such as tourism, direct payments for 
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conservation, or carbon sequestration projects.  I feel the Wealth-related interests do 
not pose an absolute obstacle to community forest management in Menabe.  Rather, 
the GCF mechanism needs to be adapted to the local ecosystem production potential. 
 That Power-related interests are not being met under the current GCF structure 
suggests an inconsistency between one of the main purposes of implementing GCF 
contracts and their outcome.  As a mechanism for decentralizing rule-making and 
management implementation, GCF is an attempt to change and improve governance.  
Yet, the results indicate that governance-related interests held by participating groups 
are not being met.  This finding suggests that despite rhetoric of good governance that 
justifies GCFs, the practice of implementing GCFs may neglect key governance 
issues.  This finding is corroborated by other studies that have demonstrated that 
efforts to decentralize development often pay little attention to how local governance 
arrangements reflect culturally-charged struggles for power (e.g., Bebbington et al. 
2004).  To rectify this situation, additional analysis regarding the GCF mechanism and 
its implementation is needed.  It may be that GCF is not an appropriate governance 
mechanism in all cases.  It may also be that additional attention should be paid to key 
elements of good governance such as participation, clear rules, transparency, 
accountability, and monitoring and enforcement (Graham, Amos, and Plumptree 2003; 
IUCN 2004; UNDP 1997). 
Results of this study indicate that groups differ with respect to certain interests 
vis-à-vis PNWP.  This result is not surprising, but is a useful reminder that forest 
management engages actors in many sectors who often have divergent stakes in the 
outcomes of management decisions and activities (Brechin et al. 2003).  For the case 
of GCF in Menabe, these divergent interests compete with one another and result in 
tensions among groups of actors.  For instance, a tension exists between the forest 
agency and communities regarding rules enforcement, especially as concerns illegal 
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and migrant loggers.  Illegal logging occurs in a vacuum of rule enforcement and 
where market incentives are great.  This group was not targeted in this study, so 
speculation regarding their specific interests and motivations is difficult.  However, 
illegal logging may threaten the integrity of GCFs and the long-term viability of 
community management in Menabe.  Additional research that explores the overall 
dynamic and how decentralization is contested on conceptual and practical levels is 
needed.   
Results also indicate that the PNWP framework complements existing 
knowledge regarding decentralization of forest management.  Previous studies have 
identified conditions necessary for success.  This study takes a step back and examines 
the design of decentralization arrangements.  In a development context, we argue that 
forest management activities can not occur in a vacuum focusing solely on forests.  
Parties to community forest management hold multiple, and often divergent interests 
that touch many sectors.  The PNWP framework provides a lens through which 
decentralized governance arrangements may be designed to account for these multi-
sector interests. 
 
Conclusion 
Decentralization of forest management is intended, in part, to respond more 
directly to local needs than centralized decision making.  The logic behind 
decentralization of the forest sector is that local people who live close to the forest and 
rely on its resources are fit to manage because they have context-specific knowledge 
and experience.  In addition, decentralized government structures are intended to 
interact with forest users and are therefore more familiar with local particulars than 
centralized actors.   
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Results of this study indicate that decentralized forest management (at least in 
the case of GCFs) does not go far enough in responding to local interests.  Forest 
management touches multiple sectors and therefore decisions or activities that focus 
solely on forest manipulation are not adequate for addressing local realities.  For 
instance, forest management involves issues related to livelihoods, health, and 
education (i.e., People), forest management per se such as silviculture (i.e., Nature), 
income generation and economic growth (i.e., Wealth), and governance and rule-
making (i.e., Power).  In addition, forest users live their lives as whole people with 
interests and activities that are multi-sector or trans-sector (Selznick 1992).   
Although the GCF mechanism has resulted in changes in policy and structural-
level relationships, this form of decentralization has not yet resulted in individual-level 
capacity to act.  Decentralization of law enforcement, for instance, has only 
reproduced pre-decentralization structured power relations.  The necessary capacity 
and social space for community members to exercise their enforcement mandate are 
still lacking. 
The People, Nature, Wealth, and Power framework for assessing community-
based forest management initiatives provides a structure for identifying interests 
related to non-forest sectors that are implicated in community-based forest 
management, and for identifying interests held by different participating groups.  This 
study suggests that PNWP could be a useful assessment tool.  However, the challenge 
is to design community-based forest management structures and processes that start 
from a PNWP lens.  That is, deliberate attempts to design decentralized forest 
management with a PWNP approach may result in interventions that are more 
responsive to the gamut of interests held, and therefore more sustainable.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
GOVERNANCE OUTCOMES OF COMMUNITY-BASED FOREST 
MANAGEMENT IN MADAGASCAR 
 
Abstract 
 The purpose of decentralization is to distribute decision-making and 
implementation powers more broadly throughout the state and civil society.  The 
rationale of decentralization of natural resources governance is that it will minimize 
negative consequences and maximize benefits of strict state-based and rules-based 
resource governance regimes, effectively resulting in good governance.  Previous 
research has identified eleven principles of good governance:  Goal, Structures, Rules, 
Participation, Accountability, Transparency, Monitoring, Enforcement, Equity, 
Responsiveness, and Transfer of Authority.  I explore community-based forest 
management (CBFM) as implemented in Madagascar to assess the extent to which it 
produces perceived good governance outcomes.  I used a face-to-face interview 
methodology to collect data on the good governance principles from 621 respondents 
from June to November 2006.  Results indicate that CBFM produces perceptions of 
good governance outcomes in Madagascar generally, but that specific aspects of good 
governance such as Goal, Participation, Equity, and Monitoring may require specific 
attention. In addition, results suggest that the forest type in which CBFM is 
implemented may influence good governance outcomes. 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of decentralization is to distribute decision-making and 
implementation powers more broadly throughout the state and civil society.  Re-
distribution of power is meant to enhance the ability of both parties to act as agents 
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that affect substantive outcomes.  The rationale of decentralization of natural resources 
is that it will minimize negative consequences and maximize benefits of strict state-
based and rules-based resource governance regimes.  Yet, decentralization is a 
historically-contingent process that does not necessarily result in synergistic state–
society relationships.  In addition, governance outcomes of decentralized forest 
management in a given state–society institutional configuration are unclear.  The 
question remains if decentralized state–society partnerships for forest management 
result in good governance.  Good governance has been defined in the literature as 
governance that performs well with respect to eleven elements:  Goal, Structures, 
Rules, Participation, Accountability, Transparency, Monitoring, Enforcement, Equity, 
Responsiveness, and Transfer of Authority.  Understanding how instances of 
community-based forest management (CBFM) perform with respect to these eleven 
principles of good governance given variations in contextual variables may shed light 
on how to improve structures and processes to improve governance outcomes. 
 
Theoretical Background 
Governance has been defined as the combination of “people, political 
institutions, regimes, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) at all levels of 
public and private policy making that are collectively responsible for managing world 
affairs” (Hempel 1996:5) and “the interactions among structures, processes and 
traditions that determine how power and responsibilities are exercised, how decisions 
are taken, and how citizens or other stakeholders have their say” (Graham, Amos, and 
Plumptree 2003).  Thus, governance can refer to the set of rules, structures, 
interactions, and processes that exist to shape how decisions are made.   
Typically, political science addresses questions of governance related to public 
policy, economics focuses on private exchange governance via markets, and sociology 
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concentrates on governance by norms, social values, and community.  Natural 
resources cross these public/private/community divisions and are therefore the object 
of multiple forms of governance.  For instance, national parks are often governed by 
the state, private forests are often governed by individuals or corporations, and 
communal pastures are often governed by the community.   
Each of the above governance regimes has its strengths and weaknesses (i.e., 
state-based, market-based, and rules-based).  State-based conservation is a centralized 
approach that relies upon expert knowledge to make decisions; it allows for broad 
changes to occur.  This approach is often plagued by inefficiency and corruption, and 
does not account for contextual specifics (Brechin, Wilshusen, and Benjamin 2003).  
Market-based arrangements allow individuals and groups to make decisions about the 
resources they own.  For public resources, property rights can be difficult to assign 
(Ostrom 2000; Streek and Schmitter 1985).  Finally, rules-based regimes privilege 
local knowledge and encourage social interaction.  This approach has challenges too:  
consensus building can be time-consuming, local people may not have access to 
information needed to make sound conservation decisions, and power asymmetries 
may exclude certain groups from participating (Ostrom 1999).   
In an attempt to maximize the benefits of each of the governance regimes and 
minimize their weaknesses, scholars and practitioners articulated hybrid governance 
forms that cut across the conventional state/market/community boundaries (Uphoff 
1993; Ostrom 2002; Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Evans 1996; Lemos and Agrawal 
2006).  Indeed, scholars and practitioners alike have called for governance structures 
that result in (1) sustainable use of natural resources, (2) equitable distribution of 
resource benefits, and (3) institutional forms that reflect the complexity and diversity 
of the natural systems being governed (Ostrom et al. 1999; Barrett, Lee, and McPeak 
2005; Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003).  Moves toward innovative hybrid institutional 
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designs have also reflected recent trends to decentralize governance to resource users 
(e.g., Ribot 2002), to ensure social justice related to resource access and control (e.g., 
Brechin et al. 2003), and to empower local people (e.g., Agrawal and Gupta 2005).  To 
achieve a blend of institutions for natural resource governance, governments and 
international conservation and development groups have solicited the participation of 
local people by decentralizing decision-making processes and structures of authority 
(e.g., Nemarundwe 2004; Pandit and Thapa 2004).  State–civil society linkages have 
been sought to decentralize management from the central government (minimizing 
negative effects such as inefficiency) and involve local communities (maximizing 
effects of local contextual knowledge).  Public-private partnerships have also been 
cultivated to maximize efficiency while upholding legitimacy.   
Although theoretically compelling, hybrid governance arrangements are 
difficult to design and implement given real-world institutional complexities.  Efforts 
to decentralize natural resource governance in developing countries have often 
involved not only the state and local communities, but third-party NGOs as well 
(Mohan 2002).  Where empirical evidence does exist, it is often documented 
retrospectively.  Although the emergence of hybrids is occurring, designing and 
implementing hybrid institutional forms that will result in good governance outcomes 
with respect to both effective, just processes and substantive conservation 
achievements is difficult.   
Given the relative novelty of hybrid approaches to environmental governance, 
most cases of institutional hybrids have been described in theoretical terms.  A review 
of both theoretical and empirical work suggests certain elements that may be 
necessary for the emergence (and construction) of successful hybrids that result in 
good governance.  The identified elements include: clear resource governance goal, 
coherent institutional structure, clear rules, participation, accountability, transparency, 
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monitoring, enforcement, equity, responsiveness, and transfer of authority from the 
state to those closest to the resource (Table 6.1).  Below is a description of each of 
these eleven principles of good governance in hybrid arrangements. 
1. Goal: At the most basic level, the state and society (market or non-market actors) 
share the same goals related to resource governance for hybrid institutional 
arrangements to succeed.  Without a “common set of goals” (Evans 1996:1121) 
institutional complementarity is reduced to parallel sets of activities implemented 
by the state and society working oppositionally for separate objectives.  In 
addition, a congruence of interests related to the achievement of those goals 
facilitates complementarity insofar as the means for achieving the goals are easily 
agreed upon (Lam 1996; Antona et al. 2004). 
2. Structures: Certain state and societal structural forms have been observed to 
facilitate resource governance and the emergence of institutional hybrids (Evans 
1996).  With regard to the state, a coherent and dependable set of public 
institutions is necessary.  However, the specific form these public institutions take 
may vary without jeopardizing the possibilities for hybridism.  For instance, 
successful hybrids may result from collaboration with a highly hierarchical and 
bureaucratic state (Lam 1996; Heller 1996).  However, others have observed 
negative consequences as a result of highly bureaucratic states that demand 
simplistic application of inflexible rules.  Regarding the community, evidence 
suggests that institutional hybrids are more likely when the state’s partner is a 
tightly-knit group that shares norms of reciprocity and whose members trust one 
another (Johnson and Nelson 2004; Ostrom 2000).   
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Table 6.1  Good governance principles as identified through literature review.  
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3. Rules: The state is responsible for establishing fair legal frameworks and enforcing 
them impartially (UNDP 1997).  These frameworks need to be predictable, 
dependable, and systematic.  Rules about appropriation of the natural resource 
must be agreed upon by all parties to the hybrid, and must be well-suited to the 
local context (Johnson and Nelson 2004; Ostrom 1990).  In addition, partners 
should have a clear legal status with commensurate responsibilities and authority 
(Menzies 2004). 
4. Participation: Individuals should have a voice in decision making, either directly 
or through legitimate representation (UNDP 1997; Graham, Amos, and Plumptree 
2003).  This collective choice arrangement may not be completely egalitarian, but 
it must be perceived as fair and legitimate by all participants (Johnson and Nelson 
2004).  The state has a responsibility to provide the public sphere in which civil 
society can participate, and civil society has the responsibility to demand and take 
advantage of this sphere (Baiocchi 2003).  Although genuine participation is 
necessary for institutional hybrids in resource governance, participation alone 
cannot guarantee sustainability in a situation plagued by corruption and deception 
(Nygren 2005). 
5. Accountability: Decision makers, whether public or private actors, are accountable 
to their stakeholders and the public.  State actors need to be held accountable for 
their actions.  Decentralization without appropriate checks and balances can 
“easily privilege local governments and traditional authorities as ‘authentic’ 
sources of authority, with little consideration for whether these actors are 
accountable to the local populations” (Nygren 2005:646).   
6. Transparency:  Transparency includes free flow of information that is accessible 
to those concerned (UNDP 1997; Ostrom 2000; Guttman 1976; Andersson and 
Hoskins 2004).  Transparency facilitates accountability insofar as individuals and 
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groups have access to information they need to assess the validity, legitimacy, and 
appropriateness of decisions that are made. 
7. Monitoring:  Monitoring responsibilities are extremely important to the success of 
hybrid governance regimes.  Ideally, “monitoring of resource use and the 
imposition of sanctions for violations should be carried out by either the members 
of the managing communal entity or by persons accountable to the members” 
(Johnson and Nelson 2004:721).  Otherwise, the ability of resource users to 
regulate behavior among themselves and outsiders during the absence of state 
authorities may be weakened to the point that no effective management of resource 
use is possible.   
8. Enforcement:  Although the state usually retains law enforcement authority, in a 
hybrid arrangement, state enforcement may undermine or complicate non-state 
attempts to set rules and sanction behavior (Johnson and Nelson 2004; Ostrom 
1990).  “It matters less which rules a community or country adopts than how well 
they monitor and enforce the rules they set” (Barrett, Lee, and McPeak 2005:195)1.   
9. Equity: Actors in hybrid arrangements have a responsibility for ensuring that 
institutions are created and emerge to support equitable distribution of resource 
benefits (Ostrom 1990).  What is deemed equitable to some, however, may not be 
equitable to others.  Care must be taken to understand the legitimacy of local social 
structures and the culturally-specific definitions of equity (Agrawal and Gupta 
2005).  Just as institutions can reify inequitable social structures, loose institutional 
structures are easily dominated by elites (Menzies 2004).   
10. Responsiveness: Flexibility and adaptability in design and implementation can be 
critical to establishing hybrid institutional arrangements for resource governance 
(Barrett, Lee, and McPeak 2005).  This implies that the construction of hybrids is a 
                                                 
1 Original italics. 
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process of constant negotiation, re-positioning, improvement, and evaluation.  One 
crucial element to designing adaptable institutional arrangements is being keenly 
aware of the social and ecological environment to ensure rules are appropriate to 
the context (Schafer and Bell 2002).   
11. Transfer of Authority:  Transfer of Authority, in addition to responsibility, may be 
a necessary element for good governance in hybrid arrangements (Wily 1999; 
Schafer and Bell 2002; Kumar and Vashisht 2005).  The distinction is made 
between authority – the ability to made decisions, create rules, and change rules – 
and responsibility – the task of implementing activities.  Specifically, hybrids 
require “strong political commitment to the devolution of power on the part of the 
bureaucracy” (Kumar and Vashisht 2005:37). 
These eleven conditions have been identified through theoretical and empirical 
work to be essential for the emergence (and construction) of hybrid institutional forms 
for good governance of natural resources. 
 
Research Questions 
This research attempts to answer the general question: To what extent does 
decentralized community-based forest management result in perceived good 
governance?  Specifically, I use a variety of research methods to answer the questions: 
1. What are the governance outcomes of community-based forest management 
(CBFM)?  
2. What are the relationships among the eleven governance principles in the 
context of CBFM? 
3. To what extent do the eleven governance principles explain or account for 
good governance? 
To answer these questions, I rely on the case of contractual forest management in 
Madagascar. 
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Research Context 
Madagascar is regarded as one of the most biologically rich areas on Earth 
with nearly 80% of its flora and fauna endemic to the island (Lourenco 1996; 
Goodman and Benstead 2003).  Most famous for its tropical forest biodiversity, 
Madagascar is home to several ecosystem types:  evergreen dense forests, 
sclerophyllous forests, deciduous dry forests, spiny thickets, mangroves, offshore 
marine ecosystems, and intertidal and shallow marine ecosystems (Dufils 2003; 
Cooke, Lutjeharms, and Vasseur 2003).   
Decentralization of forest management was formalized by the Malagasy 
government on September 30, 1996 through law #96-025 that allows for local 
management of renewable natural resources.  This law was then put into practice 
through several enabling decrees; including #2000-27 and #2001-122 that empower 
local communities to manage renewable resources and allow for contractual forest 
management.  Under these CBFM arrangements, local forest committees enter into a 
contractual agreement with the Malagasy forest service, MEEF (Ministère de 
l’Environnement et des Eaux et Forêts), regarding the use and management of local 
forested lands.  In most cases, the contracting process is facilitated by a third party – 
either a conservation or development organization.    
CBFM contracts are signed between the MEEF and a community-level forest 
association, Communauté de Base (COBA).  To be granted a contract, a COBA must 
have official standing as an association and be sanctioned by the Mayor’s office.  
Initial CBFM contracts are granted for three years.  If all parties involved agree that 
the forest is being properly managed at the end of this initial period, the contract can 
be renewed for ten years.  At no point, however, does the community gain title to the 
land in question.  Areas of forest that are under CBFM contracts are zoned into three 
parts:  a conservation zone (no extraction of any resources), a sustainable use zone (for 
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daily-use resource extraction), and a commercial zone.  Currently, approximately 350 
CBFM contracts exist in Madagascar. 
The case of CBFM in Madagascar is an opportunity to explore governance 
outcomes of decentralized forest management that involves several classes of actors 
(e.g., the state, communities, and NGOs).    
 
Methods 
 A variety of methods and an iterative process of moving between inductive and 
deductive reasoning were used to collect data.  Inductive reasoning allowed me to 
formulate questions and identify categories for analysis based on direct observation 
and open-ended inquiry.  Deductive reasoning involved evaluation of previously-
identified categories and their relationship to one another.  Both qualitative and 
quantitative methods were used.  Qualitative methods provided insight into the study 
context and informed development of the quantitative survey instrument.  
Understanding the nuanced research context facilitates the interpretation of 
quantitative research results (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998).  Quantitative inquiry 
allowed me to examine relationships among the eleven governance principles as well 
as assess the degree to which these principles explain variation in good governance 
itself. 
Exploratory research was conducted in the summer of 2004 to identify specific 
research questions related to community-based forest management in Madagascar.  
This exploratory phase identified forest-related interests held by community members, 
forest agency staff, and NGOs.  These interests were coded and categorized, and 
governance emerged as an area needing further study (see Chapter 5).  This finding is 
important given that CBFM is itself an institutional structure designed to improve 
governance through decentralization.  Thus, the second phase of inquiry, reported 
here, employed a quantitative survey to focus on perceptions of governance outcomes 
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of CBFM in Madagascar.  I focused on identifying perceptions of good governance 
outcomes because CBFM is a social process that involves navigating power relations.  
As such, it is subject to social construction by social agents.  An analysis of perceived 
governance outcomes contributes to an understanding of CBFM’s performance as 
interpreted by participating stakeholders. 
 
Sampling 
The study included a sample of CBFM contracts in Madagascar.  The 
population of CBFM contracts in Madagascar (n ≈ 350) was divided into sampling 
strata (Trochim 2001) to ensure variability in CBFM contract types represented in the 
sample, and also to facilitate data collection at the field level.  Strata were identified 
based on two criteria: (1) objective of the CBFM contract and (2) forest type.  In 
general, CBFM contracts in Madagascar have one of two objectives: conservation or 
sustainable use.  Conservation-oriented contracts are often facilitated by conservation 
organizations and are put into place as a mechanism of decentralized forest 
governance whereby local communities have the primary responsibility for ensuring 
long-term conservation of the forests they manage.  Conversely, development-oriented 
CBFM contracts are set up to encourage sustainable use of forest resources (both 
timber and non-timber).  All contracts include the three forest zones (e.g., 
conservation zone, sustainable use zone, and commercial zone), and therefore include 
both conservation and sustainable use.  Additionally, CBFM contracts occur 
throughout Madagascar, in a variety of forest ecosystems.  For the purposes of this 
study, three broad categories of forests have been identified: natural humid forests, 
natural dry forests, and Tapia forest2.  The CBFM mechanism is a standardized tool 
                                                 
2 Tapia forest – An endemic forest of Madagascar dominated by the Tapia tree (Uapaca bojeri). These 
woodlands or wooded savannas grow in several zones scattered across the western highlands, and have 
long been seen as remnants of previously grander and more diverse forests, degraded into their current 
shape by frequent burning (Kull 2002). 
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that was designed for application throughout Madagascar in a variety of forest types, 
and therefore differences among forest types is not expected.  Yet, including various 
forest types and comparing results across them is important for assessing the tool’s 
universal applicability.  In addition, the forest types act as a proxy for other contextual 
differences that exist across regions of Madagascar.  To ensure diversity in the types 
of CBFM contracts included in the study, sample contracts were selected to reflect 
combinations of the two strata identified. Two CBFM contracts were selected for each 
of the six combinations of the two strata.  Table 6.2 illustrates the strata and sampling 
frame for the CBFM contracts.   
 
Table 6.2  Sample strata and sampling frame for CBFM contracts in Madagascar. 
 CBFM Objective 
Forest Type Conservation Economic Valuation
Natural Humid forest Contract A Contract B Contract C Contract D
Natural Dry forest Contract E Contract F Contract G Contract H
Tapia forest Contract I Contract J Contract K Contract L
 
For each of the 12 contracts, three categories of actors exist:  community 
members, government employees, and NGO staff.  A systematic sample with a 
random start (Trochim 2001) of community members was taken for each contract.  
However, given the disproportionately small number of government employees and 
NGO staff involved in each contract, a census of these groups was taken.  For NGO 
staff, individuals both at the national and local levels from the NGOs involved in 
CBFM at the selected sites were included.  For government employees, no national-
level staff were included because no one at the Ministry of Environment, Water, and 
Forests self-identified has having primary responsibility for CBFM contracts.  At the 
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local level, relevant employees of the mayor’s offices and regional offices of the 
Ministry of Environment, Water and Forests were included. 
 
Reliability Analysis 
A survey instrument was developed to measure respondents’ perception of the 
performance of CBFM with respect to good governance (Appendices E, F, G).  The 
survey instrument included at least three items for each governance-related variable 
being measured, plus items on demographic characteristics of respondents and general 
questions regarding respondents’ knowledge of the CBFM mechanism (Table 6.3).  
The governance variables were measured using a standard 5-point Likert scale, where 
1 corresponds to “strongly agree” and 5 corresponds to “strongly disagree.”  I used a 
concept-question matrix to link survey questions to variables of interest (Appendix H).  
Two local enumerators were hired to implement the face-to-face survey.  The 
enumerators were trained and the survey instrument was pre-tested from May 20-26, 
2006.  Fifty (50) individuals were surveyed during the pretest in a village in the 
Arivonimamo commune that was not included in the final survey.  After the pretest 
was completed, SPSS was used to analyze the data to check for inter-rater reliability 
and inter-item reliability. 
For inter-rater reliability, an independent samples t-test for equality of means 
between the two enumerators was conducted to detect significant differences between 
the responses collected by each of the two enumerators.  This test detected significant 
differences for 10 items.  These items were revised. 
Subsequent to the inter-rater reliability test, an inter-item reliability test was 
conducted to check for internal consistency among items measuring a single variable.  
Chronbach’s alpha was used to measure inter-item reliability.  Seven of the variables 
had alpha values less than 0.6 (Hair et al. 1998), and therefore the items used to 
measure those variables were revised. 
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Table 6.3  Variables were measured by at least three survey items. 
 
Variable Question 
 People have different experiences with community-based 
forest management. To what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the following statements about community-based forest 
management. (Please circle one response for each statement.) 
Community-based forest management is a mechanism for good 
governance of forests 
When communities have contracts with the government to manage 
forests, the result is not good governance 
Good 
Governance 
Good governance of forests occurs when communities collaborate 
with the government to manage forests 
All participants in community-based forest management in my 
area share a common set of goals. 
I do not have the same goals for community-based forest 
management as others who participate. 
Goal 
The overall goals of community-based forest management are the 
same for me as they are for others in my area. 
The government institutional structures are clear when it comes to 
community-based forest management. 
The community institutional structures are clear when it comes ot 
community-based forest management. 
The government institutional structures for community-based 
forest management are dependable. 
Structures 
The community institutional structures for community-based 
forest management are dependable. 
Fair rules for community-based forest management do not exist. 
Both the government and the community have agreed to a set of 
fair and clear rules for community-based forest management. 
Rules 
Rules for community-based forest management are clear about the 
government and the community's responsibilities. 
Meetings for decision making about community-based 
management are open to all those who which to participate. 
I do not feel I was excluded from decision making about 
community-based forest management. 
Participation 
I was given an opportunity to participate in decision making for 
community-based forest management. 
Stakeholders trust decision makers when it comes to community-
based forest management. 
Decision makers are accountable to stakeholders in community-
based forest management. 
Accountability 
Participants in community-based forest management are able to 
hold decision makers accountable for their decisions. 
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Table 6.3 (Continued) 
 
Variable Question 
I have access to information I need about community-based forest 
management. 
Information about community-based forest management is 
communicated to those who need it. 
Transparency 
Information about community-based forest management is 
available. 
Use of forest resources is monitored. 
People's behavior in the forest is not monitored. 
Monitoring 
There are people who go out an monitor forest use. 
Rules are impartially enforced. 
People who break the rules associated with community-based 
forest management are pursued. 
Enforcement 
When people break the rules about forest use, they pay a price. 
I feel the costs associated with community-based forest 
management are distributed equitably. 
I feel the benefits associated with community-based forest 
management are distributed equitably. 
Equity 
The distribution of costs and benefits associated with community-
based forest management is as it should be. 
Services regarding forest use are available. 
Services regarding forest use are timely. 
Responsive-
ness 
Services regarding forest use are adequate. 
In community-based forest management, the community has the 
authority to create rules. 
Decision-making authority is transferred from the government to 
the community in community-based forest management. 
Transfer of 
Authority 
 
The government has passed decision-making power to the 
community in community-based forest management. 
 
After these reliability tests were conducted, problem items were revised and 
the enumerators were re-trained with the revised survey instrument.  A second 
instrument test was then conducted with a total of 20 respondents.  Inter-rater and 
inter-item reliability tests were conducted for a second time.  The second pretest 
showed no significant inter-rater differences, nor did it show any significant 
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differences regarding inter-item reliability (all items has alpha values greater than 0.6 
(Hair et al. 1998)). 
 
Survey Implementation 
The final survey was implemented from June – November 2006.  A total of 
621 individuals were surveyed by the two enumerators.  This sample was purposeful 
with regard to the sites chosen for each sample stratum, and systematic with regard to 
the individuals chosen within each site (Salant and Dillman 1994) (Tables 6.4 and 
6.5). 
 
Tables 6.4  Sample for the study broken down by respondents. 
 National Level Local Level Total Sample 
Community members NA 600 6003 
Government employees 0 11 114 
NGO staff 2 8 105 
TOTAL 2 619 621 
 
Table 6.5  Sample for the study broken down by forest type. 
 Frequency Percent
Natural humid forest 209 33.7
Natural dry forest 210 33.8
Tapia forest 202 32.5
TOTAL 621 100
 
Analysis 
 Frequencies were generated for the demographic variables to understand the 
details of the sample respondents.  Chronbach’s alpha was calculated to ensure 
internal consistency among survey items measuring each construct (Hair et al. 1998).  
                                                 
3 50 individuals x 12 communities = 600 
4 At the local level, 9 individuals from the Ministry and 2 individuals who work for the Mayor’s office. 
5 At the national level, 2 NGO staff directly responsible for CBFM in the sample communities.  At the 
local level, 8 NGO staff total. 
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I then created scored variables using means of the three survey items to create a single 
composite variable for each construct.   
Research Question 1. What are the governance outcomes of community-based forest 
management?  I generated mean responses for each construct to understand the 
governance outcomes of CBFM.  These scores enabled me to assess respondents’ 
ratings for an overall good governance variable, as well as for each of the principles of 
good governance.  Initially, I considered responses from community members separate 
from those of government employees and NGO staff from all forest types combined.  
This allowed me to compare responses from community members to those of 
government employees and NGO staff.  Despite the small number of government and 
NGO responses, this comparison is appropriate because a census of government and 
NGO personnel for the study sites was taken.  Subsequently, I generated means for 
each construct from community respondents by forest type to understand differences 
that might exist.  
 For both analyses I used ANOVA tests with Bonferroni’s post hoc multiple 
comparison to compare means and detect differences among groups.  Bonferroni’s 
comparison uses t tests to perform pairwise comparisons between group means, but 
controls overall error rate by setting the error rate for each test to the experimentwise 
error rate divided by the total number of tests. Hence, the observed significance level 
is adjusted for the fact that multiple comparisons are being made. 
Research Question 2. What are the relationships among the eleven governance 
principles in the context of CBFM?  To explore the relationships among governance 
constructs, I used principal components analysis (Hatcher and Stepanski 1994) to 
determine if constructs could be simplified into component groups.  The procedure is 
appropriate when a researcher wishes to reduce measures on a number of constructs 
into fewer, artificial variables that may then be used as criterion variables in 
subsequent investigations (Hatcher and Stepanski 1994).   
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To determine sampling adequacy based on correlation and partial correlation, 
as well as to assess if data factored well, I used the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
statistic.  I used the Kaiser criterion (Kaiser 1960) and dropped all factor groups with 
eigenvalues <1, and conducted a scree test (Cattell 1966) to verify dropping factor 
groups.  I employed the varimax rotation method to maximize variance, but then relied 
on normalized values to ease interpretability.  Constructs were assigned to a factor 
group based on the group in which they loaded highest, provided they loaded over 0.4 
(Hatcher and Stepanski 1994).   
Research Question 3. To what extent do the eleven governance principles explain or 
account for good governance?  To understand the relationship between the 
governance constructs and respondents’ perception of governance, I conducted 
regression analysis.  I regressed the overall good governance indicator on the 11 
governance principles and used a backward linear regression procedure to develop the 
good governance model.  The backward procedure is a variable selection process in 
which all variables are entered into the equation and then sequentially removed.  The 
variable with the smallest partial correlation with the good governance variable was 
removed first.  The variable remaining in the equation with the smallest partial 
correlation is removed next.  The procedure stops when all variables are significant.   
 
Results 
Of the 621 individuals sampled, 73.8% were male and 26.2% were female.  
94.5% had not completed primary school, and 97.4% stated that the main objective of 
the CBFM contract they were associated with was conservation (as opposed to 
sustainable use).  A total of 76.3 % of respondents included “conserving forests for 
future generations” and “deriving economic benefits from forest use” as benefits they 
currently feel they are receiving from CBFM contracts.  Yet, 65.6% of respondents 
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indicated that conducting forest patrols and suffering restrictions on forest use are the 
costs they bear in association with CBFM contracts.   
A total of five knowledge-related items were included in the survey.  These 
items measured respondents’ general knowledge of the CBFM mechanism in 
Madagascar.  Of note is that 67% of community respondents wrongly believe that the 
community gains title to the land under CBFM (Table 6.6). 
Research Question 1. What are the governance outcomes of community-based forest 
management?   
 Overall, respondents felt that CBFM contracts perform well in terms of 
governance, as indicated by the mean values of 1.11, 1.64, and 1.20 from community 
members, government employees, and NGO staff, respectively (Table 6.7).  ANOVA 
test for differences indicates that government employees may be less satisfied with the 
overall governance outcome of CBFM contracts in the study sites than community 
members and NGO staff.   
On eight of the eleven governance principles (i.e., Goal, Structures, 
Accountability, Transparency, Monitoring, Enforcement, Equity, and Transfer of 
Authority), government employee and NGO staff responses were not different and 
were significantly higher than community members’ responses.  This suggests that 
government employees and NGO staff are less satisfied with the performance of 
CBFM contracts in the study sites on these eight principles of good governance.   
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Table 6.6  Responses to items related to general knowledge of community-based 
forest management contracts in Madagascar.
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Table 6.7  ANOVA test for differences among respondents on governance variables. 
 Respondents  
Variablesa 
Community 
members 
(n=600) 
Government 
employees 
(n=11) 
NGO 
staff 
(n=10) 
Test 
Statistics 
Good Governance    
Meanb 1.11a 1.64b 1.20a F=13.087 
Std. Error 0.013 0.310 0.133 p<.001 
Goal     
Mean 1.17a 2.91b 2.60b F=10.258 
Std. Error 0.043 0.251 0.371 p<.001 
Structures     
Mean 1.14a 1.82b 1.80b F=33.000 
Std. Error 0.014 0.226 0.291 p<.001 
Rules     
Mean 1.19a 1.73bc 1.30ac F=6.455 
Std. Error 0.020 0.237 0.213 p<.01 
Participation     
Mean 1.51a 2.36bc 1.70ac F=3.286 
Std. Error 0.046 0.338 0.335 p<.05 
Accountability     
Mean 1.31a 2.45b 2.10b F=20.576 
Std. Error 0.028 0.247 0.277 p<.001 
Transparency     
Mean 1.10a 1.91b 2.10b F=62.649 
Std. Error 0.013 0.285 0.407 p<.001 
Monitoring     
Mean 1.35a 2.73b 2.10b F=28.873 
Std. Error 0.026 0.384 0.348 p<.001 
Enforcement     
Mean 1.16a 2.00b 2.10b F=39.311 
Std. Error 0.017 0.330 0.348 p<.001 
Equity     
Mean 1.50a 2.73b 2.70b F=19.197 
Std. Error 0.036 0.407 0.260 p<.001 
Responsiveness     
Mean 1.15a 3.00b 2.50c F=133.462 
Std. Error 0.016 0.405 0.401 p<.001 
Transfer of Authority    
Mean 1.25a 2.73b 2.60b F=58.351 
Std. Error 0.023 0.333 0.400 p<.001 
                                                 
a Scale: 1-5, where 1= “strongly agree”, 2= “slightly agree”, 3= “neutral/don’t know”, 4= “slightly 
disagree”, 5= “strongly disagree.” 
b Means with the same letters are not different, Bonferroni’s post-hoc comparison (p<.05) 
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Government employees seem to be least satisfied with CBFM contracts in the 
study sites, as indicated by the high scores they gave to nine of the eleven principles of 
good governance (Goal=2.91, Structures=1.82, Rules=1.73, Participation=2.36, 
Accountability=2.45, Monitoring=2.73, Equity=2.73, Responsiveness=3.00, Transfer 
of Authority=2.73) and the overall good governance measure (mean=1.64).  The 
variances around these means were quite high (low std. error=0.226, high std. 
error=0.407), suggesting that respondents are not necessarily in agreement on these 
points. 
In general, community member respondents were fairly satisfied with the 
governance outcomes of the CBFM contracts across forest types (low score=1.01, 
high score=2.49).  Respondents in the natural humid forest were less satisfied with the 
performance of CBFM (mean good governance=1.28) than in the other two forest 
types (mean good governance natural dry forest=1.04, mean good governance Tapia 
forest=1.01) (Table 6.8).  Mean scores for every governance variable were 
significantly higher (p<.001), indicating less satisfaction.  Responses from community 
members in the natural dry forest and the Tapia forest were neither different on the 
overall Good Governance variable, nor on ten of the eleven principles of good 
governance variables.    
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Table 6.8  ANOVA test for differences among community responses by forest type. 
 Forest Type  
Variablesa 
Natural 
humid forest 
(n=201) 
Natural 
dry forest 
(n=200) 
Tapia 
forest 
(n=100) Test Statistics 
Good Governance    
Meanb 1.28a 1.04b 1.01b F=53.336 
Std. Error 0.032 0.014 0.007 p<.001 
Goal     
Mean 2.29a 1.25b 1.57c F=60.828 
Std. Error 0.082 0.038 0.077 p<.001 
Structures     
Mean 1.37a 1.02b 1.02b F=90.280 
Std. Error 0.035 0.010 0.009 p<.001 
Rules     
Mean 1.56a 1.01b 1.00b F=124.576 
Std. Error 0.049 0.007 0.000 p<.001 
Participation     
Mean 2.49a 1.00b 1.02b F=190.799 
Std. Error 0.106 0.000 0.015 p<.001 
Accountability     
Mean 1.90a 1.01b 1.02b F=169.315 
Std. Error 0.065 0.007 0.016 p<.001 
Transparency     
Mean 1.30a 1.01b 1.01b F=74.586 
Std. Error 0.033 0.005 0.005 p<.001 
Monitoring     
Mean 1.57a 1.20b 1.28b F=19.801 
Std. Error 0.050 0.045 0.036 p<.001 
Enforcement     
Mean 1.45a 1.01b 1.01b F=98.298 
Std. Error 0.043 0.005 0.007 p<.001 
Equity     
Mean 2.02a 1.31b 1.15b F=69.487 
Std. Error 0.070 0.061 0.028 p<.001 
Responsiveness     
Mean 1.35a 1.04b 1.05b F=45.418 
Std. Error 0.039 0.016 0.016 p<.001 
Transfer of Authority    
Mean 1.65a 1.07b 1.03b F=103.149 
Std. Error 0.050 0.029 0.014 p<.001 
                                                 
a Scale: 1-5, where 1= “strongly agree”, 2= “slightly agree”, 3= “neutral/don’t know”, 4= “slightly 
disagree”, 5= “strongly disagree.” 
b Means with the same letters are not different, Bonferroni’s post-hoc comparison (p<.05) 
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CBFM contracts in the natural humid forest performed best (i.e., had the 
lowest score indicating respondents satisfaction) on Transparency (mean=1.30) and 
worst (highest score indicating respondents dissatisfaction) on Participation 
(mean=2.49).  Contracts in the natural dry forest performed best on Participation 
(mean=1.00) and worst on Equity (mean=1.31), and contracts in the Tapia forest 
performed best on Rules (mean=1.00) and worst on Goal (mean=1.57).  Across forest 
types, CBFM contracts were least well performing with regards to having a clear goal 
and ensuring equitable distribution of costs and benefits.  There was less agreement on 
the issue of participation; those in the natural humid forest indicated that CBFM does 
not perform well with regard to the participation variable whereas those in the dry and 
Tapia forests were less satisfied with regard to the forest monitoring aspects. 
Research Question 2. What are the relationships among the eleven governance 
principles in the context of CBFM?   
 Principal components analysis (PCA) resulted in two components (Figure 6.1).  
Component 1, explained 49.79% of the variance while Component 2 explained 
25.87% of the variance.  Constructs were assigned to a component based on the group 
in which they loaded highest, provided they loaded over 0.4 (Dunteman 1989).  The 
first component was composed of all the governance principles except Goal, and the 
second component included only Goal.  The fact that all but one variable loaded on to 
a single component suggests that PCA may not be appropriate in this case.  A Pearson 
correlation matrix indicates that all eleven principles of good governance variables 
have a moderately strong positive relationship to one another (Table 6.9).  These 
outcomes imply that all good governance variables are somewhat related to one 
another, but that they do not group into meaningful groupings. 
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Figure 6.1 Two principal components associated with principles of good governance 
of decentralized hybrid institutional arrangement for forest management.  The first 
component is made up of ten constructs while the second component only includes 
Goal. 
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Research Question 3. To what extent do the eleven governance principles explain or 
account for good governance?   
 To understand the relationship between the principles of good governance and 
good governance itself, I conducted regression analysis.  The analytical objective in 
conducting this regression was to test the theory that good governance is made up of 
the eleven governance principles.  That is, to test the extent to which the eleven 
governance principles explain good governance.  Given the results of the PCA, I 
conducted the regression using the original eleven good governance principles rather 
than using the two components. 
 
Tables 6.10a and 6.10b  Results of regression analysis (Predictors: Goal, Structures, 
Rules, Participation, Accountability, Transparency, Monitoring, Enforcement, Equity, 
Responsiveness, and Transfer of Authority) 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 29.152 11 2.650 51.317 p<.001 
Residual 30.366 588 0.052   
Total 59.518 599    
 
Predictor t Sig. 
(Constant) 6.899 .000 
Goal 0.503 .615 
Structures 1.009 .313 
Rules 0.219 .827 
Participation 0.135 .892 
Accountability 2.654 .008 
Transparency 4.024 .000 
Monitoring 2.750 .006 
Enforcement 1.886 .060 
Equity 2.399 .017 
Responsiveness 2.683 .008 
Transfer of Authority 1.026 .305 
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Regressing all principles of good governance variables on Good Governance 
was significant and explained 48.0% (Adjusted R2) of the variance in Good 
Governance (Tables 6.10a and 6.10b).  Only five of the eleven principles of good 
governance had significant coefficients at the 0.05 level (i.e., Accountability 
(t=2.654), Transparency (t=4.024), Monitoring (t=2.750), Equity (2.399), and 
Responsiveness (t=2.683)).   
Using a backward linear regression procedure that removed variables one-by-
one, a good governance model was developed after six iterations of regression.  The 
good governance model explains 48.2% (Adjusted R2) of the variance in Good 
Governance and includes predictors Accountability, Transparency, Monitoring, 
Enforcement, Equity, and Responsiveness.  All parameter estimates were positive, 
indicating that each of these indicators has a significant independent correlation with 
perceptions of good governance (Tables 6.11a and 6.11b). 
 
Tables 6.11a and 6.11b  Results of regression analysis (Predictors: Accountability, 
Transparency, Monitoring, Enforcement, Equity, and Responsiveness) 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 28.969 6 4.828 93.723 p<.001 
Residual 30.549 593 0.052   
Total 59.518 599    
 
Predictor t Sig. 
(Constant) 10.308 0.000 
Accountability 5.709 0.000 
Transparency 4.399 0.000 
Monitoring 3.068 0.002 
Enforcement 2.243 0.025 
Equity 2.881 0.004 
Responsiveness 2.887 0.004 
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Discussion 
The results presented here support the idea that decentralized hybrid 
institutional arrangements that bring the state and communities together to manage 
forest resources may result in good governance.  The majority of respondents agreed 
that the CBFM contracts with which they are associated are well governed in general.  
The aggregate of community members rated CBFM contracts as better governed than 
did government employees and NGO staff.  Although these results can not be 
extrapolated to all CBFM contracts in Madagascar, they are representative of the study 
sites because a census of government employees and NGO staff involved in these 
CBFM contracts was taken.  That community members consistently rated CBFM 
contracts as more satisfactory than government employees and NGO staff in terms of 
governance performance may be an indication that their expectations are lower.  This 
may also be an artifact of the research methodology itself, which may not be 
completely appropriate for traditional Malagasy culture and may therefore not 
elucidate accurate responses from community members, who are generally more 
deeply rooted in traditional practices and ways of knowing than government 
employees and NGO staff.  Anthropologists who study Malagasy culture have noted 
that Malagasy tend to avoid conflict (Dahl 1999), which may suggest that community 
members responded “strongly agree” or “slightly agree” because they thought these 
were the “correct” responses (social desirability bias).  Moreover, Malagasy tend to 
have a high degree of respect for authority (Dahl 1999), which may have influenced 
community members’ willingness or ability to suggest that a government-sponsored 
program such as CBFM is not performing well.  These results are consistent with 
those presented in Chapter 5 insofar as government employees expressed the least 
satisfaction regarding the performance of the CBFM contracts. 
Analysis of community members’ responses in each forest type shows a 
significant difference between responses from humid forest dwellers and others on 
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eleven parameters (Good Governance and all governance principles except Goal).  
This suggests that those in the humid forest are less satisfied with CBFM than those in 
the other two forests types, perhaps indicating that the social desirability bias may not 
be a factor.  That community members in the humid forest indicated a lower level of 
satisfaction implies their comfort and ability in expressing a somewhat negative 
perspective.  The extent of the social desirability bias in the results presented here 
could be explored further with a comparison of responses by all three types of actors 
in each of the three forest types.  The small sample of government employees and 
NGO staff, and subsequent amount of data, do not permit this analysis.   
Humid forest dwellers’ responses differ from those in the dry and Tapia forest, 
indicating that the ecological, social, historical, and political context affects how 
people perceive the governance outcome of this CBFM mechanism.  For instance, the 
contracts located in the humid forest were supported by a USAID-funded NGO from 
1999 to 2003, when the USAID funding ended and the project stopped.  USAID 
funding resumed in 2004, after a hiatus of approximately one year.  This gap in NGO 
support for the implementation of CBFM may have affected community perceptions 
of governance outcomes.  In addition, the humid forest is of particular interest for 
biodiversity conservation due to the high density of unique and threatened species that 
occur in that environment.  Community members may associate the interest in 
conservation of these species with restrictions on forest resource access and use.  This 
may also contribute to their perceptions of CBFM governance outcomes.  The 
contextual specifics are of importance for interpreting and understanding survey 
results. 
Of interest is that the mean scores for Good Governance and each of the 
governance principles for each of the three types of actors were all below 3.00.  This 
indicates that, on average, no group responded “slightly disagree” or “strongly 
disagree” to the statements put to them.  Respondents indicated they agreed to some 
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extent, did not know, or were neutral.  These affirmative responses may indicate if the 
social desirability bias exists it applies equally to all three types of respondents, 
validating the results of this study.  
 Of the eleven principles of good governance included in this study, Goal, 
Participation, Equity, and to some extent Monitoring stand out.  According to 
community respondents, CBFM contracts do not perform as well on these items as 
they do on the other six.  This result is interesting because of the 19 references 
consulted that identify principles of good governance, 11 identify these four principles 
as important for governance (Evans 1996; Lam 1996; Antona et al. 2004; UNDP 
1997; Baiocchi 2003; Graham, Amos, and Plumptree 2003; Johnson and Nelson 2004; 
Ostrom 1990; Barrett, Lee, and McPeak 2005; Menzies 2004; Agrawal and Gupta 
2005).  The results here do not necessarily imply that the theory is flawed.  Regression 
results confirm that Accountability, Transparency, Monitoring, Enforcement, Equity, 
and Responsiveness account for the variation in Good Governance.  Rather, designing 
and implementing CBFM contracts that have a clear goal, promote participation, 
ensure equitable distribution of costs and benefits, and are well monitored is very 
difficult to do.  Implementing these components is challenging and requires specific 
attention to be successful. 
 The eleven principles of good governance explored did not group into 
meaningful components.  The items are all correlated, however, suggesting that they 
are not completely discrete.  Implementing hybrid CBFM arrangements with an eye 
toward good governance may not be a matter of setting up systems or process for each 
one of the good governance principles independently in a checklist fashion.  Rather, it 
may better be viewed as a dynamic social process that is constantly in flux and that 
may evolve over time as the actors and/or context change.  
 Findings indicated that only some of the good governance principles account 
for much of the variation in good governance in general.  Although statistically 
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significant, the meaning of this finding is difficult to ascertain.  For instance, 
participation is seemingly an important aspect of good governance, especially in a 
decentralized context.  Yet, the good governance model does not include participation 
as a predictor of good governance.  Further research is needed to understand why this 
may be, but perhaps some of the other elements of good governance included in the 
model are capturing the essence of participation and of the other good governance 
elements that dropped out. 
 Responses to the five knowledge items provide additional insight into how 
results might be interpreted.  The vast majority, if not all, government employee and 
NGO staff respondents responded to the knowledge items correctly, signifying that 
they understand the CBFM mechanism as it is implemented in Madagascar.  
Community responses were more varied.  For all knowledge items, community 
respondents opted to answer “true” or “don’t know” rather than answer “false.”  Of 
particular note is the fact that the majority of community respondents indicated that 
communities become owners of the land under CBFM, which is not true.  This implies 
that communities are simply misinformed of the outcome of CBFM regarding land 
tenure and that additional communication and information efforts are needed.   
 
Conclusion 
 Although the results presented here are by no means definitive, they do provide 
a basis from which to draw certain conclusions, define orientations for future research, 
and provide recommendations to managers and policymakers, assuming that results 
reflect respondents’ real perceptions related to governance.  If, as some 
anthropological research suggests, the method used to collect data was inappropriate 
for the context and therefore did not garner accurate information, then the results 
should not be used to inform policy or practice.  Further research that focuses on the 
relevance of Likert scales to contexts such as rural Madagascar is needed.    
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I submit that the results presented here are trustworthy for the context in which 
the data were collected because of the robust and deliberate way in which the inquiry 
was undertaken.  Findings suggest that CBFM is performing well in Madagascar.  
Government employees are least satisfied with CBFM governance outcomes, which is 
consistent with qualitative findings described in Chapter 5.  Humid forest dwellers are 
least satisfied with CBFM governance outcomes, which is accounted for by the 
contextual, as well as physical, aspects of the CBFM contracts at those sites.  Yet, 
these results are strictly limited to the institutional aspects of governance and have 
offered no insight related to forest-level outcomes the CBFM provides.  Questions 
regarding the sustainability of management regimes under CBFM remain. 
 A deeper exploration of the principles of good governance and their 
relationship to the overall governance regime is needed to inform specific strategies 
for CBFM design and implementation.  That CBFM seems to perform better with 
respect to some principles than others is of interest, but further inquiry is needed 
regarding the causes of these differences and their relationships to the design and/or 
implementation of CBFM in various contexts.    
Policymakers and CBFM managers alike may find utility in these results 
insofar as they provide insight into the technical specifics of developing institutional 
hybrids.  Although results are preliminary, these findings suggest that policymakers 
may need to develop flexible mechanisms that can be adapted to various natural 
contexts, and that managers need to be innovative in their application of the policy on 
the ground.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Institutional synergy combats the divide between the state and civil society, 
where the state refers to government and civil society refers to the “public sphere of 
collective action between the family and the state…” (Bratton 1994:75).  The concept 
of synergy rests on the idea that “the existence of the state and the rules it establishes 
and enforces can strengthen and increase the efficiency of [local organizations and 
institutions, which in turn] give rise to collective action increasing the power of the 
state” (Nugent 1993:629).  Properties of civil society and government mutually 
reinforce one another resulting in a new, emergent form.   
 Institutional synergy is a mechanism by which decentralization of power can 
occur.  Decentralization has been defined in various ways depending on the type of 
powers being decentralized and the recipient of those powers.  However, 
decentralization in its broadest sense refers to “the transfer of power from the central 
government to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and 
territorial hierarchy” (Larson and Ribot 2004:3).  Two common forms of 
decentralization are deconcentration and democratic decentralization.  
Deconcentration occurs when the central state redistributes authority to its own 
representatives at lower levels of government (Oyono 2004).  Democratic 
decentralization is a stronger form of decentralization than deconcentration insofar as 
it involves local people in decision making by creating and empowering representative 
local entities.  Democratic decentralization aims to transfer power to local entities that 
are representative of and accountable to local populations (Oyono 2004; Larson and 
Ribot 2004).   
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 In natural resource conservation, democratic decentralization has often meant 
some form of power transfer from the state to the local resource user community (e.g., 
Xu and Ribot 2004; Edmonds 2002; Oyono 2004; Wiggins, Marfo, and Anchirinah 
2004).  However, power transfer is not absolute, resulting in shared responsibility 
between the state and the community.  Although specific rules for who will be 
responsible for what change with each situation depending on the resource in question, 
the degree of decentralization, and user needs, the state–civil society link is an 
important component of democratic decentralization.    
A partnership between the state and civil society may provide benefits beyond 
state-based or rules-based governance alone, but confounding factors exist that may 
complicate the state–civil society linkage.  Agrawal and Gibson caution scholars and 
practitioners alike not to lose sight of the real-world contextual complexities:  “We 
must recognize that state officials and community representatives are located within 
asymmetric organizational structures.  They enjoy access to very different levels of 
resources and power” (1999:639).  Similarly, Ribot asserts that it is not enough to join 
the state to community or to transfer power from the state to the community.  The 
mechanisms by which transfer of power occurs, and the institutional forms that are 
created for such purposes are of importance:  “Transferring power without accountable 
representation is dangerous.  Establishing accountable representation without powers 
is empty” (2002:2).  Striking a balance between the state and civil society can be 
difficult precisely because of these issues of inequality, representation, and 
accountability.  
 In addition, the conceptual category of “civil society” is not homogenous in 
real-world situations.  Depending on the place, time, and sector, civil society could be 
represented by any number of groups, including non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) or community groups (Uphoff 1993).  In the case of natural resource 
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management and conservation, international organizations often act as initiators or 
interventionists to bridge the state and civil society (Hockley and Andriamarovololona 
2007).  These conservation NGOs fill a void left by a defunct state and often engage in 
service provision much as the state would (Mohan 2002).  They may provide technical 
expertise regarding natural resource conservation, and they also may be better able to 
engage local communities than a centralized or bureaucratic state (Bratton 1990).  
However, NGOs do not necessarily represent the interests of either the state or the 
community.  They are accountable to the state insofar as their activities are state-
sanctioned, but they are also accountable to their funding sources.  Several studies 
have shown that donors tend to have great influence over the policies of the NGOs 
they support (e.g., Fowler 1998; Nyamugasira 1998).  Thus understood NGOs often 
function as the state in terms of service provision, but they represent and advance their 
own (and donors’) interests when advocating and implementing policies.   
Local community groups also fall into the conceptual category of civil society.  
However, they differ from NGOs in their inability to maneuver across vast social, 
political, and geographic spaces.  Whereas NGOs often have access to resources, 
people, and political power at various scales due to their ties to multi-lateral donors, 
central governments, local governments, and local elites, community groups are often 
bound more narrowly.  Community groups can be understood as “constituted by 
economic, social, cultural, and political relations and flows of commodities, 
information and people that extend far beyond a given locality” (Mohan 2002:134).  
However, those relations and flows are often subject to more restrictive social 
boundaries than those of many NGOs.   
The research presented in this dissertation explored the implementation of a 
democratic decentralization policy of forest management responsibilities in 
Madagascar that involves state, NGO, and community actors. 
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Review of Research 
 Building on criticisms about the lack of a coherent understanding of how 
power operates in the context of community-based forest management (CBFM), a 
realist view of power was proposed as a useful framework through which to 
understand decentralized power in Chapter 2.  This view contends that power is the 
socially-structured capacity to act, and understanding it as such may provide insights 
as to how to democratize practice.  Although not a prescription for how to act, the 
realist view suggests that by understanding how structure and agency exist in a state of 
constant dynamism, practitioners may be able to maneuver within structured power 
relations to positively affect power asymmetries. 
 Decentralization of forest management is not only about how individuals act 
within structured power relations, but it is also about transforming institutional 
relationships.  Linkages among the state, NGOs, and community groups are created, 
adapted, and modified to adhere to new policies.  Governing within these new 
institutional structures and relationships is a challenge, and may result in increased 
marginalization of some groups.  In Chapter 3, I defined good governance in these 
contexts as being comprised of 11 elements:  clear resource governance goal, coherent 
institutional structure, clear rules, participation, accountability, transparency, 
monitoring, enforcement, equity, responsiveness, and transfer of authority.  To ensure 
that CBFM is effective in terms of its social equity mandate (Pagdee, Kim, and 
Daugherty 2006), it must perform well with regards to these good governance 
elements, as perceived by those who participate in it.   
 To gather empirical evidence related to decentralized governance of forests, I 
chose the case of community-based forest management in Madagascar.  Chapter 4 
describes the history of forest management in Madagascar, which provides a context 
in which to interpret results.  The evolution of forest policy in Madagascar is 
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consistent in terms of external or central decision-making.  Throughout recent history, 
Malagasy forests have been managed, used, or conserved on the basis of decisions and 
policies that were created either at the central level (e.g., during pre-colonial times and 
during early independence), or by external actors (e.g., during colonial times by the 
French and more recently by donor agencies).  Interestingly, even the move toward 
local “empowerment” for forest management was initiated by external/central actors, 
rather than emerging from a local or grassroots demand.   
 An initial step in assessing the relationship among state employees, NGO staff 
and community members in CBFM in Madagascar involved understanding each 
actor’s interests vis-à-vis the forest and this forest management mechanism.  To do so, 
I used a framework that divided interests into four categories, those having to do with 
People (health services and products, and education), Nature (the forest itself, and its 
overall state), Wealth (commercialization or income-generating activities), and Power 
(governance-related aspects).  This framework, although imperfect because of its 
technocratic tendency toward reifying the People, Nature, Wealth, and Power 
categories, provided a means for comparing among groups.  The results of this 
exploratory inquiry were that all three groups of actors converged on their 
dissatisfaction with the Wealth (economic aspects) and Power (governance aspects) 
performance of CBFM, as described in Chapter 5.  Results also indicated that of the 
three classes of actors, government employees were least satisified with the 
responsiveness of CBFM to their interests.   
This study did not focus specifically on the economics of CBFM in 
Madagascar.  Yet, the results presented in Chapter 5, as well as those presented in 
Chapter 6 related to communities’ expectation for deriving economic benefits from 
forest use, confirm other work that has identified the problems with the economic 
incentives of CBFM (Hockley and Andriamarovololona 2007).  As noted by Hockley 
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and Andriamarovololona (2007:v), “By providing insufficient support to 
[communities], and pretending indifference to the wider benefits of their management, 
external stakeholders have tried to extract a ‘free lunch’ from communities; securing 
forest conservation at minimum cost.”  How the lack of tangible economic incentives 
for community participation in CBFM affects perceptions of governance outcomes or 
relationships among community members and government employees or NGO staff 
remains unclear.  Additional work is needed to understand the complex 
interconnectedness among the economic incentive structure of CBFM, its governance 
structure, and the power dynamics that are produced and reproduced within these 
structures. 
Chapter 6 relates the results of further exploration of governance outcomes of 
CBFM.  These results were generated through a quantitative survey of participants in 
CBFM in three different forest areas: natural humid forest, natural dry forest, and 
Tapia forest.  A quantitative method was chosen for two purposes.  First, quantitative 
methods can generate results from information gathered from many respondents.  
They allowed me to obtain a broad picture of many participants’ experiences with 
CBFM.  Second, quantitative methods and results hold a privileged place in our 
society, including within the academic and professional worlds.  I made a deliberate 
choice to include these methods so that I would have the experience of using them, but 
also so that I would be able to communicate some portion of my results with people 
who may be more interested by quantitative than by qualitative results.  This was a 
politically-motivated decision, as well as an academically-driven one.   
When taken together, the results presented in Chapters 5 and 6 offer some 
interesting insights that go beyond what is described in each chapter individually.  In 
individual conversations and small group discussions, all three groups of respondents 
to qualitative questions regarding CBFM indicated their dissatisfaction with its 
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governance outcomes.  When rating standardized statements regarding governance 
using a Likert scale, respondents in all three groups indicated that they are fairly 
satisfied with governance outcomes of CBFM.  That is, they strongly agreed or agreed 
that CBFM was providing good governance outcomes at their sites.  Interpreted 
literally, this finding suggests an inconsistency with the results presented in Chapter 5, 
which indicated that all three respondent groups feel CBFM is not meeting their 
governance–related interests.  Comparing responses among classes of actors gives a 
different view of these results.  In both rounds of data collection (qualitative and 
quantitative) government employees were the least satisfied with governance 
outcomes of CBFM.  Reasons for this may be that government employees understand 
most fully what the ideal governance outcomes of CBFM would be and are thus using 
a different point of reference than are NGO staff or community members.   
Chapters 2 through 6, the core of this dissertation, raise questions regarding 
how to conduct simultaneously research that provides meaningful insights regarding 
individual-level action and behavior within socially-structured power relations, and 
structural-level relationships among classes of actors such as government, NGO, and 
community.  The results of this work provide valuable understanding of the workings 
of CBFM in Madagascar, but they also increase the awareness of the complexity of 
social research.  To understand the relationships among actors and the workings of 
decentralized forest management requires exploring various aspects over a long period 
of time in a given context.  A full grasp of the inner workings of CBFM in 
Madagascar would require more work and more time.  
A higher level of abstraction of the research findings as a whole suggests that 
decentralization of forest management in Madagascar has had a more tangible effect 
on structural-level relationships than on individual-level capacity to act.  Communities 
are now actively implicated in decision-making processes regarding forest 
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management, and there is an effort on the part of government and NGOs to share 
information, responsibilities, and benefits more broadly.  Legally, officially, and 
institutionally, there is an earnest attempt to equalize the historical asymmetry of 
authority between the government and communities regarding forest management.  
Whether the exercise of power by individuals in CBFM arrangements has been 
proportionately affected is less clear.  In some instances individual community 
members seem to have exercised power (e.g., humid forest communities expressing 
some dissatisfaction), yet in other cases community members seem to reproduce pre-
decentralization structured power relations (e.g., defaulting to the affirmative or 
positive response).   Additional research that applies the realist view of power to 
structured power relations among classes of actors in forest management in 
Madagascar would offer more insight into the individual-level effect of institutional-
level decentralization. 
The process of decentralizing community-based forest management is 
premised on empowerment of local communities.  The state’s policy in Madagascar is 
meant to provide new opportunities for local communities to participate in decision-
making and implementation regarding forest management.  Intentions 
notwithstanding, my conclusion regarding the current situation in Madagascar is that 
the decentralization process is actually providing the state with greater potential to 
control than it previously had.  Due to insufficient resources, the state lacks capacity to 
manage forests throughout the country.  Decentralization, the state’s strategy to 
compensate for this, has begun to make clear that which was previously obscure (i.e., 
local-level forest practices including extractive use).  Local forest practices largely 
continue as they did previously, but now the local actors are organized into 
community associations and the rules regarding new standards for forest use are 
articulated.  Rather than resulting in community empowerment, decentralization to 
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date allows the state to know, evaluate, and have the potential to control how forests 
are being used. 
 
Contributions 
The methodological approach used in this inquiry combined interviewing and 
participant observation with a conventional quantitative survey.  This approach was 
meant to extract the benefits of both qualitative methods, which provide in-depth and 
nuanced understanding, and quantitative methods, which allow for large numbers of 
respondents and provide a broad, general picture.  On the surface, qualitative and 
quantitative results were inconsistent (i.e., respondents expressed dissatisfaction in 
qualitative interviews but expressed satisfaction when responding to the survey).  A 
closer look reveals that results from both methods indicate that government employees 
are least satisfied with CBFM governance outcomes.  This has important 
methodological implications for how to interpret Likert scale results.  When 
interpreted literally, all respondents (including government employees) indicated they 
strongly agreed or agreed that CBFM was producing positive governance outcomes. 
When analyzed by stakeholder group, however, government employees indicated less 
satisfaction than the other two groups.  Thus, the interpretation of Likert scale results 
was informed by the qualitative findings.  The Likert ratings of 1 to 5 are not absolute 
values, they are relative scores.  
 In addition, use of both qualitative and quantitative results in this study reflects 
my personal struggle with how I know reality and how I construct knowledge.  Both 
methods assume a social construction of reality, but the quantitative methods suggest a 
single knowable reality that is observable and measurable.  After having completed 
this research endeavor I still believe that reality is socially constructed, but I also 
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believe that it is knowable.  I continue to have confidence in the research tools that 
allow us to observe, investigate, interpret, and conclude. 
From a theoretical perspective, this inquiry has explored blending concepts of 
power and governance to shed light on the dynamics between social structure and 
individual agency.  I adopted a realist view of power that suggests the reified dualism 
between structure and agency is a false dichotomy.  Actions occur within structured 
social relations and power is exercised within socially-structured power relations.  
Understanding how institutional-level changes (which may include legislation, policy, 
and organizational-level partnerships) affect and are affected by individual-level 
action is difficult.  This study represents an attempt to marry the concepts of 
governance and power to overcome this difficulty.  Future research could go much 
further by observing organizational and individual-level changes over time and 
analyzing them within the framework of the realist view.   
The research findings also contributed to a new understanding of power in the 
context of forest management.  Whereas previous studies have been limited to the 
examination of the exercise of power in natural resources conflict situations (e.g., 
social movements resulting from conflicts over resource access), this inquiry provides 
a theoretical foundation for conducting more nuanced analyses of the workings of 
power in these contexts.  The realist view of power not only represents a theoretical 
underpinning for future research on power in natural resource management and 
conservation, it potentially offers a contribution to practice as it sheds light on ways in 
which practitioners might change their behavior to democratize professional practice. 
 Through this research process I have gained insight into the workings of power 
in everyday actions.  Power is exercised continuously by individuals who exist within 
social structures.  This insight has given me the ability to see how power is exercised, 
consciously or unconsciously, and what the effects of this are in a professional setting.  
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In many cases, social inequalities are reproduced.  Yet, the ability to see the workings 
of power does not necessarily lead to a prescription for acting to democratize practice.  
My practice has not yet been substantively affected by the insight I gained from this 
research, but I now understand my practice differently.  Results of this inquiry may 
impact others’ professional practice insofar as it may provide them with similar insight 
into the workings of power. 
 Finally, the results of this research suggest that policy or procedural changes 
may be necessary to enable the state, NGOs and communities to collaborate 
effectively in decentralized forest management in Madagascar.  For instance, results 
indicate that although decentralization has influenced legislation and the institutional-
level partnerships between the state and local communities, it has yet to affect 
individual-level action proportionately.  A long time horizon is needed to ensure that 
the historical legacy of top-down, authoritative forest policy is overcome.  This 
centralized forest management history resulted in specific social-structural relations 
between state actors and forest users that persist today.   
` Individuals are not inherently powerful or powerless.  They exercise power in a 
dynamic and relative manner within historically-contingent social structures.  Thus, I 
conclude that decentralization of forest management in Madagascar does not 
“empower” local communities.  Rather, it begins to open a space in which individuals, 
located in various social positions, can act to transform pre-existing power relations. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
HUMAN SUBJECTS’ CONSENT SCRIPT 
English 
 
Introduction 
 Hello, my name is Daniela Raik and I am a student from Cornell University in 
the United States.  I am doing a research project for my PhD program on contractual 
forest management (GCF) here in the Menabe region.  I lived in Marofandilia for 2 
years as a Peace Corps volunteer back in 1998. 
 
Study Purpose and Methods 
 The purpose of the study is to find out how the GCF approach influences 
conservation and people’s well-being.  I want to know how people have participated in 
the creation of the GCF contracts.  I’m also interested in what has happened to the 
forest and to people’s way of life since the GCF’s have been implemented.  To gather 
this information, I am interviewing different people such as: 
♦ Ministry personnel at the national, regional, and local levels 
♦ NGO personnel at the national, regional, and local levels 
♦ Forest users, landowners, and residents of the region 
I would like to record the interviews and take notes.  Recordings and notes will be in 
my possession only.  No one else will have access to the recordings or the notes.  In 
addition, your name will not be associated with the information you give me.  I 
promise you confidentiality. 
This is the first phase of my research.  After I have completed these initial 
interviews, I will return to the United States.  I plan to come back to the Menabe 
region in 2005 to complete data collection.   
 I hope that the results of this study will be used to improve the way that forest 
management and conservation is planned and implemented in this region.  After the 
study is completed, I will present the results to you. 
 
Risks and Benefits 
 If you decide to participate in this study, there are some risks and benefits that 
you should be aware of.  By participating, you may encounter the following risks: 
♦ Spending your time to participate and not reaping any tangible benefits of 
the study. 
♦ Inadvertantly being asked culturally inappropriate questions related to 
practices or beliefs regarding the forest. 
♦ Being asked potentially uncomfortable questions regarding forest policies, 
regulations, and enforcement practices. 
By participating in this study, you may also experience the following benefits: 
♦ You will contribute to a study that will lead to recommendations for 
improvement in policy and practice of forest conservation in the Menabe 
region. 
♦ You will be provided a vehicle by which to voice your opinions and 
concerns regarding forest management policies and practices. 
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♦ You will have the opportunity to learn about research practices and 
methodologies through conversations with me. 
 
 
Informed Consent 
 Participation in this study is completely voluntary.  If you do not want to 
participate for any reason, you may exclude yourself.  If you decide to participate, but 
do not want to answer some of the questions, you are free to refrain from answering.  
Also, you are free to abort the interview at any time.   
As I mentioned earlier, this interview is completely confidential.  I will not 
associate your name with the information you provide.  Only I will have access to 
your name. 
 
Do you understand what I have told you? 
 
Do you have any questions? 
 
Do you argree to participate in this study? 
 
Do you agree to be recorded? 
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HUMAN SUBJECTS’ CONSENT SCRIPT 
Malagasy 
 
Teny fampidirana 
 Miarahaba anao. Daniela no anarako ary mpianatra avy any amin’ny 
oniversitean’ny Cornell any Etazonia aho.  Manao fikarohana manokana ho an’ny 
diplaoma-ko izay tsy inona fa Doctorat momba ny fitantanana ala eto amin’ny faritry 
Menabe aho.  Efa nipetraka tany Marofandilia nandritry ny roa taona aho tamin’ny 
taona 1998. 
 
Ny anton’ny fikarohana sy ny fomba hanatanterahana an’izany 
 Ny anton’ny fikarohana izay ho ataoko moa dia ny hamantatra ny hoe: ahoana 
ny fiantraikan’ny fomba fiasan’ny GCF amin’ny fitantanana ny ala sy ny fiananan’ny 
mponina andavan’andro.  Tiako ho jerena ihany koa ny hoe: tamin’ny fomba ahoana 
no nahafahan’ny mponina nandray anjara tamin’ny famoronana ny fifanarahana 
momba ny GCF.  Tiako ihany koa ny ahafantatra ny amin’ny hoe inona daholo no efa 
zava-bita na zava-nitranga teo amin’ny ala na koa ny fianan’ny mponina mampiasa na 
manodidina azy hatramin’izay niasan’ny GCF izay.  Mba ahafahako mahazo an’ireo 
information ireo dia tsy maintsy hiresadresaka amin’ireto sokanin’olona manaraka 
ireto aho: 
• Mpiasan’ny ministera eny amin’ny ambaratonga ambony nationaly io, 
ambaratongam-paritra na rezionaly, ary koa ny eny antoerana. 
• Ny mpiasan’ny ONG eny amin’ny ambaratonga nationaly, ambaratongam-
paritra, ary ny eny antoerana. 
• Ny mpampiasa ny ala, ny tompon’ny ala, ary ny mponina  monina eny 
amin’ny faritra manodidina ny ala. 
 
Raha tsy mampaninona dia tiako raha raisina an-tsoratra sy amin’ny alalan’ny vata 
fandraisam-peo ny resaka izay ho atao.  Ny raki-tsoratra sy ny raki-peo dia ho 
tazoniko ho ahy irery fa tsy misy olona hafa afaka ny ahita, ihaino na koa mamaky 
azy.  Ho fanampin’izany, ny anaranao dia tsy ho voatonotonona na aseho miaraka 
amin’ny valin-teny izay homenao ahy.  Afaky ny mampanantena anao aho ny 
amin’izany. 
 Toy izao no mety ho fandehanan’ny fikarohana.  Rehefa avy mahavita an’ity 
fanadiahadihana ity aho dia tsy maintsy miverina any Etazonia.  Mikendy ny hiverina 
aty amin’ny faritry Menabe indray aho amin’ny taona 2005 hamarana ny fanangonana 
ny données izay tsy maintsy hataoko. 
 Antenaiko fa ny vokatr’ity fikarohana ataoko ity dia hanasoa sy hanatsara ny 
fomba fanajariana sy fitantanana ny ala izay efa tanterahina aty amin’ny faritra moa 
amin’izao.  Rehefa vita ny fikaroahana dia ho asehoko anareo ny vokatra. 
 
Ny tomboatsoa sy ny mety ho olana 
 Raha manaiky ny handray anjara amin’ity fanadihadihana ity ianao dia tsara ny 
mampahafantatra anao mialoha fa misy tombotsoa sy ny olana kely mety ho hitanao: 
• Ny fahalanian’ny fotoananao mandray anjara nefa mety tsy dia hisy setriny 
ho azonao firy avy amin’ny vokatry ny fikarohana. 
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• Mety ho hisedra fanontaniana mikasika ny fomba amam-panao na koa 
finoana momba ny ala. 
• Mety iangaviana koa ny hiresaka mikasika ny lalana mifehy ny ala,  ny 
fandaminana misy,  ary koa ny fanarahan-dalana. 
 
Eo ampandraisana anjara amin’ity fikarohana ity, dia mety ahita an’ireto tombotsoa 
manaraka ireto koa anefa ianao: 
• Ny fandraisanao anjara dia ho raisina ho isan’ny soson-kevitra izay 
hoentina hanatsarana mivantana  fomba fintantana sy fiarovanana ny ala 
ary koa ny fanatanterahana an’izany ety amin’ny faritr’i Menabe. 
• Ity no isan’ny fotoana ahafanao manome ny soso-kevitrao momba ny 
politika ankapobeny mikasika ny fitantanana ny ala ary koa ny fomba 
fanatanterahana an’izany. 
• Ho isan’ireo ahazo fampianarana mikasika ny fomba entina manao 
fikarohana ary koa ny metodolojia hanaovana an’izany ianao eo 
ampiresahina miaraka amiko. 
 
Fifanekena ambava 
 Fandraisana anjara amin’ity fikarohana ity dia tsy an-tery.  Raha ohatra ka tsy 
te-handray anjara ianao noho ny antony samihafa dia afaky ny manda tsotra izao.  
Raha ohatra ka vonona kosa ianao ny handray anjara nefa tsy te-hamaly ny 
fanontaniana sasan-tsasany, malalaka tsara ianao ny manao an’izay.  Azonao tanteraka 
ihany koa ny manapitra na manapaka avy hatrany ny fanadihadihana. 
 Araky ny nambara tetsy aloha, ity fanadihadihana ity dia tsiambara telo.  Tsy 
ho voatonotonona mihitsy ny anaranao ary koa tsy ho apetaka miaraka amin’ireo 
valim-panontanianao.  Izaho ihany no mety mahafantatra ny anaranao. 
 
Azonao tsara ve ireo voalazako etsy ambony ireo? 
 
Manana fanontaniana ve ianao? 
 
Manaiky ve ianao ny handray anjara amin’ity fikarohana ity? 
 
Manaiky ve ianao raha ohatra ka ho raisim-peo? 
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HUMAN SUBJECTS’ APPROVALS 
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APPENDIX D 
 
GUIDING QUESTIONS FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS  
English 
 
1. Have you been involved in the GCF process?  In what ways? 
2. Why did you/did you not become involved in GCF? 
3. Can you tell me the story of how the GCF evolved? 
4. Who has been involved?  Who are the actors? 
5. How do these people relate to one another? What are their relationships? 
6. How did you use the forest before GCF? (for what?) 
7. How do you use the forest now? (for what?) 
8. Why is the forest important to you? 
9. Who owns the forest? 
10. Who has rights to the forest?  What rights to they have? 
11. Has GCF given you more or less access to forest resources? 
12. Has the GCF been a positive or negative development for the community?  
Why? 
13. What are the goals of GCF? 
14. Do you own land?  Agricultural/forested land? 
15. How old are you? 
16. Are you married? 
17. Do you have children?  How many? 
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GUIDING QUESTIONS FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
Malagasy 
 
1. Moa ve ainao isan’ny mpandray anjara amin’ny fandehanan’ny GCF?  
Amin’ny fomba ahoana? 
 
2. Raha tsia dia inona no antony tsy nandraisanao anjara? 
 
3. Mba afaka tantarainao ahy kely ve ny momba ny  fananganana ny GCF sy ny 
fandehanany? 
 
4. Iza avy no voakasika mivantana na koa efa nandray anjara? Ary olona tahaky 
ny ahoana ireo mpiasa na mpikambana ao aminy? 
 
5. Inona no fifandraisana na koa fiaraha-miasa misy eo amin’ireo olona voalaza 
etsy ambony ireo?  Misy fifandraisana mivantana ve izy ireo? 
 
6. Ahoana no fomba fampiasanareo na koa fitrandrahanareo ny ala talohan’ny 
nahatongavan’ny GCF? Ho amin’ny inona? 
 
7. Ahoana no fomba fampiasanareo na koa ny fitrandrahanareo ny ala amin’izao? 
 
8. Inona no maha sarobidy ny ala hoy ianao?  Nahoana no ilaina ny ala? 
 
9. Iza no tompon’ny ala? Na koa miandraikitra mivantana ny fitantanana ny ala? 
 
10. Iza no manana zo sy fahefana amin’ny fampiasana ny ala?  Zo ohatry ny 
ahoana no ananan’ilay olona na koa anan’izy ireo? 
 
11. Ohatry ny ahoana ny fahefana na zo omen’ny GCF anareo amin’ny fampiasana 
ny ala?  Malalaka sa kely dia kely? 
 
12. Mba mitondra vokatsoa  eo amin’ny fampandrosoana ny mponina ve ny 
fisian’ny GCF? Sa ny mifanohitra amin’izany? 
 
13. Inona avy ireo tanjon’ny GSF? 
 
14. Manana tany ve ianao? Tanimboly sa tanin-kala? 
 
15. Raha tsy mahadiso, firy taona ianao? 
 
16. Manambady  ve ianao? 
 
17. Efa manan-janaka? 
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PRETEST 1 SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
Malagasy 
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English 
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Malagasy 
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English 
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French 
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Malagasy 
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